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ABSTRACT 
DELIMITATION OF THE OTTOMAN-IRANIAN FRONTIER: TAHIR PASHA 
AND THE OTTOMAN FRONTIER COMMISSION, 1905-1908 
 
Karlıoğlu, Fatih 
MA, Department of History 
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı 
June 2015, 154 pages 
 
The Ottoman-Iranian frontier in the early twentieth century consists of two separate 
categories: (1) the disputed lands, where a status quo was declared between the two 
states, and (2) the undisputed lands, where the Ottoman-Iranian boundary had been 
already shaped. This study concentrates on one of the last Ottoman frontier 
commissions, led by Tahir Pasha between 1907 and 1908, and illustrates the 
historical trajectory that shows how Tahir Pasha, as an experienced Ottoman 
statesman, who lived more than thirty-three years in various eastern frontier 
provinces, was involved in the boundary making process. The study introduces not 
only Tahir Pasha to historical studies, but also it exposes the anatomy of the 
commission that he led, so the study presents insightful data regarding the salaries, 
previous tasks, and tenures of its officials, and conditions under which Ottoman 
commissioners served in a limited financial situation that restricted the activities of 
the Ottoman bureaucratic and military elites. Paradoxically, the expenditures of the 
commission and the cost of keeping alert the additional Ottoman troops in the 
frontier zone deteriorated the situation. Providing this data, this study shows how the 
commission interacted with British, Russian, and Iranian officials diplomatically in a 
period where the Ottoman military began to occupy parts of the contested lands 
between 1905 and 1908, and explains the possible reasons of the invasion by 
cinsidering the international power relations that was strained with the Ottoman 
intervention. Considering the impacts of the international conjecture, the study 
discusses how Ottoman and Iranian governments and commissioners held 
negotiations, what kind of procedures were applied, how negotiations were 
conducted, what the results were, and how all developments led both commissions to 
reach a deadlock regarding the fate of the boundary in 1908. During this process, 
 v 
Tahir Pasha's individual initiatives, research methods, and concluding remarks are 
analyzed by evaluating official reports he sent to Istanbul. 
 
Keywords: Tahir Pasha, disputed lands, frontier commission, frontier delimitation, 
frontier negotiations, military fortifications.  
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ÖZ 
OSMANLI-İRAN SINIRININ BELIRLENMESI: TAHIR PAŞA VE OSMANLI 
SINIR KOMİSYONU, 1905-1908 
 
Karlıoğlu, Fatih 
MA, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Engin Akarlı 
Haziran 2015, 154 sayfa 
 
Osmanlı-İran sınırındaki tartışmalı arazilerin genel olarak iki kısımda şekillendiği 
görülür. İlk kısım Osmanlı ve İran arasında statüko ilan edilen ihtilaflı arazileri 
kapsar. Bu arazilerin hangi ülkeye ait olduğu yirminci yüzyılın ilk on yılında iki ülke 
arasında temel anlaşmazlık unsuru olmuştur. İkincisi ise Osmanlı ve İran arasında 
sorunsuz çözüme kavuşturulma potansiyeline sahip toprakları içerir. Tüm sınırı 
belirlemek ve Beyazıt’tan Süleymaniye’ye kadar olan ilk kısım arazilerin 
oluşturduğu sorunları engellemek için 1907 yılında Tahir Paşa yönetiminde yeni bir 
sınır komisyonu oluşturulur. İhtilaflı bölge içinden geçen sınırı belirlemek 
çalışmaların ağırlık noktasını oluşturması gerekirken, İran’ın toptancı tutumu ve 
buna karşılık Osmanlı’nın Savuçbulak’a kadar olan tüm bölgeyi kendisine ilhak 
etmek istmesi süreci tekrar tıkamıştır. Bu tez tüm bu süreci tekrar ele alırken, aynı 
zamanda Van, Bitlis, Musul, Erzurum ve Trabzon gibi doğu sınır eyaletlerinde 
toplamda 33 yıl görev yapmış bir Osmanlı devlet adamı olan Tahir Paşa’nın sınır 
belirleme işlerine hangi şartlarda katıldığı ve süreci nasıl yönettiği tartışılmaktadır. 
Çalışma hem Tahir Paşa’yı tarih çalışmalarına tanıtırken hem de yine onun 
tarafından yönetilen bir sınır komisyonu anatomisi çıkarmaktadır. Tahir Paşa ve 
komisyon görevlilerinin maaş miktarları, görev süreleri, komisyondan önceki görev 
yerleri, sınır komisyonunda hangi şartlarda ne kadar hizmet ettikleri ile ilgili 
niteliksel ve niceliksel bilgiler verilmiştir. Bunun yanında komisyonun çalışmasını 
engelleyen unsurlara da dikkat çekilmiştir. İklim ve coğrafi zorlukların yanında, 
Osmanlı maliyesinin kötü durumu, komisyonun rahat çalışmasını olumsuz etkileyen 
önemli faktörlerden biridir. Bu sınırlı mali durum bir yandan Osmanlı sınır 
politikalarını ve askeri faalyietlerini kısıtlarken, diğer yandan askeri tahkimatla 
oluşan yeni harcamalar finansal durumu paradoksal olarak daha da kötüleştirmiştir. 
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Sonuç olarak, bu tez, 1905’ten 1908’e kadar oluşan iç ve dış dinamikler 
çerçevesinde, Osmanlı sınır komisyonunun İngiliz, Rus ve İranlı bürokratlar ile nasıl 
bir diplomatik etkileşim içerisinde bulunduğunu anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Birinci 
Dünya Savaşı öncesi Ermeni ve Kürt rekabeti hakkında fikir veren bu çalışma, 
rekabette Osmanlı’nın dengeleyici bir rol üstlenmeye çalıştığını göstermektedir. 
Mevcut çalışma, Osmanlı işgallerinin arkasında yatan nedenleri dönemin bölgesel 
güç ilişkileri çerçevesinde ele alarak, Osmanlı, Rusya ve İngiltere’nin bölge ile ilgili 
pozisyonlarını birincil kaynaklar üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Tüm bu bilgiler 
ışığında, sınır müzakerelerinin hangi şartlarda başladığı, ne çeşit bir yöntem ya da 
müzakere teknikleri uygulandığı, bu müzakerelerin nasıl yönetildiği, ne çeşit 
sonuçlar üretildiği, ve sınır müzakerelerini çıkmaza sokan iddialar ve görüşler ortaya 
konmuştur. Bu aşamada, Tahir Paşa’nın sınırla ilgili bireysel girişimleri, araştırma 
teknikleri ve ulaştığı sonuçlar merkeze gönderdiği kendi raporları üzerinden 
değerlendirilmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tahir Paşa, ihtilaflı araziler, sınır komisyonu, sınır kesimi, sınır 
müzakereleri, askeri tahkimatlar.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
“The history of the world 
is best observed from the 
frontiers.”1 
 
Pierre Vilar 
 
Differing from most of today’s modern nation states, the empires of the past 
had more flexible, penetrable, and porous frontiers. Today, nobody uses the concept 
of frontier to describe the outer limits of a state. Instead, it seems that the concept of 
border / boundary is universally accepted by the states in order to define their limits 
precisely. However, the wide usage of the notion of the border / boundary in the 
present day obstructs the reality that the concept of the frontier is still alive. All the 
modern states experienced distinctively such a complex transitional period from the 
pre-modern frontiers to the modern border / boundary.  
 Extending to Eurasia and across Africa for centuries, the Ottoman Empire 
created a cultural space where many languages were spoken, many religious rituals 
were practiced, and many ethnic groups lived. The frontiers of the Ottoman Empire 
reflected this cosmopolite nature highly. A. C. S. Peacock states that scholars rarely 
examined the Ottoman frontiers compared to that of Rome and China. According to 
Peacock, the Ottoman frontiers were  ‘places both of interaction with the outside 
world through trade and [places] of war and conflict, places where the empire’s 
prestige and authority were both displayed and challenged’.2 The actors who became 
the agents of the state on the frontiers, exercised the imperial rules, but the 
difficulties on the frontier boundaries challenged the full-implementation of this 
authority. These difficulties on the frontiers intensified in the modern era when the 
Ottoman Empire began to suffer under international and internal pressures.  
                                                 
1
 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (California: University 
of California Press, 1989), 1. 
2
 A. C. S Peacock, “Introduction: The Ottoman Empire and Its Frontiers,” in The Frontiers of the 
Ottoman World, by A. C. S Peacock, Proceedings of the British Academy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 1. 
 2 
One the most striking examples of these difficulties occurred on the frontier 
with Iran in the early years of the twentieth century. This border front remained 
stable in terms of its conflicts. Peacock states, “the border with the Safavids [of Iran] 
was ambiguous with numerous tribes of fluctuating loyalties inhabiting the no-man’s 
land between the two empires. However, for the merchants and pilgrims there were 
clearly defined stations which nonetheless marked the transition from one political 
jurisdiction to another in sixteenth- to seventeenth century Iraq.”3 The frontier 
became the stage for Sunni-Shi’i conflicts beginning from the sixteenth century. As 
Kemal H. Karpat explains, the same trend on the frontiers was that religion [Islam] 
affected the relations of Iran and the Ottoman Empire by the late eighteenth and 
throughout the nineteenth century.
4
 In order to settle the conflicts by demarcating the 
boundary, both Iran and the Ottoman Empire formed many boundary commissions 
and produced a significant amount of frontier knowledge.  
Therefore, the aim of this study is to examine to what extent one of these 
boundary commissions, which was formed under Tahir Pasha
5
, shaped the Ottoman-
Iranian relations between 1907 and 1908 in its international context.  Many scholars 
studied the struggle over the delimitation of the eastern frontiers of the Ottoman 
Empire. Nevertheless, these studies are not enough to explain how the imperial 
frontiers turned into imperial borders. Although there are well-written grand stories 
of the boundary, they tend to examine the frontier as a whole over a broad period on 
a macroscopic level. This method brings advantages and disadvantages. This kind of 
study helps the reader understand the general framework of the boundary 
delimitation, and the issues of conflict, but neglects the inner elements of the 
boundary affairs such as the role of frontier actors. To examine the complex set of 
conflicts rooted in the past requires such a broad perspective, but these subjects can 
be studied by choosing a specific theme such as the imperial eastern boundary. Some 
scholars address this gap. Metin Atmaca
6
 and Janet Klein
7’s works are just two 
examples of this new trend. I also suggest a microscopic level of analysis in my 
                                                 
3
 Peacock, “Introduction”, 2. 
4
 Kemal H. Karpat and Robert W. Zens, Ottoman Borderlands: Issues, Personalities and Political 
Changes (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 1. 
5
 See Appendix A. Tahir Pasha’s Career Line in Two Phases.  
6
 Metin Atmaca, “Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier: The Babans 
(1500-1851)” (Ph.D. dissertation, Albert Ludwigs University of Freiburg, 2013). 
7
 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2011). 
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study that focuses on the boundary delimitation and conflicts through the eyes of the 
boundary commissioners themselves and some other frontier actors. I think the 
boundary commissions and their commissioners have their own history. As the key 
political entity, the boundary commission was being formed with hopes to make a 
change in the present state of the boundary. Thus, the period of each commission is a 
period of reactivation, interactions, and reactions, aimed to settle violent disputes, 
and conflicts of the frontiers by delimiting the eastern boundary in a modern sense.  
The present study identifies the subject matter mentioned above by using a 
mixed method of both the macro and micro modes of research, making use of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. In order to show the struggle behind 
the formation of the boundary commission, it adopts financial figures that were 
required for the sake of the boundary delimitation. To be able to understand the 
stance of the Ottoman government regarding its eastern boundary, it relies on the 
qualitative method of analysis interpreting data within their context. Moreover, I give 
particular importance to the chronological order of the events by comparing the 
reports which were written by the British and Ottoman officers. The study makes 
Tahir Pasha, the chief commissioner of the boundary commission, the center of 
analysis because the commission was dominated by his view of the boundary. Thus, 
the present study can also be considered a contribution to biographical works of the 
Ottoman elite because it partly constructs the life of Tahir Pasha through his political 
activities intermixed with thirty-three years of his life on the imperial eastern frontier 
provinces. As a result, it aims to introduce an example of a governor whose long 
tenure
8
 in state affairs enabled him to witness many local disputes, some of which 
are still matters of contestation in today’s Turkey.  
The study seeks answers to various research questions, such as the following. 
To what extent could a frontier actor act independently from the center? Was it 
possible for a frontier actor to act independently? How was the Ottoman 
administration in the eastern peripheries in the late period? How did the Ottomans 
control a marginal area, which was disputed? Why did the Ottomans occupy certain 
disputed lands between 1905 and 1908? How did these occupations affect Ottoman-
Iranian relations? How did Britain and Russia react to these occupations? What was 
the response of the Ottoman Empire to their counter-arguments during the boundary 
                                                 
8
 See Appendix A. Tahir Pasha’s Career Line in Two Phases. 
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negotiations? To what extent did the natural conditions have an impact on the 
boundary delimitation process? Most importantly, how was the relation of the Palace 
and the Porte regarding the Kurdish subjects of the State? How did they co-operate 
and disagree? How were the state-tribe relations? What was the role of religion in 
Abdulhamid’s relations with the Sunni-Kurdish tribes that remained loyal to him? 
What were the arguments of the chief boundary negotiator, Tahir Pasha? What kind 
of approach did he adopt? Did the idea of Islamic unity play a significant role in 
Tahir Pasha’s approach? Thus, can we say that pro-Caliphate polices influenced the 
delimitation of the imperial eastern boundaries in the orient? Did the Ottoman 
government have an effective authority over these groups? Did the tribes have an 
ability to shape the state’s policies? How were the relations of the Kurds with the 
Armenians who were backed by Russia? How did the Kurds view Russia? How did 
the frontier society view and react to the reforms? How was the relation between the 
rulers and the ruled?  
In chapter 1, the recent studies on the imperial eastern boundaries are 
discussed according to the time they cover and the methodology they use. The 
chapter discusses the research methodology of the thesis as well. 
Chapter 2 presents the historical context of Ottoman-Iranian relations relying 
on a periodization according to the reign of Iranian dynasties. The historical 
development of Ottoman-Iranian relations during the Safavids (1502-1736) is 
examined in 3. 1. By leaving out some dynasties such as the Avşars (1736-1747) and 
the Zends (1747-1796), the chapter then focuses on the developments on the frontier 
during the time of the Qajars (1796-1925). Within this period, the years starting from 
1840s emphasized because the states took most of the serious decisions regarding the 
boundary delimitation in those years. Thus, the chapter establishes that the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran covered disputed and undisputed territories. 
Chapter 2 examines the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 based on articles 
included in The Times. These articles reflect the public opinions of Britain, Germany, 
and Russia over the imperial rivalries. Thus, the chapter discusses how the 
convention was the product of Britain’s isolationist policies towards Russia in the 
Iranian Gulf. The convention indicated that both countries, whose interests 
intersected on the peaceful colonization of Iran, respected the integrity of Iran. Thus, 
it aimed to stop the Ottoman occupations and fortifications in / around the disputed 
zone, and the convention consolidated the ideas to form a new boundary commission 
 5 
in 1907 in order to delimitate the disputed zone where the Russians had impediments 
due to the frontier difficulties. 
Chapter 3 examines the effort to form a boundary commission when the 
Ottoman budget had suffered from cash shortages that show how essential cash is to 
political advancement. This chapter introduces the boundary commissioners and 
examines two political unrests in Bitlis and Van in 1907, which became a reason to 
bring Tahir Pasha back to Bitlis and Van from Trabzon. In detail, salaries and travel 
payments of the commissioners, occasional expenditures, and the cost of military 
fortifications are presented as commission-related expenses, which increased the 
budgetary problems of the Ottoman Empire.  
Chapter 4 investigates the actions of the boundary commission in two phases 
based on the reports of Tahir Pasha and other Ottoman frontier actors as well as on 
the reports of the British, Russian and Iranian representatives. The first phase in 
section 4. 1 evaluates the first duty of the commission, which was inquiring the 
charges against the Ottoman troops following a local dispute between the Pro-Iranian 
Nestorians, Muslims and Pro-Ottoman Kurds. The second part in section 4. 2 
illustrates how Tahir Pasha developed a conceptual framework benefiting from the 
imperial edicts, the Porte’s reports, ancient treaties and maps. Section 4. 2. 2. shows 
that Tahir Pasha used a ‘Civilizational Approach’ during the boundary negotiations 
by taking strength from the framework he cultivated and the secret instructions of the 
Palace. The rest of the sections deal with new territories such as Ushni and 
Savuçbulak (Suj Bulak) during Tahir Pasha’s period, and the Ottoman legitimization 
efforts of the occupations through the protectionist policies that can be seen vividly 
in their inter-institutional correspondences.  
A broad range of the terms is introduced in the thesis, such as the frontier 
actors, the frontier difficulties, the status quo, and the status quo line. Some of these 
terms may call for clarification. The frontier actors include all the commissioners, the 
high-ranking military commanders who are responsible to observe the status quo, 
and the governors who served in the frontier provinces. It seems these three groups 
were the main actors in the frontier zone and they shaped the frontier policies. They 
were also the implementers of the civilizational approach in the field. The third term 
is the frontier difficulties. This term is used to define the conflicting nature of the 
disputed lands, and it refers to the inter-tribal conflicts, raids, attacks, plunders, 
lawlessness, feuds, rumors, and the geographical limitations of the lands in the 
 6 
general sense. The Times reporter described these lands as ‘Wild Districts’ due to 
these difficulties. The status quo as a term coincides with the frontier zone that 
included the controversial districts between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. However, 
each state had a different understanding of the status quo. While the Ottoman State 
designated a district to fall in the status quo area, Iran disputed that position. The 
status quo line (istatüsko hattı) corresponds to the last limit of the status quo. 
1. 1. Literature Review and Research Methodology 
First, this chapter presents my eveluation of the available literature on the 
Ottoman frontiers in three groups. The first group introduces the scholars who 
studied the frontiers of the empire during its construction on the peripheries of the 
Byzantium Empire. Then, it opens a subcategory to evaluate the works of Alfred J. 
Rieber and Cem Emrence, who studied the Ottoman frontiers in a broader 
perspective relying on the Annales School. The chapter continues with the second 
group, which is made up of the works that indicate the formation of the frontiers 
during the Safavid period. The third group includes works that show the interactions 
between the spirit of the time (Zeitgeist) and the frontiers in the late Ottoman period. 
The present study as well shares this approach and discusses the works of Sabri Ateş 
and Melike Sarıkçıoğlu in particular. The chapter ends with a discussion of the 
research method of the current study, explaining how existing data are selected and 
discussed.   
1. 2. Review of Works on Ottoman Frontiers 
The last ten years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of 
academic works studying Ottoman history from its frontiers. Many scholars in 
Turkey and abroad have studied topics related to Ottoman frontiers. Although their 
research scope intersected in examining the frontiers and their effects on the interior, 
they mostly approached these issues from different views. These scholars can be 
categorized according to their scope of deviation in examining different Ottoman 
times, themes and spaces until the emergence of different modern nation-states at the 
frontiers. 
  Such studies reveal that works on frontiers have three main pillars that have 
roughly gone parallel with the periodization of Ottoman history. These three 
 7 
frameworks, within which scholars study frontier-related topics mainly focus on the 
role of frontiers in the construction of the Ottoman State, the Safavid-Ottoman 
struggle that reverberated on their frontiers, and the agitations of the late Ottoman 
period and their impact on “moving frontiers”9. Many other scholars have produced 
similar works concerning other parts of the empire as well. The late period, however, 
is different in nature. Ottoman history in this period is discussed in terms of 
modernity and traditional continuity. Thus, the eastern frontiers are seen as a stage to 
examine a stage to examine the dissolution of the empire in comparison to other 
parts.  
 Many scholars, such as Herbert Adams Gibbons, Mehmet Fuad Köprülü, 
Paul Wittek, Colin Imber, Halil İnalcık, Mehmet Öz, Colin Heywood have put 
forward hypotheses regarding the emergence of the Ottomans. More recently, these 
studies on the “true origins” of the proto-Ottomans10  have been re-evaluated by 
Cemal Kafadar.
11
 One of the common themes among these debates is the existence 
of a fluid frontier zone in southeastern Anatolia where the newcomers (the Turkish-
speaking settlers and conquerors) enjoyed the existing borderland institutions and 
local knowledge.
12
 These early frontier-interior relations, which many authors 
debate, show that frontier zones had their own distinct features. Kafadar discovered 
this through sources from the Turco-Muslim frontier milieu of Anatolia, which 
involved legendary accounts of the lives of warriors and dervishes. He discussed 
how frontier people invented their own state-like structures and traditions by basing 
them on a complex set of values and attitudes embodied in the concept of Gaza.
13
 
Departing from all identifications of the early Ottomans, they were partly the last 
product of long and ongoing interactions among the neighboring settlers in the 
frontiers. 
 Before discussing the second category, it should be stated that there are a few 
authors who focus on the whole frontier history of the Ottoman Empire making use 
of the approach of the Annales School of history. This approach entails a holistic 
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study of a historical problem in interaction with geography and sociology. For 
instance, Alfred J. Rieber and Cem Emrence have used this methodology in their 
works. Emrence’s work explains imperial experiences by referring to his own 
conceptualization of pathways such as “the coast, the interior and the frontier”14 
interacting with one another. Rieber adopts a more distinctive methodology and 
historiography. As he was obviously inspired by the Annales School, he attempts to 
write the global history of Eurasian empires by adopting a broad comparative and 
transnational approach towards the imperial space, ideologies, cultural practices, 
institutions (armies, bureaucracies and elite), frontier encounters, crises, and legacies. 
He examines these issues at two distinct levels: from above, and from below.
15
 By 
doing so, he seeks to answer some important questions within a long time span (La 
longue durée). One of the questions to which he sought an answer in his study is, 
how the continental empires survived competition in the same regions for such a 
long time.
16
 According to him, geo-cultural, geopolitical, and civilizational 
approaches dominate studies on this issue, but his preference is a geo-cultural 
approach. He looks, at three spatial concepts: Eurasia, borderlands, and frontiers as 
shaped by intricate historical processes over many years.
17
 In other words, Rieber 
stresses that his study interprets Eurasia, its frontiers, and the borderlands as spaces 
shaped by complex historical processes forming a geo-cultural context in which the 
great conflicts of the twentieth century came to be situated.
18
 
 The second category can be designated under two significant edited books 
containing various articles. The first one is Kemal Karpat and R. W. Zens’ The 
Ottoman Borderlands, where some issues such as identities and political alterations 
on the borderlands are examined for the first time. The second is The Frontier of the 
Ottoman World, which was edited by A. C. S. Peacock six years later than The 
Ottoman Borderlands. A comparative study embraces many essays the authors of 
which have benefitted from historical and archeological approaches. Although, it 
does not compare the subjects discussed, it gives a chance to its audience to compare 
them based on the diverse articles in the book. It sets out important aspects of 
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Ottoman frontier fortifications, administration, society and economy in terms of how 
Ottomans cope with the challenge of controlling its frontiers.  
Neither of these works is designed to cover a specific region nor a specific 
theme. They do not present a stable period either. Distinct articles evaluate a variety 
of subjects regarding the Ottoman frontiers from the fifteenth to the twentieth 
century. They cover many articles written specifically for the sake of Ottoman 
frontiers and borderlands from north to south, from east to west in a composition of 
various contents and theoretical claims. In the case of the Ottoman frontiers and 
borderlands, these works represent a limited literature, since they are scattered and 
bring more complexity to the issues due to the fact that the interrelations of the 
borderlands changed according to local knowledge and practices, and it would be 
more relevant if studies could be gathered under different titles. In particular, 
imperial eastern borders, as never completely settled borders until the first quarter of 
twentieth century, present a unique historical experience in terms of Ottoman border 
studies due to its consequences on todays’ Turkey. Apart from the articles in which 
the Black Sea, Balkan and North African frontiers of the empire were examined by 
various authors, most of the articles that fall under the second category evaluate the 
borders, by especially focusing on the Safavid period. This is very important in that 
these studies have constituted a background for a better understanding of the 
Ottoman-Iranian conflicts of the late period and helped the analysis of the impacts of 
frontier interactions in early twentieth century Ottoman-Iranian relations.  
 The third category of border studies emerged to gather together studies 
eastern borders of the empire but in a different period. This category tends to bring 
together studies related to the late Ottoman period, and particularly the Hamidian era. 
Albert Hourani, Melike Sarıkcıoğlu, Sabri Ateş, Janet Klein, and Metin Atmaca are 
prominent researchers who focus on the circumstances of the eastern borders in the 
late period or the imperial eastern frontiers overall. Their works intersects roughly 
between the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century.  
 Sarıkçıoğlu’s Osmanlı-İran Hudut Sorunları (1847-1913) covers a period that 
she frames as a deadlock. It starts with the Erzurum Treaty in 1847 and ends with the 
Istanbul Protocol in 1913. In this period, the parties failed to settle their border 
conflicts, and this situation prevented the development of Ottoman-Iranian relations 
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for a long time.
19
 Ateş extends this period to the beginning of the First World War 
(WWI) because he believes that the two states finally recognized their shared 
boundaries a few days after the outbreak of the war.
20
 These two works were 
originally PhD dissertations. Other works based on PhD dissertations are Klein’s The 
Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militia in the Ottoman Tribal Zone, and Atmaca’s 
Politics of Alliance and Rivalry on the Ottoman-Iranian Frontier: The Babans 
(1500-1851). In their studies, Klein and Atmaca focus on one theme rather than 
directly examining border conflicts and border delimitation. Klein examines the 
changing dynamics of frontier conflicts and shifting alliances, center-periphery 
relations, and many other issues regarding the border control of the empire in light of 
evaluating the role of Kurdish militias in the imperial tribal zone. Her research 
determines there was a strong correlation between being a militia loyal to Ottoman 
Sultan and gaining material superiority in the tribal frontier zone.  
 Depending on this relationship, the Kurdish tribal chiefs abused the system 
by using the titles and honorary ranks given them to acquire more power and local 
hegemony and obtaining more lands and privileges from the state in the process.
21
 
Klein argues that Ottoman policies of incorporating Kurds in the state by way of 
recruiting them to the Hamidiye Light Cavalry System (1890-1908 and beyond) 
brought the incorporation and the dissolution at the same time ‘in a sort of non-state 
space’.22  
Atmaca deals with the history of the Kurdish Baban emirate and its 
surroundings from 1500 to 1900. He claims that Ottoman authorities did not 
administer the region directly. Although regional governance belonged to the 
Ottoman authorities, local notables directed and mobilized local opinions.  He 
underlines that Ottoman authorities and local notables were mutually dependent 
because the rising power of the notables came from their connections with the elites 
in Istanbul.
23
 It can be said that constructive and deconstructive manners of the 
Ottoman governors and commanders accompanied the creation of such a network. 
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 It is useful to compare two important studies of this category. One is Ateş’s 
work. The other is Sarıkçıoğlu’s study. These two studies are important in terms of 
providing valuable knowledge on Ottoman-Iranian relations in the late period by 
analyzing these relations using different methods. They also use different sources. 
While Sarıkçıoğlu uses Iranian and Ottoman archives predominately24, Ateş mainly 
uses the British archival sources (such as envoy reports), and newspapers as his 
primary sources. Sarıkçıoğlu focuses on the political economic strategies of the states 
intersecting at the frontiers. She examines the interrelations of the Ottoman Empire 
and Iran, which changed conjecturally over time. She investigates the activities of the 
Ottoman-Iranian frontier commissions in a chronological order and marks the steps 
of boundary negotiations from a macro perspective. Thus, she attempts to show how 
political unrests and imperial rivalries had a major impact on the policies of both 
states, and how these disturbances changed the direction of their respective polices.
 25
 
Ateş investigates the same period by including the story of the efforts of the 
Ottomans for modernization and its impact on the borderlands, the dilemmas of 
borderlanders in terms of identity and loyalty, and the local power struggles in the 
greater history of Ottoman-Iranian relations.  
 The boundary delimitation is a key point issue in in both of these studies. 
Both of them mirror the activities of all the boundary commissions who were 
charged to delimitate the Ottoman-Iranian boundary starting from the 1840s. They 
had reached a deadlock regarding the validity of the treaties.
26
 Arthur Conolly, a 
British officer in the 1840s, described the same period that Sarıkçıoğlu and Ateş 
cover with a pithy expression. This period had become a stage to the contest of 
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Russia and Britain for hegemony over Eurasian borderlands, so he called this period 
an era of “the Great Game” (1818-1907).27  This expression became a historical 
concept later indicated the framework of the pressure diverging until 1907, turned 
into a collective pressure on the Ottoman and Iranian territories in 1907. Their 
compromise necessitated the speedy solution of the boundary conflicts and the 
boundary delimitation between two states not to brink them to the edge of war. 
Although Russia and Britain reached a compromise, the Ottoman and Qajar 
governments did not reach a similar compromise.  
1. 3. Research Methodology 
This study relies on quantitative and qualitative research methods employs an 
explanatory framework of analysis. The research gives special importance to 
establishing the chronological order of events, and examines the archival data in a 
comparative perspective. I found nearly three hundred files, which include hundreds 
of official documents, in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul. This group of 
documents embodied directly the activities of Tahir Pasha and the other frontier 
actors. To investigate their activities accurately, I adopted a critical and comparative 
approach to the documents to prepare the ground for an examination of Tahir Pasha 
and the Boundary Commission. The existence of several Tahir Pashas of Albanian 
origins complicated the confirmation of the documents attributed to our Tahir Pasha 
who headed the Ottoman delegation in boundary negotiations with Iran. I separated 
first Tahir Pasha by comparing all the reports written by all Tahir Pashas with his 
biographical register. This examination enabled me to discard documents related to 
other Tahir Pashas. 
My research relies largely on qualitative research methods. This qualitative 
approach enables us to understand human behavior and the reasons for such behavior 
within a framework of the meanings, attributes, and symbols of a particular period.  
In the fifth chapter, a quantitative analysis is employed in order to 
demonstrate a correlation between the Ottoman budget and border related 
expenditures, and the evident and eventual impact of this correlation on the policy 
and decision making. 
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 I analyze the discourse of the frontier actors in the sixth chapter to understand 
Ottoman statesmen’s approach to local people and borderlands in the disputed 
territory by an analysis of the semiotic meanings of the Ottoman discourse in official 
documents. 
The research relies heavily on primary sources such as annual reports, 
recollections, newspapers, and maps, and secondary sources like various books and 
selected articles.  
A map has ben used to illustrate whole range of the boundary. Practically, I 
preferred taking snapshots in order to demonstrate a local area, Ottoman military 
fortifications, and lodging of the Ottoman commissioners.  
I have widely used two significant terms, namely, frontier actors and frontier 
difficulties. The first term suggests those actors who implemented or challenged 
Abdulhamid’s policies in the frontier zone. These actors had multiple roles, as they 
were mostly the governors of border provinces, border commanders, commission 
members, foreign consuls, and tribal leaders. The second term, frontier difficulties, 
conceptualizes the conditions surrounding frontier actors. Briefly, the prevalent 
conditions around the disputed territory which were strained by inter-tribal conflicts, 
raids, attacks, plunders, lawlessness, feuds, rumors that were based on false and 
biased information, and geographic handicaps for wheels complicated the work of 
frontier actors in advance. The Times reporters used to describe this territory by using 
the term ‘Wild Districts’ to draw attention to the prevalent roughness of the disputed 
terrain. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the Ottoman-Safavid (1502-1736) 
relations and the conditions of the eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire in that 
period. Second, it moves on to a historical period when the Ottoman state had the 
Qajar state (1796-1925) as its eastern neighbor. I emphasize the era from the 1840s 
to the 1870s, as this era produced high volume of local knowledge on the Ottoman 
Iranian frontiers. These efforts resulted with the narrowing of a long boundary to the 
status of partly defined boundary by creating a border zone that would be demarcated 
later.  Thus, this chapter provides a better understanding of the historical context of 
the boundary conflicts and the efforts to delimitate the boundary until the emergency 
of the border zone.  
2. 1. Ottoman-Safavid Relations and Frontiers (1502-1736) 
The Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) was an influential entity in Eastern 
Anatolia and Northwestern Iran, where it emerged as a combination of political 
traditions and religious actors. It formed a state several decades after the Ottomans 
had conquered Constantinople in 1453.
28
 As Dale states, these actors were the Aq 
Qoyunlus, as (the White Sheep Turks), and the Safavid Sufi pirs. These groups had 
limited political and religious influence in the region in 1453. Together, these groups 
competed with other hegemonic dynasties in the region, such as the Qara Qoyunlu 
(Black Sheep Turks), located in Tabriz. Under the leadership of Uzun Hasan, the Aq 
Quyunlus began to establish its hegemony over the other dynasties in the region by 
forming a challenging power in Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and Northwestern Iran.
29
 
 As Dale asserts, Uzan Hasan, a Sunni Turkish Muslim, aimed to constitute a 
legitimate confederation that could be transformed into a “major Perso-Islamic 
principality”. For this purpose, he began to patronize Muslim institutions and Sufi 
orders. Moreover, he tended to consolidate his legitimacy by promoting 
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intermarriages with the pirs from the Safavid order after the Ottomans defeated them 
in 1471.
30
 
 Shah Ismail (b. 1847- d. 1524), whose mother was the daughter of Uzun 
Hasan, turned the Safavid order into a state. The audience on which he based his 
legitimacy was quite fragmented. He embraced the Shi’i concepts as doctrine and 
demanded the obedience of Sunni Muslims, Sufi pirs, and Shi’i Imams. He used 
intermarriage as a way of policy making, and he wanted to solidify his relations with 
members of tribal military coalitions.
31
  
 Shah Ismail defeated his Aq Quyunlu relatives in 1501 and occupied most of 
the Iranian plateau within the following decade. He continued to enforce Shi’ism as 
the dominant belief system in the region and tried to institutionalize Shi’ism in a 
territory where the number Sunnis exceeded that of the Shi’a. 32 
 Ismail began to proclaim himself as the Padishah of Iran, the king of kings 
and the sultan of sultans. In political terminology, the Ottomans used similar titles 
and the Ottomans perceived his actions as a threat to their sovereignty in Eastern 
Anatolia. They were two different Islamic entities competing in the same field and 
region. When Ismail turned his face to the west, and began winning over most of the 
Oghuz tribes, Selim I (r. 1512-20) decided to put an end to the propaganda of Ismail.  
 An incident not prompted this decision was the revolt of Shah Kulu in 
Southeastern Anatolia, which became very influential. Ideologically, the revolt 
carried anti-Ottoman features and supported Shah Ismail’s ideology.33 As Selim had 
the opportunity to observe this revolt closely, he proclaimed that Is’mail created a 
heretical belief system. In 1514, he destroyed the army of Ismail in Chaldıran in 
Azerbaijan.  Ismail was forced abandon his claims of sovereignty in Eastern 
Anatolia, and withdrew to the Iranian plateau,
34
 while the Ottoman borders moved 
eastwards to the current western borders of Iran.  
 After the war, the Safavids began to deal with internal conflict, inter-tribal 
rivalries, and external threats. Frictions, incursions, and occupations continued 
throughout the century between the Safavids and the Ottomans. Shah Tahmasb 
(1524-76), who was Ismail’s successor, had an aggressive attitude towards the 
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Ottomans, and he did not hesitate to confront the Ottomans once again. The territory 
of the Ottoman Empire was religiously divided, so the Ottomans did not abstain from 
interfering in western parts of Iran.
35
 However, as Faroqhi states, the major Ottoman 
conquest of Safavid controlled lands was achieved during the reign of Suleiman the 
Magnificent (b. 1494- d. 1566). Iraq and Basra became Ottoman provinces as a result 
of the campaigns of 1534 and 1546.
36
  
 After Selim I ended the influence of Ismail, he started a diplomatic campaign 
to win over the tribes located on the eastern frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. For 
example, the principalities in the Van region accepted Ottoman sovereignty in 1515 
due to the diplomatic enterprise of Molla Idris Bidlisi.
37
 Many local princes, notables 
and families chose to shift to the Ottoman side. Bitlis, Hakkari, Mahmudi, and many 
other districts on the border gradually became integrated into the Ottoman Empire 
during the sixteenth century.  
 Matthee describes the frontiers where merchants crossed from one border 
point to another as political borders. He states that tribes, “whose loyalty might be 
bought but could never be taken for granted”38, resided in the vast proportion of the 
border area. According to him, the Kurds inhabited the northern parts of the 
borderlands and the Arabs inhabited the southern parts. These tribal people were 
unwilling to submit to central control. The states’ strategies to bring security to the 
borders and benefit from the area could not be implemented because the states could 
not control the tribes that lived on both sides.  
 In this context, centrally controlled Ottoman lands, where the government 
could implement a proper tax system were limited in the region. Many ideas, from 
pragmatism to ideological commitment, were put forward regarding how the 
government would take over the region.
39
 As Sinclair stresses, it was important to 
maintain a balance depending on mutual interests between the central Ottoman 
government and regional principalities, which could slip out of the government’s 
hand as wet soap. He states, “the whole existence of the principalities depended on 
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an equilibrium of tribal transhumance patterns and allegiance.”40 Öz asserts that the 
Ottomans considered regional differences and applied a variety of pragmatic and 
flexible land-tenure systems throughout the empire in this century. He presents a 
case study on the lands of Bitlis where he points out that the Timar system, which 
was applied throughout the empire, was not applied in most districts in the 
borderlands. Instead, the Ottomans implemented the hükümet41 and ocaklık42 systems 
in the sub-province of Bitlis. In return, they received the tribes’ consent and 
obedience to the sultan.
43
 Sinclair states that the application of the sancak system in 
these frontier regions, which were largely populated by tribes, could push the local 
population to seek government protection on the other side of the borderlands. Öz 
justifies this view by explaining that “the number of hükümets and “yurtluk-
ocaklık”44 districts used to increase when the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry increased 
towards the middle of the seventeenth century.”45 Sinclair states that having borders 
with the Safavid Empire accelerated the escape of some tribal population, and the 
Ottomans needed further and firmer arrangements in districts nearby the Safavid 
Empire.
46
 It is clear that having similar and mutual benefits connecting one tribe to 
another, which is the strong essence of tribal kinship, not only defines their internal 
relations but also their external relations with other states. This enables the 
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identification of the allegiance patterns of eastern border landers of the empire in the 
pre-modern era. It can be seen that state-tribe relations in the frontier zones 
embodied pragmatism, ideological commitment, and flexibility.  
2. 2. Ottoman-Qajar Relations and Frontiers (1796-1925) 
The central administration of the Ottoman Empire, governed by one dynasty, 
was more stable compared to Iran’s. At the end of prolonged political turmoil in Iran, 
the Qajar dynasty took charge of Iran and governed it from 1785 to 1925. In this era, 
complex interrelations in the frontier zones among statesmen and tribes continued by 
small configurations, in the context explained previously. Since the time of Ismail, 
the legitimacy of the governors was based on winning the consent of the tribes 
among other factors. One dimension of this policy was to control the tribes and tribal 
lands by promoting intermarriages. Sine the Ottoman dynasty had its political center 
far from the state’s eastern peripheries, it did not have such a policy. Instead, it 
shared its authority with local rulers without having any systematic application of 
dynastical intermarriage to tribal lords.  
 During the Qajar period, Iran seemed to be a country of tribal confederations 
with influential spiritual figures (pirs). Keddie describes the consequences of the 
former Iranian policy by these words:  
 
These indigenous factors at the turn of the twentieth century weakened the 
modernization efforts in Iran, so industry, infrastructure, or agriculture 
remained primitive thanks to decentralizing powers of tribes, ulema, some 
cities and regions.
47
  
 
The attempts of the Qajar governors were thus far in favor of Iran on its 
western border zone where it competed with the Ottomans over the domination of 
borderlands. In the 1890s, the Ottomans systematically developed few institutions to 
solidify the tribes and state relations in the context of the implementation of pro-
Caliphate policies. Abdulhamid II established schools for the tribes and formed new 
troops recruiting the Kurds, but throughout the centuries, the conflicts, wars and 
agreements created porous borders with many fugitives. 
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 It is clear that the earlier efforts for the modernization of the Ottoman 
Empire, which pre-dated those in Iran, may have damaged the loyalty of some 
Ottoman tribes living in borderlands adjacent to Iran due to the fact that these 
modernization efforts restricted the movements of the tribes, which were prompted 
by pragmatic concerns. If the empire became more pragmatic, the tribes could have 
flexibly changed their sides. 
 The flexible and pragmatic policies of the tribes did not overlap with the 
nature of the modern state, and tended to create a greater problem for a state whose 
modernization process was on the verge of crumbling. Moving and shifting tribes 
from one side to another began to cause major conflicts. For centuries, Iran spent 
much energy to make the tribes its loyal subjects, but as it strove to do so, it slowed 
down its own modernization process. However, this created an advantage over the 
Ottomans, who had started to modernize earlier. This factor showed where the 
legitimacy of the Qajar dynasty came from in Western Iran. Another factor was the 
protection Iran had from Britain and Russia throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. To shed light on this point further, the modernization efforts, 
which can be open to debate as to whether or not they ever existed in western Iran, 
should be investigated in terms of the application of land and tax systems enforced 
on the tribes, in order to discover whether there were any points weakening the 
loyalty of the tribes and pushing them to seek refuge in Ottoman territories in the 
early twentieth century.  
  In order to map out in detail the relationship of the Ottomans and the Qajars 
intersecting on the frontier, the period between 1843 and 1876 need be investigated 
carefully, given its importance. During this period, the Ottoman and Qajar frontier 
relations reached their peak in defining the borders due to some changes in world 
politics. Both Britain and Russia desired to achieve stability in the area (in especially 
Mesopotamia in the case of Britain, and the Caucasian provinces in the case of 
Russia). They did not want to lose the economic advantages they had gained earlier. 
The crisis in Egypt, multilateral conventions based on economic interests to pacify 
the Levant, and the establishment of a reliable regime over the Ottoman straits during 
this time created conditions that were a priority for these nations rather than the 
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frontiers in the 1840s.
48
 This international conjecture resulted in an arrangement of a 
quadripartite boundary commission in 1843 aiming to create a borderline, which was 
more definitive and binding and could end territorial disputes.
49
  
 The next four years were to determine the owner of the Muhammerah port on 
the Shatt al-Arab. Russia and Britain in agreement asserted that the port had greater 
links to Iran than the Ottomans.
50
 However, specifying the ownership of Shatt Al-
Arab River embodied vagueness. The Ottoman proposals were rejected by Britain 
and Russia on grounds that they were the entire owners of the river, so the river 
dispute could not have been resolved until 1975.
51
 
 Shofield compares the status quo mentioned in the articles of the treaty of 
1843 to the ones in the treaty of 1847. As he explains, article 2 of the 1843 treaty had 
many ambiguities, but it envisioned some territorial definition associated with 
Suleymaniye and Zohab. For instance, article 2 envisioned the allocation of Zohab 
between Ottoman lands and Iran. The western parts of Zohab would be given to the 
Ottoman State, but the eastern parts including the mountains and valleys, specifically 
Kerrind, would be given to the State of Iran. Article 2 also shows that Iran gave up 
all claims regarding the situation of Suleymaniye. Lastly, article 2 gives insight 
regarding the situation of Muhammerah. The article recognized the town and the 
seaport of Muhammerah and the eastern side of the Shatt-el Arab to be under full 
“Iranian” sovereignty.52 The parties could not agree, but they signed an agreement in 
1847. According to this treaty, the parties would establish a commission consisting 
of four parties to survey the mentioned lands. If this effort would not be successful, 
the treaty, which was signed in 1843, would be considered as grounds for further 
negotiations.  
The commission gathered in 1850 and worked until 1852, but could not find 
common grounds regarding the status quo by making contradictory comments about 
the articles of 1847, the Erzurum Treaty.
53
 In this commission, Dervish Pasha was 
the Ottoman representative. After he ended Iranian occupation of Khotour, he 
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recognized the port of Muhammerah and the Island of Khizr as being Iranian. In 
return, Iran would “abandon illegally-held territorial positions further north in the 
borderlands, including Khotour”.54 Then, Iran demanded sovereignty over all eastern 
parts of the Shatt al-Arab. Obviously, the parties found themselves dealing with the 
articles of 1843. At least, in 1851, the Ottoman and Qajar commissioners (Mirza 
Jaafar Khan) adopted a “status quo line”55 at Muhammerah. The next phase of ran 
into a deadlock when the nonnative powers imposed the determination of the 
sovereignty over Zohab according to the stipulations of the treaty of 1847, which put 
the Ottomans in a disadvantageous position. Dervish Pasha insisted on the restoration 
of the 1843 status quo line in Muhammerah and Zohab, but nonnative powers 
continued to work and announced in 1852 that the “mediating commissioners were in 
possession of sufficient topographical data to map the southern Perso-Ottoman 
borderlands from the Gulf northwards to Zohab.”56  
 Although the Ottomans were clearly unsatisfied with the terms of the 
Erzurum Treaty, the Qajar commissioner showed Khotour as a condition to agree 
with the prescriptions of the Erzurum Treaty. This restricted the border delimitation 
further, and, the creation of a border map was suspended, but a long borderline had 
become limited to a border zone
57
, a debatable and conflict prone space.
58
 
After a while, Dervish Pasha reconvened the commission to finish the survey 
that would eventually define the rest of the borders from Zohab to Mount Ararat, but 
Shofield asserts that Dervish Pasha was behaving “unilateral”59, meaning he was 
acting independently from the other commissioners, trying to cultivate his 
relationship with the people who inhabited the mentioned border zone
60
. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that demographic elements of the border zone 
seem entirely vague in terms of determining its ethnic and religious components at 
this point. This border zone belonged to none of the local states, so it was open to 
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conflict and negotiations in the 1850s. This is why, the argument that Dervish Pasha 
seduced people residing at the border zone seems neither valid nor impartial, because 
if the border zone people were of Iranian origin, why would there be a need for 
further negotiations regarding the border zone? His argument seems to be 
teleological, and aiming to legitimize the leaving of the border zone to Iran, ignoring 
the seductive activities of Iranians in these districts. 
 It seems Britain began to advocate Iran after the border was specified from 
the Gulf to Zohab, and aimed to delimitate the rest of the border in favor of Iran. 
Somehow, the British officials lost all the accounts, including surveys regarding the 
border delimitation. They encouraged Iranians privately to sign contracts regarding 
the forts on the line. By losing the accounts, it seems the British forced the Ottomans 
to accept the articles of 1847. British representative Williams, after having lost the 
documents, stated: 
 
Mediating commissioners’ original instruction had been to confine territorial 
restitution to Muhammerah, Suleymaniye, and Zohab, in conformity with the 
1847 treaty, but elsewhere to respect the status quo as originally estimated in 
1843.
61
 
 
Under these circumstances, the Porte rejected the suggestion to partition 
Zohab. The occupation of Khotour by Dervish Pasha became one obstacle in front of 
the resolution. Russia and Britain were trying to restore Khotour to Iran. In 1861, 
Istanbul refused to evacuate Khotour as well.
62
 Russia and Britain did not have even 
an identical draft map in 1867. Their maps were different from one another, 
indicating different place names and the ignorance of the British and Russian 
representatives of the local languages. According to Schofield, this explained why 
the Ottomans did not trust nonnative commissioners, since these mediating 
commissioners simply did not consider “the human geography of the borderlands”.63 
Dervish Pasha’s unilateral action can be perceived as a reaction to their ignorance. In 
1869, Britain and Russia completed the Identical Map or Carte Identique, but it still 
included “errors with upwards of 4,000 discrepancies.”64 However, the Qajar 
government was sufficiently satisfied with the Anglo-Russian map in contrast to the 
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Porte. In 1869, they recognized the status quo in the border zone by signing an 
agreement minimizing the border disputes and ending the construction of buildings 
in disputed lands. However, manipulation and conflict continued.  
 Local commissioners played a border game by switching between the 
treaties, which were signed until the 1870s. Form the 1840s to the 1870s, the border 
saw minor changes, but the local knowledge regarding the border increased. 
However, the local parties frequently manipulated the articles of the treaties. When a 
new agreement designated a new status quo, they would determine to what extent 
these new parameters were useful to them, and shift the status quo depending on 
points that were more beneficial to them. The problem was that all treaties 
approached the border as a single issue, but, especially by basing it on the 1847 and 
1843 treaties, the local parties would try to apply their own will by getting strength 
from one or another article of a mentioned treaty that they saw useful for their aims 
regarding a section of the borderland. In other words, they had a whole text in theory, 
but in practice, they wanted to apply one article to one part of the border while they 
applied another article from another treaty to another part. This way, they 
manipulated the treaties and the articles, and this created major problems in border 
delimitation between the 1840s and the 1870s, especially for the disputed lands.
65
  
 Although all parties tried to find common grounds for compromise, the 
outbreak of the Serbian War of 1876 and Turco-Russian War of 1877-1878 delayed 
the process. The Treaty of Berlin, which was signed in 1878, caused extensive losses 
of territory, and included some articles regarding the eastern peripheries of the 
empire.
66
 One of these articles was about Khotour. With this article, the Ottoman 
Empire had to hand Khotour over to Iran.
67
 Khotour held an important place in 
Ottoman border diplomacy because this point was an exit for the forces located in 
Van.
68
 With the ceding of Khotour, the Ottoman Empire lost one of its most 
significant pathways to the inner parts of Iran.  
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In conclusion, new parameters or paradigms of border definitions became 
unclear and foreign interventions put the Ottomans in a disadvantageous position 
causing them to lose geographical superiority vis-à-vis Iran. Local knowledge 
defining the borders increased with surveys in the region, but reliability of these 
surveys, and the articles of the treaty were open to debate. The Ottoman government 
did not trust the surveys, which were prepared by outsiders, so Dervish Pasha 
shuttled between unilateralism and multilateralism in a pragmatic state of nature. 
However, as mentioned above, at least, the parties agreed upon the southern parts of 
the border and a border zone was drawn in the north. The rest of the study analyzes 
how the states dealt with the demarcation of this border zone, which evolved little 
through history. 
2. 3. A Convention: For Peace or For War 
From the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, 
the demarcation of the border zone continued to be the prime concern of the 
competing states. Russian and British policies regarding the region had to change 
due to major conjectural changes in the world. Britain began to follow inclusive 
policies for the developments occurring in the frontier of the Ottoman and Qajar 
States against Russia by shifting away from its isolationist policies to cultivate the 
ground for a rapprochement in the first decade of the twentieth century. Russia and 
Britain knew that Iran would not be able to take the possession of the disputed lands, 
when they saw a strong resistance against Majd es Sultanah’s fortifications and 
actions in the frontier zone. In 1907, Russia and Britain put pressure on both the 
Ottoman and the Qajar governments to agree another to another frontier commission. 
Wratislaw expressed the reasons behind the common ground that would lead to the 
formation of the commission:  
 
Russia and G. Britain now began to show increased interest in the doings on 
the Turco-Persian frontier—Russia because she did not at all approve of the 
Turks establishing themselves in a position which would lay the Caucasus 
open to a flank attack in the event of a war, and G. Britain in the cause of 
peace and order, and to some extent because the Anglo-Russian agreement 
being now an actual fact, she felt bound to support Russia and Persia.
69
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This section evaluates the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907 as a crucial 
development that prepared the ground for the formation of a new boundary 
commission to demarcate the rest of the border zone and to sustain the Anglo-
Russian rapprochement in Iran. This chapter also examines the public opinion in 
Britain, Russia, and Germany, based on the Times and on local newspaper articles 
quoted in the Times. Thus, it discusses the convention that was signed before the 
completion of the designation of the boundaries. The convention brought neither 
peace nor total war to the region but pushed the formation of the boundary 
commission to the field amid inter-tribal fighting.  
2. 3. 1. The Anglo-Russian Treaty (1907-1914) 
When the treaty
70
 was signed between Britain and Russia in St. Petersburg on 
August 31, 1907, it incited a discussion that fluctuated between optimistic and 
pessimistic views of the Anglo-Russian Entente. As Hughes stresses, a significant 
portion of the British public opinion remained skeptical about the treaty, although the 
Tsarist government assured that it had given up its traditional ambition of moving 
forward [to the south] policy in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet.
71
 Ira Klein argues, 
Britain was dissatisfied with the convention because it failed to “fulfill the British 
aim of halting Russian expansion in areas strategically crucial to the defense of India, 
and that in Central Asia, after 1912, the Anglo-Russian Convention hindered rather 
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than furthered the British quest for security.”72 The year of 1905 was a long year for 
Russia. It was defeated by the Japanese armies and had to deal with revolutionary 
tumults at home. Furthermore, the German push for economic concessions and 
privileges in Iran and other places where the Russians had vested interests pushed 
Russia to agree with Britain in 1907. The failure of the Russians in front of the 
Japanese armies prepared the ground for reconciliation. Before the Anglo-Russian 
treaty was signed, Iran began to take advantage of the conditions. Majd es Sultanah 
attempted to penetrate the disputed lands, which belonged to no one, and attacked the 
area in order to conquer it in 1905.
73
 The Ottomans responded to this unilateral 
attempt the same way, and gave the option to Iran to fight for or to withdraw from 
their military fortifications. 
2. 3. 2. Comments on the Anglo-Russian Convention: 
Correspondence regarding the responsible countries shows that the Russian 
and German press closely followed the Anglo-Russian agreement and debated as to 
the consequences of the agreement by putting forward comments in their 
newspapers. For instance, different newspapers belonging to different social milieus 
in Russia criticized the agreement with different views, some being against the 
agreement and others favoring it. The Russ, The Novoe Vremya, The Radical Journal 
Tovarishch, The Bourse Gazette portrayed the different sides of the agreement. For 
instance,  
 
The Russ states: 
The convention is not so much a treaty embodying bargains as a courteous 
exchange of presents, preluding a further development of cordial relations 
and promising in the near future a new combination of the political forces of 
the world and a settlement of many complicated questions hitherto believed 
to be insoluble. Russia has definitely abandoned old idea of an outlet towards 
the Indian Ocean. Is there not serious reason to believe that compensation for 
this painful renunciation may be given in a future Convention with Great 
Britain concerning the Near East, where the question of the Straits still awaits 
a settlement?
74
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The Novoe Vremya states:  
The Convention can serve as an instrument either for peace or for war. Which 
it is to be depends on the attitude of the other Powers and ourselves, for in a 
rapprochement with Great Britain we attract the antipathy of Powers which 
have hitherto been hostile to her and confirm our sympathy with those powers 
which have been friendly to her.
75
 
 
Tovarishch remarks:  
Russia may be satisfied in loosing so little. She would not have signed such a 
treaty five years ago, when she was dreaming of an expedition into India, or 
was at least ready to threaten Great Britain on the first favorable occasion.
76
 
 
The Bourse Gazette states:  
Inasmuch as the form of the Convention is unprecedented, it will not be 
surprising if Iran, behind whose back the experiment is being conducted, 
expresses discontent. The danger of the situation is increased by the fact that 
there exists in Europe a tertius gaudens how in certain given circumstances 
may be desirous of increasing the suspicions of the new ‘Sick Man’ in the 
East. Russian and British diplomacy should make heroic efforts thoroughly to 
convince Russia nor Great Britain is pursuing secret aims in Iran or 
contemplating any intrigues against the independence or integrity of that 
country.
77
 
 
Apart from the Russian and British views regarding the Anglo-Russian treaty, 
one Times reporter gives an insight as to the German press. According to him, 
Germany attempted to discover “which of the two parties to the Anglo-Russian 
Agreement had secured the greater advantage by the Convention”78. He reports to 
have seen the German attempt as a “futile” attempt. Perhaps, it was the way of tactics 
used by the Times not to awake Russia further, but it seems the German press aimed 
to reveal the disadvantageous position of Russia. Thus, an idea, which was 
represented by the Bismarckian political doctrine, shows that German interests 
demand that “points of friction between England and the other Powers should be 
carefully maintained”.79 Therefore, he explains, this agreement should be “prevented 
from extending to spheres in which vital German interests are concerned”.80 The 
opinions mentioned above more likely concentrated on the penetration of the 
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Germans in the commercial sphere. The Germans asserted that the “Anglo-Russian 
Convention, with respect to Iran, as a possible menace to legitimate expansion into 
the sphere”81.  
The Cologne Gazette read, “two Powers cannot be prevented from settling 
their differences and safeguarding their interests as they think fit.” The Rhenish 
journal evaluated the role of the third party in the commercial sphere as follows: 
 
Third parties also have their inalienable rights, and that in the economic 
struggle in Iran, for example, Germany, who has never cherished any but 
commercial ambitions in that region, will have to show that she is an efficient 
competitor.
82
 
 
The newspaper concluded, “British and Russian trade in Iran will trespass 
upon each other’s spheres of influence, and that new points of frictions will be 
created to the advantage of third parties.”83 The Frankfurter Zeitung evaluated the 
Anglo-Russian Convention in an article attempting to show the agreement is a 
posthumous product of the British policy of Germany. They linked the inception of 
negotiations between Russia and Britain regarding the convention to the time that 
Anglo-Germen relations were under great pressure. It was stated:  
 
With the improvement in Anglo-German relations Germany can contemplate 
the Agreement with greater equanimity than would have been the case last 
year, provided that German trade in Iran is allowed full scope for expansion. 
Although Germany would at first be able to offer but little opposition, a 
partition of Iran as a result of the Convention between Great Britain and 
Russia would not ultimately be conducive to the maintenance of the world’s 
peace, which the two Powers have professedly desired to promote.
84
 
 
The Times stated the official German quarters did not have any useful 
proposition. It read, “Modern German policy is essentially opportunist” and 
continued, “Parliamentary interpellations or more remote contingencies could be a 
sufficient reason for tolerating the survival of a view of British policy which has long 
been discredited”85. 
                                                 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 Ibid. 
 29 
 Although the Anglo-Russian Agreement was signed in August, it was 
announced in the Iranian parliament on October 5, 1907. One of the parliament 
members, Musteshar Dauleh, elucidated the importance of the agreement regarding 
the independence of Iran. As the Iranian correspondent of the Times stated, on 
October 6, 1907, “Iranians were equally friendly to England and to Russia, but they 
did not recognize that foreign treaties had power to deal with the affairs of Iran.”86 
 The conflict continued among the empires to establish commercial and 
territorial superiority over places connected to the Indian trade route dominated by 
Britain. The Ottomans had extended their authority in the disputed lands. The Times 
reporter in Tabriz reported the “Turks occupied Askerabad 20 versts from Urumiah. 
Salma has also been taken. Then, the British Consul left Urumiah for Mawana in 
order to communicate to Tahir Pasha.”87 For the Ottomans, it was the best time to 
occupy the disputed lands; otherwise Iran would have done that in 1905.  
In addition, the international political conjecture was quite suitable for this as 
well as the internal politics of Iran that dealt with two groups, those who supported 
the monarchy on the one hand, and those who supported the parliament and 
constitutionalism on the other. Both Britain and Russia approached these two groups 
differently. Britain supported the revolutionary attempts in the neutral zone and in its 
sphere of influence in the south, in contrast to the Russians who supported the Qajar 
dynasty.
88
 However, there were revolutionary attempts also in northern Iran where 
Russian interests lay, and Britain guaranteed its existence in the south by limiting 
Russia to the northern zone by the provisions of the treaty and by following a secret 
agenda to keep Russia preoccupied in the north with the revolutionary groups.  
 During this time, a member of the Iranian nationalist movement, Atabeg, was 
assassinated. This formally made him a national hero of the Iranian reform 
movement. The Times asserted that a constitutional movement so largely tempered 
by this assassination scarcely seems to deserve the sympathy conferred upon it by 
British radicals who would have cheerfully sacrificed the prospect of a peaceful 
solution for Asiatic difficulties with Russia to the susceptibilities of the amiable 
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“children of Iran.”89 Apart from the methods that the Iranian Parliament advocated 
for the salvation of the country, disorder was rampant throughout the country.  
 In the meantime, an Ottoman force took a considerable slice of Iranian 
territory under its control on the northwestern frontier. This frontier region was 
described as a “wild district” in Lake Urumiah.  
 According to the Times, the position of the sultan was stronger than that of 
the shah in those wild districts of the border zone. It was stated that many 
circumstances favored the designs, which the sultan pursued with his usual 
persistency. First, it stated that his adversaries were weak and distracted by internal 
commotions. Second, it elaborated the sultan wanted to safely venture upon liberties 
with Russia whose sphere of interest in Iran included the disputed territory. Russia 
would not have dared to take the area prior to the Japanese War. Third, it explained 
that the frontier was never fully and accurately delimited. Fourth, the dispute had 
been going on for long and could commend itself to Turkish conservatism. Lastly, it 
was a dispute with who were held to be heretical Shias and could be given a fine 
orthodox flavor.
90
  
 The Times implied that Britain and Russia would welcome the occupation of 
the disputed border zone by Iran in 1905. It stated that Turkish troops had been 
encroaching steadily and progressively for the last two years in the territory, which 
was hitherto being held and occupied by the Iranians, although the status quo of the 
border zone did not allow Iran to interfere. Thus, Iranian fortifications around the 
zone in 1905 were against the agreement that was signed in 1869 stressing the 
importance of non-intervention of the parties. With the interference of their troops in 
the zone, the Ottomans increased their unilateral actions in the border zone. The 
Times read: 
 
They (the Ottoman troops and tribal forces) have been in Lahijan for two 
years, they hold Mergawan and Tergawan, which, like Baradost, possess easy 
descents into the rich plain of Urumiah, and they are trying to levy taxes 
within a few miles of that city itself.”91 The rout of the Iranians under Majd-
es-Sultanah in July has made the Ottomans more aggressive than ever, and 
the four regiments of Iranian infantry with guns, which are to accompany the 
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Shah’s new Commissioner, are not likely to overawe the Turkish 
commander.
92
  
 
The Anglo-Russian treaty did not create common grounds to fix the border 
conflicts on the border zone, but tended to guarantee the supremacy of Russia and 
Britain in their respective spheres of influence. Moreover, it can be said that the 
treaty prevented a possible coalition like the Anglo-German or Russian-German 
Ententes. Thus, it can be said that the treaty also prevented third party intervention. 
The Anglo-Russia convention encouraged them to reevaluate the historical process 
of the delimitation of the Ottoman-Iranian boundary under Russian and British 
observation because the Ottoman-Iranian boundary that remained undefined was 
threatening the regional security and stability of Iran, thus, their interests as well.  
2. 3. 3. Disputed Border Zone 
 The Times mentioned the general tendency of the two mediating powers 
regarding the border issue in 1907, as it was believed that the “two Muslim 
Governments” could actually fix the precise frontier line within the zone.93 The 
Times mentions retrospectively the current situation of the boundary as follows:  
 
Between 1843 and 1865, a mixed commission where British, Russian, 
Ottoman and Iranian representatives existed, investigated whole frontier from 
Mount Ararat to the Iranian Gulf, and finally a map was prepared on which 
the undisputed territories were laid down between two states, together with a 
zone twenty or thirty miles broad, which included all the disputed 
territories.
94
 
 
The Times described both governments as “Oriental Governments” so that 
they did nothing further to solve their problems. In contrast, both governments had 
repeated to maintain a provisional status quo within the zone, but the disorder in the 
zone continued even though the Russian and British concerns turned into pressure 
that necessitated the resolution of the border delimitation as soon as possible.  
 To respond to the Porte militarily, the Qajar government constituted a force 
thanks to the significant sum given by the Iranians to expel the Ottoman troops from 
the zone. People from various national and political societies collected £400,000 and 
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asked the government to take prompt measures to ensure the safety of the roads, to 
restore the order in the provinces, and to send an able and patriotic person to 
represent Iran on the Commission for the settlement of the frontier dispute. This 
statement shows that Iran was not capable to provide public order and security on its 
frontiers under the prevailing conditions. 
The convention had a dual role in the pre-war period. It could not stop the 
rivalry between Russia and Britain, but it suspended it for a while. This opened a 
space to restart the boundary negotiations. The convention became influential 
bringing all parties to the table to solve border conflicts. It increased the hopes of 
creating a fixed borderline. However, the provisions of the treaty were far from 
bringing peace to the region, because Britain and Russia had different methods and 
approaches to fix these regional problems, but at least, they prevented the 
deterioration of the Russian position in northern Iran. This suspension of antagonism 
between Russia and Britain prevented a third party intervention as well, but the 
situation encouraged the Ottoman advancements in the controversial border zone and 
explains why the Iranians behaved reluctantly and desired to incorporate disputed 
proportion of the border zone without negotiations. Nevertheless, they were forced 
by the mediating powers to resume negotiations in order to end the arbitrary behavior 
of the tribes and other unknown groups committing crimes against humanity in the 
border zone. Chapter 3 and 4 will show that the Ottomans demonstrated a manifest 
sensitivity to providing regional security and stability.  
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CHAPTER 3 
FORMATION OF THE FRONTIER COMMISSION 
This chapter begins with an evaluation of the rationale behind forming a new 
boundary commission, despite serious financial problems. Second, it analyzes the 
relevant financial information regarding the salaries, travel payments of the 
commission members, the costs of border-related military fortifications and the like. 
Third, it shows the pathway that Tahir Pasha involved to the frontier delimitation 
after having role in the settlement of public outrages that were erupted in Bitlis and 
Van. His role in the settlement led him to be the chairperson of just forming frontier 
commission in a critical period. In sum, this chapter sets the ground to shed light on 
the reasons why Abdulhamid and the Sublime Porte repeatedly forced Tahir Pasha
95
 
to delimit the imperial eastern boundary when the budgetary problems of the 
government peaked.  
3. 1. Commission Members, Commission-Related Expenses, and Increasing 
Budgetary Problems 
This section consists of two parts. First, it evaluates the cost of the 
commissioners’ salaries and travel allowances. Second, it analyses the financial 
ramifications of the Ottoman military fortifications. Then, both are analyzed in a 
broader context in terms of what all the variables meant for the Ottoman image on 
the border in a transition period between the Abdulhamid and CUP eras. 
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The basic economic parameters of the period (1907-1908) indicate that the 
financial troubles of the earlier years continued. Engin D. Akarlı shows this 
continuity by under the three generations of 1839-71/6, 1876-1909, and 1909-18. In 
all three cases, economic backwardness and budget deficiencies caused serious 
disadvantages. Akarlı argues that healing the budget deficit created by the first 
generation preoccupied the second and third generations.
96
 The second generation 
(1876-1909) of this category corresponds to the reign of Abdulhamid, when the 
Ottoman government had to deal with grave financial problems. The boundary 
commission was formed amid this financial depression. Its formation brought 
additional burden on the central treasury. In order to meet the requirement of the 
budgets of 1323, 1324, and 1325, and to cover the budget deficits, the treasury 
disposed of some of its resources. G. Lowther states regarding this matter: 
 
Table 3.1: A summary of the financial estimates for 1325, which were 
forwarded to Istanbul before the end of November.  
Income Amount Expenditures Amount 
 £ T.  £ T. 
Local Revenues 1, 936, 421 Civil expenditure 969, 122 
3 per cent Customs surtax 660, 000 Military expenditure 1, 486, 
397 
Advance by Public Debt 250, 000 Railway guarantees, & 
c. 
390, 901 
Total 2, 846, 421 Total 2, 846, 
421 
 
The figures adopted for the special resources assigned by the Porte to cover 
the excess of expenditure over local revenue, namely the 3 per cent. Custom surtax 
and the advance made by the Public Debt were the same as for 1324.
97
 
The budget of the Ottoman Empire was annually arranged and allocated 
department by department. This enabled the departments to participate in the making 
of the annual budget. However, unexpected expenditures created additional problems 
in balancing the budget. Some of the expenditures of the boundary commission were 
of this nature. Besides the budgetary difficulties of the Ottoman Empire became 
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chronic, Akarlı argues that the budget was being mostly prepared in a four-phase 
process during the time of Abdulhamid.
98
 However, inter-departmental discussions 
on how they would provide for the sums required by the boundary affairs 
demonstrated that the commission’s expenditures were not included in this process to 
prepare the regular budget. Finding these sums had a process of its own. Because the 
formation of the commission was decided suddenly, the Ottoman government had to 
apply a complex procedure to pay for its expenditures.
99
 It is important to ask from 
where the government hoped to find the funds to meet the costs of the boundary 
delimitation. How did the Ottomans deal with such unexpected payments? Why did 
the payment of even such sums that were relatively minor compared to the regular 
budget items prove so difficult? Answering these questions will clearly show the 
struggle behind the border delimitation, too. Clearly, the Ottoman officials had to 
apply a complex set of payment procedures to meet the expenditures of the border 
commission. 
The inter-departmental correspondences related to this issue added up to a 
significantly high number of documents. The ambiguity regarding how these 
expenditures would be paid was obvious. Dealing with this situation preoccupied the 
Ottoman officials. For instance, this ambiguity concerned both the Ministry of 
Financial Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs. However, the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs was the main institution that had to resolve the budgetary problems 
of the commission by producing practical solutions. The officials of all three 
ministries became involved in the struggle to create funds. Two main reasons caused 
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problems. First, the commission was formed after the annual budget was fixed. 
Second, the time that the boundary delimitation would take was not known, so the 
officials could not tell how long the commissioners would be paid for. Initially, these 
two reasons caused ambiguity. Later, this ambiguity intensified because it began to 
become apparent that the central treasury did not have the necessary funds to pay for 
either the salaries of the commissioners or their daily needs in the border front. Their 
payments were gradually released and always delayed. The treasury paid the 
payments by taking loans and issuing payment vouchers that would be paid months 
later.  
The complex set of the payment procedure turned into a cycle that kept 
manifesting the destitution of the Ottoman treasury. Even when the Ottoman treasury 
had funds to rely on, the formation of the boundary commission abruptly and the 
activities in which it was involved generated a need for ready cash and increased the 
budgetary problems. Furthermore, as the commission had been formed in order to 
prevent the cross border violence and the proliferation of the conflicts that 
undermined the public security and order on the eastern limits of the Ottoman 
provinces, it became the basic reason for new expenditures. The frontier policies 
produced by the commission supported the consolidation of the Ottoman military 
fortifications around the frontier. These additional expenditures as well strained the 
Ottoman finances.  
3. 2. Salaries and Travel Payments of the Commission Members  
The commission was formed initially as a committee of inquiry expected to 
investigate the unrest in Van and to settle the boundary disputes and conflicts. Tahir 
Pasha was just a member of this committee, which was headed by Emin Bey Efendi, 
a Member of the Court of Appeals.
100
 Later, Tahir was appointed as the head of the 
investigation committee, replacing Emin Bey. This committee eventually turned into 
a boundary commission. Abdulhamid confirmed its staff on August 10, 1907, by 
appointing a chairman, members and officers. 
101
  
The members of the boundary commission met for the first time upon their 
appointment to the investigation committee. They served in different posts and 
places across the empire previously. One exception to this was Tevfik Bey. He 
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served as the director of the Ministry of Education in Trabzon before he was 
appointed as one of the commissioners. Tahir Pasha probably knew him from the 
days of his governorship of Trabzon and invited him to join the commission to fill 
the gap left by Emin Bey’s departure. He became the last member to join the 
commission and his appointment ended the discussion whether there was need for 
new members or not.  
Although the organization of the commission was completed, how much 
money they would receive while they served on it had not been clearly specified yet. 
This ambiguous situation regarding the finances of the commission continued almost 
until the Porte terminated the commission.  
The salaries of each employees of the commission differed according to their 
position of significance and rank. It was decided that their salaries would have been 
paid monthly, but their salaries were sent cumulatively months later due to financial 
problems. All the payment procedure and figures show that the commissioners kept 
their previous post in addition to their duties in the commission. Accordingly, they 
were paid not only for their service in border affairs but also for their previous post. 
Relatively, they received a small rise in their salaries or an extra salary that changed 
in accordance with their original salaries. However, these financial supports turned 
into their second salaries when the affairs of the commission prolonged for many 
reasons because these additional salaries were paid to them as long as they remained 
as a member of the commission in addition to their first salary. Furthermore, they 
were to be reimbursed for their travel costs in keeping with the set procedures of the 
regulation for travel allowance (Harcırah Nizamnamesi) calculated according to the 
miles they covered.  
3. 3. Members of the Commission and Their Salaries 
As it is stated above, the Boundary Commission embodied a group of senior 
bureaucrats and military commanders. Some of the commissioners were invisible 
throughout in the inter-departmental correspondences, while others were not. The 
salaries indicate that there was a hierarchy within the commission. Tahir Pasha was 
at the top of this hierarchy, but Ali Nadir Pasha, Brigadier General, Şakir Bey, 
Colonel, and Danyal Pasha, Kerkük Commander-Divisional General, were the other 
 38 
commissioners whose say was important.
102
 In addition to these prominent figures, 
there were lower ranked military officers, civil servants, and assistants, who were 
included and excluded intermittently according to the need of the commission. For 
instance, Kazım Bey and Abdülrezzak Efendi, two junior officers, had been asked to 
provide the security of the commission, on March 31, 1908. They became also 
temporary staff of the commission for a while wherever the commission went. They 
were to be paid double their junior salaries. Thus, each of them received two hundred 
and fifty qurushes monthly. In total, they were paid five hundred qurushes extra, but 
the condition of the central treasury was inadequate to pay even such a small amount, 
so Musul supplied this payment by cash, and sent its vouchers, which showed how 
much they paid, to the central treasury to refund it from the allocation of the Ministry 
of Interior.
103
  
The seventeenth article of the Regulation for Travel Allowance indicated that 
any officer who had been temporarily appointed to an official post would be paid an 
additional sum to compensate his travel costs. These travel allowances compromised 
the cost of their round trip and multiple destinations. The temporary members of the 
commission as they became visible only through the payment of their allowances and 
were invisible in the rest of the commission’s records, Brigade Commander 
Abdurrahim Pasha, and Colonel Mustafa Bey, are cases in point. Their actual salaries 
and supplementary salaries were calculated together, so Abdurrahim Pasha was paid 
seven thousand and two hundred qurushes and Mustafa Bey was paid three thousand 
and six hundred qurushes.
104
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Table 3.2-Travel Allowance, Salaries, and Extra Salaries of the Boundary 
Commissioners (In 1907: 650 Liras= 65.000 qurushes, so 1 Lira = 100 qurushes) 
Com. Members Travel Allowance Present Salary Extra Salary 
Tahir Pasha Not available 23.000 q 1, 500 q 
Danyal Pasha 15, 000 q Not available 800 q 
A. Nadir Pasha 25, 000 q Not available 720 q  
Tevfik Bey Not available Not available 700 q 
Şakir Bey 25, 000 q Not available 350 q 
+ 
Zeki Pasha Not available Not available Not available 
 
 
The amount of Tahir Pasha’s travel allowance was not specified. When Tahir 
Pasha was recalled from Trabzon to Bitlis, he received travel allowance for a round 
trip. Probably, Tahir Pasha continued using this money for his trips between 
provinces.
 105
 Until his duty was confirmed, the travel allowance he received created 
some problems. The finance officers began to ask the Grand Vizierate whether Tahir 
Pasha and Tevfik Bey would receive a travel allowance and an extra salary or not. 
Furthermore, they asked how much they would be paid, if they would be paid
 
.
106
 
The officers also questioned whether Danyal Pasha would receive an extra salary or 
not apart from his travel allowance.
107
 While the officers continued to inquire about 
the payments of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey, they decided to pay one extra salary to 
Ali Nadir Pasha and Şakir Bey each commensurate with their actual salaries at the 
beginning.  
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 Another document, written a few months later, indicates 
that Tahir Pasha and the officers who went with him took twenty seven thousand and seven hundred 
and fifty six qurushes and five paras, as it is stated above. However, it is also stated that Tahir Pasha 
received a loan, which was sixteen thousand and five hundred and forty four qurushes for his round 
trip although he should have taken nine thousand six hundred and twenty qurushes for his traveling 
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The travel allowances that would be paid to Ali Nadir Pasha, Şakir Bey and 
Danyal Pasha had been specified. Ali Nadir Pasha and Şakir Bey, each of them, 
would receive two hundred and fifty liras (25, 000 qurushes) and Danyal Pasha 
would receive one hundred and fifty liras (15, 000 qurushes). In total, three of them 
were paid six hundred and fifty liras (65, 000 qurushes) for their travel allowance.
108
 
The Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior demanded this payment 
immediately from the Finance Ministry and expressed that it must be added to the 
annual budget of the Ministry of the Interior in 1907.
109
 
The Treasury found the payment of these sums impossible for lack of 
adequate funds. When the central treasury declared its inability to pay these sums in 
a short time to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, the Province of 
Musul was ordered to pay the required sum in cash in return for vouchers. The 
officers in Musul would send the vouchers to the Central Treasury requesting the 
payment of the indicated sums out of the allocation of the Ministry of the Interior.  
Thus, Musul paid 7,500 qurushes to Tahir Pasha as supplement and paid 
4,000 qurushes to Danyal Pasha. Ali Nadir Pasha was paid 3,600 qurushes. Şakir 
Bey was paid 1,800 qurushes. Tevfik Bey was paid 3,500 qurushes.
110
 In total, they 
received 20,400 qurushes. The financial officers struggled hard to pay Musul its 
expenses, but they could not do it due to the condition of the treasury. Instead, they 
began to delay the payments. The bills circulated from one office to another. The 
finance officials observed, “If those sums could not be paid on time, the payments 
should have been conveyed to the Unexpected Expenses Account (Zuhurat Tertibi) 
of the Ministry of the Interior in 1907.
111
  
On January 2, 1908, the Financial Ministry notified that the Unexpected 
Expenses Office of the Ministry of the Interior could not provide all the money, so 
they assumed that the Expenditure Allocations Office (Mesarif Mürettebatı) should 
pay the remaining sums. However, this office as well stated that they had limited and 
fixed funds and noted that to the General Allocations Office (Mürettebat-ı 
Umumiyye), which arranged the Budget of the Ministry of the Interior, should make 
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the payments. At the end, the Ministry stated that paying such a significant amount 
of money was impossible.
112
  
On January 13, 1908, apparently, they still had not supplied the required 
funds. They kept debating how they would find the required sums. They suggested 
that the unpaid vouchers should be returned to the Unexpected Expenses. Then, the 
accountants stated that there was not another choice left apart from adding that sum 
as a budget deficit to the current year’s (1907) budget under the Arrangement of 
Unexpected Expenses when the vouchers arrived.
113
 However, these financial 
problems did not stop them to seek the funds needed for frontier delimitation.  
The issue of paying the extra salaries of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey
114
 was 
finally resolved. It was decided that they would receive extra salaries as long as they 
were involved in the border defining process. However, the exact amount of their 
payment remained unfixed. Probably, this sum was paid by Van because the 
provincial revenue office of Van inquired about the clarification of a few points 
regarding the extra salaries of Tahir Pasha and Tevfik Bey. In this respect, Mehmed 
Sabri, the Minister of Finance, conveyed the appeal of the revenue office to the 
Ministry of the Interior, on January 25, 1908, requesting information about their 
tenure as members of the frontier delimitation mission from the beginning to the end. 
In addition, the revenue office asked whether their first extra salaries would 
be increased or not, and their salaries would be subject to five per cent deduction for 
Aid for Civil Officials (Mülkiye Musabin), an insurance fund for civil bureaucrats, 
and one per cent for Aid for Debilitated Soldiers (Zu’afa-yı Askeriyye İ’aneleri)115, a 
fund to help debilitated soldiers.
116
  
On February 4, 1908, the Financial Affairs informed the revenue office that 
Tahir Pasha and other commission members should have been paid as of the 
beginning of their boundary investigation duty, and should not be subject to the 
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regulations regarding the insurance funds. However, the Chief Secretary of the 
Ministry of the Interior noted that their extra salaries needed to be cut by five percent 
for the insurance fund for civil bureaucrats and one percent for a similar insurance. 
However, their salary should not increase (terakki) and not be subject to cuts for the 
Debilitated Soldiers Insurance Fund (Zu’afa-yı Askeriyye İanesi).117 Thus, the 
prolonged process to deliver the salaries of these two significant members of the 
commission ended.  
Tahir Pasha’s actual salary was 23, 000 qurushes when he was appointed to 
the Governorship of Bitlis, on July 30, 1907.
118
 According to his biographical 
register, he received, apart from his own salary 1, 500 qurushes extra to recover the 
money he spent from his own pocket while he dealt with the border affairs.
119
 That 
means, in total, he received 24, 500 qurushes for each month. If Musul paid 7, 500 
qurushes to Tahir Pasha to supplement his actual salary, on January 14, 1907, we can 
assume that Tahir Pasha stayed there at least five months since he received 1, 500 
qurushes extra for each month.  
By this logic, Musul paid 4, 000 qurushes to Danyal Pasha, 3, 600 three 
qurushes to Ali Nadir Pasha, 1, 800 qurushes to Şakir Bey, and 3, 500 qurushes to 
Tevfik Bey, which means 20, 400 qurushes in total.
 120
 Thus, if these sums covered a 
five-month period, the share of each commissioner can be calculated, as Danyal 
Pasha received 800; Ali Nadir Pasha received 720; Şakir Bey received 350; Tevfik 
Bey received 700 qurushes for each month as an addition to their actual salaries.
121
  
However, it must be added that these figures do not reflect the entire sum that 
was paid to the commissioners until the last day of the commission, but it gives some 
insight about the extent of the pressure their payments put on the budget throughout 
the border defining process. All these factors show that the Ottoman Treasury 
suffered from the shortage of revenue. Thus, extraordinary expenditure further 
strained the Ottoman finances. 
The formation of the commission put a new burden on the budget. They 
solved the problem only by taking domestic loans from Musul and Van. The 
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vouchers were written in the name of the provinces. The Treasury promised to pay 
these sums back soon. However, these bills circulated from department to 
department as the officials tried to find a budget account from which they could 
make the payments. 
Despite the problems were encountered to reimburse, the Province of Musul 
continued to meet the requirements of the commission against future payments by 
the Treasury.
 122
 On February 11, 1908, the Chief Secretarial Office of the Ministry 
of the Interior clarified the procedure for finding the funds. They wrote that several 
documents involving requests for payment had been sent to the Ministry of the 
Internal Affairs inadvertently instead of the Treasury.
 123
 These seven pieces dispatch 
notes and three promissory notes referred to transactions that involved salary and 
travel cost payments to the commissioners. These sums, which were eventually paid 
by Musul, amounted to 42, 855, 50 qurushes.
124
 
The expenditures of the commission appear to have been added to the annual 
budget temporarily in 1908. On March 19, 1908, the Chief Secretarial Office of the 
Ministry of the Interior informed the Ministry of Finance again that the salaries 
allocated to Tahir Pasha and the other commissioners should have been stated in the 
budget as a temporary item because the work of the commission was about to end. It 
would have been permanently removed from the budget if the commission were 
finally dismissed. In this case, the travel allowances that would be paid to Tahir 
Pasha and the commissioners were set at 122, 400 qurushes for the period from 
September 14, 1907, to March 13, 1908. The sum for their extra salaries would be 
added to this amount, and all would have been allocated from the annual budget, 
eventually.
125
 
3. 4. Occasional Expenditures, Military Fortifications, and the Claims for the 
Termination of the Boundary Commission 
Beyond the difficulties encountered in meeting the payments of the 
commissioners, border-related issues increased the burden on the budget in other 
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ways as well once the commission became involved in these issues proactively. The 
Porte acted on frontier matters according to the information it received from the 
frontier actors. The tendency of the Ottoman and Qajar governments to solve the 
problems diplomatically shifted to aggressive military fortifications and unilateral 
action of the chief commissioners towards the end of 1908. Each fortification and 
expansion effort created a state of panic in the Ottoman Finance Ministry because 
they knew the Treasury did not have sufficient funds to afford the expenses of the 
military fortifications in the villages around the Lake Urumiah. Most of them 
believed that each day the Ottoman troops spent in the frontier zone would bring a 
heavy burden on the Treasury. 
When these occasional pressures increased and cash shortages began to be 
unbearable, the Ottoman officials began to question the number of the military 
troops. They thought the number of troops in the frontier zone could be reduced. 
They suggested the withdrawal of troops, hoping to reduce the costs. This proposal 
divided the Ottoman officialdom into two groups. One group, including Tahir Pasha, 
stressed the importance of the troops. They believed the present number of troops 
should be maintained. The other group demanded the reduction of the number of 
troops to alleviate the burden on the Treasury. Initially, Tahir Pasha opposed them. 
On August 18, 1908, he sent a telegram to the Internal Affairs in which he clearly 
showed his unwillingness to decrease the number of troops. He stated that all the 
battalions that were kept in the border zone were actually very necessary, and the 
Ottoman soldiers should not leave the districts where they were stationed. However, 
the condition of the government finances forced him to agree to the recalling of some 
of the battalions, but he warned Istanbul that this measure would jeopardize the 
security in two significant frontier zones, where nineteen battalion companies 
situated. As Tahir Pasha indicated, he could only decrease the number of them from 
nineteen to twelve or eleven. According to him, seven or eight battalion companies 
should continue their duties and this would be sufficient for now to defend the two 
critical frontier areas, near the disputed zone.
126
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Two days later, Ali Rıza, the Governor of Van, in a telegram that showed his 
opposition to the decision that Tahir Pasha had to take unwillingly. Van was a 
province bordering with these conflict prone zones, and these troops in question were 
actually stationed around the border of Van. Their reduction would threaten border 
security in Van, according to Ali Rıza. His reports provide details about the Ottoman 
fortifications (including the number of troops and the range of military equipment) 
on the border front. According to him, the troops consisted of two artillery battalions, 
two battalions of infantry troops, two regular army squads, one militia unit or 
reserve, and one cavalry squad.
127
 Then, he asked vitally about the cost of these 
troops for the Central Treasury. He stated that if the two regular army squads, whose 
costs were paid by Musul, were excluded, the total cost 155, 300 odd qurushes. Thus, 
Ali Rıza argued that the evacuation of the troops to decrease the expenditures would 
create security problems, and creating funds by dissolving the troops on the border 
was not more important than keeping the public secure and maintaining order in the 
border zone.
128
 Nevertheless, these regular troops were withdrawn as described in 
Tahir Pasha’s letter mentioned above.  
The usefulness of the commission began to be questioned. In September of 
1908, Ali Nadir Pasha and Tevfik Bey resigned from the commission. The appeals of 
these resignations show that they thought that the commission’s expenses were 
unnecessary and aggravating the financial crisis. The reasons behind their resignation 
are explained in the rest of this study, but the most significant statement was in 
Tevfik Bey’s appeal as he referred to current financial situation: “I resigned from the 
commission not to contribute any longer to the damage inflicted on the State 
Treasury unnecessarily…”129  
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3. 5. Tahir Pasha’s Involvement in Boundary Delimitation  
Tahir Pasha was a key frontier actor. He had become a significant policy 
implementer, usually for the Palace. He was often asked to mediate and to 
investigate local disputes. Following Tahir Pasha’s footprints throughout his career 
and detecting the degree of his influence in other state affairs is a challenge. He was 
charged with different duties concerning various problems in different provinces, 
including some the affairs of which were not directly related to his official post. He 
usually had to move from one province to another to investigate conflicts and 
contribute to their settlement. Undoubtedly, his personal experience of governance 
that spanned thirty-three years in the eastern provinces became influential to 
prescribe him as an official capable of restoring public order and calming down 
social unrest caused by governors’ “ignorant” of the conditions in the eastern 
provinces.
130
 
First, Ferid Pasha was the Governor of Bitlis whose disrespectful treatment of 
a mixed group of villagers and sheikhs spurred mass rallies and public unrest in 
1907.
131
 Second, Ali Bey Efendi, the Governor of Van, caused a similar reaction in 
Van the same year.
132
 
Tahir Pasha served previously in these provinces. The Porte formed a 
committee of inquiry to discover the reasons behind the unrests. At that time, Tahir 
Pasha was the Governor of Trabzon. Following the outbreaks of the events, he was 
immediately recalled first to Bitlis and then sent to Van before the unrests in these 
two provinces became widespread. O. H. Parry comments in view of these unrests: 
I told the Grand Vizier that I had news from Bitlis that there was considerable 
political effervescence and discontent there as well as at Van and Erzurum, 
that there appeared to be a strong feeling against the Imperial Government 
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among the Notables, and that there was great danger of a combination 
between the Revolutionary party and the Kurds owing to the exactions and 
maladministration of the country, and that while the Sultan’s attention was 
fixed on a few kilometers of country across the frontier, a dangerous 
revolutionary movement would perhaps break out behind and spread 
throughout the land owing to the excitement engendered by events on the 
frontier.
133
 
 
On November 20, 1907, concerning the latter view of the events, Sir. N. O’Conor 
states that 
 
. . . the state of affairs in Bitlis and Van Vilayets is so disturbed in 
consequence of the attitude of the Kurds and the general scarcity and 
suffering that Tahir Pasha, who is still Vali of Bitlis, will probably not be able 
to prolong the negotiations with the belated Iranian Commission . . . 
134
 
3. 5. 1. Praying for Rain and Rioting against the Governor: The Case of Ferid 
Pasha 
Ferid Pasha was the governor of Bitlis in 1907. During his time as governor, 
he faced a public reaction, which was led by some of the sheikhs. The reasons behind 
why the local people and sheikhs came together and opposed the governorship of 
Ferid Pasha had an interesting background, and demonstrated fragile interrelations 
between the representatives of the central government and the local population. Tahir 
Pasha knew the internal dynamics of Bitlis very well, because Bitlis was the first 
place with which he became acquainted in his long career in the eastern provinces. 
He had served there on various occasions. When the incident occurred in Bitlis, 
Tahir Pasha was sent to Bitlis from Trabzon.  
Brigadier General Celal Pasha explained in detail what happened in the 
province until Tahir Pasha reached Bitlis. Celal Pasha was the leading official who 
witnessed the development of the unrest and dealt with its settlement for the first 
time. His explanations indicate that the sheikhs had strong influence over the people, 
and this point gives us an insight regarding the governmentality of the region at that 
time. The sheikhs used the authority they derived from their influence over people 
against Ferid Pasha, one of the governors of the Ottoman State. Taking the local 
people behind them, the sheikhs underlined that the anger was against the governor 
himself and had nothing to do with the sultan. 
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Celal Pasha’s report regarding this incident helps us understand the reasons 
behind the incident, but it seems that the Ottoman officials could not understand at 
first what happened when people began to gather in front of the government 
building. Celal Pasha’s report indicates that this incident started on June 9, 1907, and 
it continued more than three days. Many days before the incident occurred, local 
people and sheikhs had appealed to Ferid Pasha to exchange some money. This 
exchanging money is not clear, but it gives an idea about Ferid Pasha’s reluctance to 
accommodate the demands of the local people.  
Local people in Bitlis depended on agriculture for their living and agriculture 
depended very much on suitable climate conditions. However, a drought hit them in 
the summer of 1907. In order to avoid this arid summer, villagers, sheikhs, and 
ulema came together to pray for rain for three days. On the last day, they demanded 
Ferid Pasha to participate while they were passing by the government building. Ferid 
Pasha did not participate in this praying activity and met them at the door without 
covering his head.  
Most probably, the sheikhs, who had control over the local people, found 
Ferid Pasha’s behavior disrespectful and something that diminished their authority 
over ordinary people. This friction and opposition turned into a social protest against 
his governorship. Meanwhile, Celal Pasha tended to calm down the crowd. He heard 
the voices of people standing in front of the exterior door and yelling and setting fire 
to the government building: “Pasha, come meet us! If you do not, we are going to 
harm the soldiers and you as well! We obey the Padishah; our target is the 
governor.”135 
Apart from angry crowd who gathered around the government building, 
another group consisting of some ulama, sheikhs, notables, and other respectabile 
people of Bitlis, occupied the telegraph station in Bitlis. By doing so, this interesting 
composition of people aimed to cut off the communications with Istanbul. They 
prevented Celal Pasha as well when he wanted to inform Istanbul about the incident.  
Ferid Pasha simply did not understand how he had caused such a public riot, 
so he was unaware of his mistake. He asked Celal Pasha to learn the demands of the 
crowd that gathered in front of the government building: “… Inform the sheikhs and 
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call them here. If people do not want me, we should solve this without using 
force…”136  
Some of the sheikhs left the telegraph house to talk to the crowd and to scold 
and restrain those people who had begun to behave violently. These disgruntled 
people plundered the government building and killed an Ottoman military officer. On 
the third day, the relations with some of the sheikhs began to normalize. These 
sheikhs feared further deterioration of the situation, and chose to cooperate with 
Celal Pasha by providing intelligence that suggested taking protective measures for 
the safety of Mustafa, Vice Governor and Provincial Captain for Security, and 
Muhammed Efendi, the Gendarme officer.  
To prevent the escalation of the conflict further in Bitlis, Tahir Pasha was 
sent to Bitlis in order to listen to the complaints of the people and to investigate the 
inappropriate actions of those people who behaved anarchistically against the 
authority of the governor.
137
 Celal Pasha was replaced with another person in Bitlis, 
and the place of some of the officers changed. 
138
 Some troops were shifted from 
Mush and Van to Bitlis under the command of the Divisional General Mahmud 
Pasha, while the Porte advised all the officials in Bitlis to calm the people down.
139
  
Before Tahir Pasha arrived at Bitlis, Ferid Pasha had already left the province 
by imperial order, and was in a village nearby Bitlis, waiting for Tahir Pasha’s 
arrival.
140
 However, later, Ferid Pasha moved to the army headquarters to prevent 
any harm towards him and was ordered to wait there until the investigation 
concluded.
141
 Meanwhile, Istanbul was looking for possibilities for a resolution to 
calm down the people and to restore public order in Bitlis. Tahir Pasha was urged to 
move faster,
142
 as reports indicated that the agitation of the people increased in Bitlis 
and the communications with the province was cut off.
143
  
The urgent arrival of Tahir Pasha at the province was very important under 
these circumstances. However, traveling from Trabzon to Bitlis within a short time 
was difficult because everyone had to use traditional means of transportation. 
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Fortunately, they were in the summer season and Tahir Pasha did not have to deal 
with the heavy weather conditions that usually closed roads for months. The means 
of transportation, distance, and road conditions still prolonged his travel. A document 
conveyed to the deputy governor of Trabzon indicates that travelling from Trabzon 
to Bitlis normally took eighty-nine hours, almost full four days, in 1907.
144
 For that 
reason, travelling this route faster than normal would have been an invaluable 
contribution to the settlement of the uprising, for, evidently the center saw Tahir 
Pasha as the only official who had the capacity to resolve the conflict. 
3. 5. 2. Anti-Governor Riot in Van: The Case of Ali Bey Efendi 
Ali Bey Efendi succeeded Tahir Pasha as the governor of Van, when Tahir 
Pasha’s term (1898-1906) ended due to his medical problems. Van was nearby 
province with Bitlis. A conflict erupted in Van as well. Although it did not escalate 
as much as it did in Bitlis, it had such a potential impact. Two commanders, 
Divisional General Mahmud Pasha and Marshall Zeki Pasha shed light on the 
reasons why Ali Bey Efendi encountered resistance in Van.  
Their statements revolved around four reasons: a) Ali Beg Efendi was 
ignorant of the local conditions. b) He did not comply with the procedures to gather 
information in order to maintain public order because of his lack of experience. c) He 
offended the Muslim population.
145
 d) There was an obvious disparity between his 
behavior and position. 
Marshal Zeki Pasha, as a strong defender of the Hamidian Light Cavalry, 
summarized that the Armenians manipulated the present conditions due to Ali Bey 
Efendi’s poor administration and inexperience as he had been in Van for almost a 
year. He asserted that a group of Armenians abused his lack of local knowledge and 
instigated tumult by spreading hatred among the inhabitants of Van.
146
 Ali Bey 
Efendi rejected all these accusations against him. Then, the Porte decided to send an 
investigation committee to find out whether Ali Bey Efendi was at fault or not.  
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Together with some well-known people that would involve later in the 
frontier commission, the Porte appointed Emin Bey Efendi, a Member of the Court 
of Appeals, as the chief investigator.
147
 Tahir Pasha was appointed as the governor of 
Bitlis after settling the unrest. He was also nominated to participate in the 
investigation. Then, he was ordered to join the investigation committee headed by 
Emin Bey. The Porte was counting on Tahir Pasha as a conflict resolver in Bitlis. 
When a need emerged to investigate the unrest in Van, the Porte understood that his 
absence could lead to similar events in Bitlis. Thus, they decided to appoint a deputy 
governor by stressing that he should be a suitable person capable of managing the 
province properly during Tahir Pasha’s absence. 
Proto-boundary commission that was charged to investigate the accusations 
directed to the imperial army was the integral part of the investigation committee of 
Emin Bey. Tahir Pasha was in this committee as well. The Porte charged the border 
commission with full authority to investigate Ali Bey Efendi’s conduct, thereby 
dismissing Emin Bey. The Porte’s decision implied that a copy of the report that 
showed the findings of the investigation of Emin Bey’s committee would be sent to 
Tahir Pasha because he did not have the time to wait for the results. He had to leave 
to meet to the British, Russian and Iranian representatives on the border front.
148
 
At the end, the investigation committee found Ali Bey Efendi guilty, and the 
Porte decided to dismiss him. Thus, Zeki Pasha, who insisted on Ali Bey’s guiltiness, 
reached his aim after the assertions about Ali Bey proved accurate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE COMMISSION IN ACTION 
The previous chapter discussed the formation of the Ottoman frontier 
commission, the impact of the commission’s expenditures on the Central Treasury, 
and the circumstances under which Tahir Pasha was involved in the commission that 
was shaped to settle the boundary issue. This chapter specifically examines how the 
frontier commission led by Tahir Pasha dealt with the frontier difficulties and 
attempted to define the imperial eastern boundary. In the first phase of this endeavor, 
the commission was charged to inquire about a local frontier dispute, which was not 
related to the delimitation of the boundary directly. In the second phase, which 
proved quite intense, the commission focused on negotiations to settle the boundary 
issues. The section shed light on the difficulties involved and how the occupation of 
controversial territories in keeping with the Palace’s response aggravated those 
difficulties. The chapter discusses as well the various reasons, multiple factors and 
development that led to the dissolution of the boundary commission. One of these 
reasons, the impact of the 1908 movement, is analyzed especially closely.  
4. 1. The Phase of Inquiry  
After Tahir Pasha dealt with the political unrest in Bitlis and Van, he was 
ordered to attend a joint meeting with the Russian, British and Iranian delegates in 
order to clarify a local dispute and the charges made against the Ottoman troops.  
In this phase, the Russian and British Consuls had conversations with the 
Ottoman frontier commissioners, and they tried to anticipate the objectives of the 
commission. The first job that Tahir Pasha fulfilled was to reprove military officers 
for their misconduct and to arrest certain Kurds. Sir. N. O’Conor, a British 
ambassador in Istanbul, perceived this action as a hopeful sign that the new 
commission could eventually define the boundary.
149
 The manner in which Tahir 
received O’Conor was most cordial. As O’Conor said, Tahir Pasha would see the 
Iranian commissioners as soon as they arrived; The Pasha was waiting for the arrival 
of the Iranian commissioners with impatience. The objects of his mission were, first, 
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to examine the charges made against the Ottoman troops, and second, to look into the 
question of the frontier in a general manner.
150
 
Before formal conversations started, all the representatives, particularly the 
British consuls, held unofficial conversations to understand the intentions of the new 
commission. The Ottoman commission arrived at the border front before the Iranian 
commission did. Thus, the British and Russian consuls found an opportunity to 
figure out first the intention of the Ottoman commissioners. The scope of these 
unofficial conversations revolved around whether the Ottoman government would 
withdraw its troops or not from the disputed lands. In a similar conversation, Tahir 
Pasha informed Sir. N. O’Conor that they considered the occupied districts 
Mergaver, Tergaver, Beradost, Somai, and Anzel as Ottoman territory. He assured 
O’Conor that his arguments were based on Dervish Pasha’s map, combined with 
other evidence. The appeals of the local people were also another point that Tahir 
Pasha used to justify his position. He found it impossible to disregard the appeal of 
the inhabitants of the district of Ushni for the blessings of the Ottoman government, 
so he implied that he could order the occupation of Ushni when required.
151
 
The British Consuls questioned whether these were Tahir Pasha’s own 
initiatives or based on the instructions sent form the Palace or the Grand Vizierate. 
O’Conor believed that Tahir Pasha would not risk his position in the service of the 
Ottoman government, a position which he valued highly. Apparently, the consul 
believed that Tahir was acting under the instructions of the Palace. The Grand 
Vizierate was providing different assurances to the British and Russian Consuls 
about the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the occupied lands. At this stage, 
the Porte had a negative view of the occupations, unlike the Palace. This 
contradiction between the Palace and the Grand Vizierate reverberated on Tahir 
Pasha’s relations with the Grand Vizierate as well. The British consuls felt that Tahir 
Pasha maintained a cordial working relationship with the Palace and was overriding 
the assurances given by the Sublime Porte to Britain, Russia and Iran.  
The British Consul-General, A. C. Wratislaw frequently recommended to 
Tahir Pasha to retrace the false steps he took on his own initiative. Tahir Pasha 
responded to him that he was ‘only a humble functionary, whose duty it was to carry 
out his instructions, not to criticize them, and that unasked-for interference in matters 
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outside his competence would lead to no other result than his dismissal.’152 The 
Ottoman archival sources indicate that the Porte very often questioned the authority 
of Tahir Pasha because his action diverged from the orders they sent. 
On November 20, 1907, the Ottoman Commission was still waiting on the 
frontier the arrival of the Iranian commissioners. The negotiations would start as 
soon as the Iranian commissioners arrived. Meanwhile, the British consuls continued 
to try to clarify the stance of Tahir Pasha and his commission through the unofficial 
conversations they held with him. Their aim was to understand what Tahir Pasha 
could propose during the negotiations. Sir N. O’Conor asserted 
 
Tahir Pasha no doubt will argue that the greater part of the disputed districts 
belongs to Turkey, that the Iranian Government have never established 
effective jurisdiction, that the consequent state of anarchy is unbearable, that 
the Ottoman government cannot allow Sunnis to be oppressed by Shiahs, and 
that Dervish Pasha’s map, although not official, is strong evidence in their 
favour, which must be taken into consideration.
153
 
 
Moreover, the British and Russian consuls began to understand the Ottoman 
troops did not have any intention to evacuate the districts they had occupied, so the 
consuls began to criticize the Sublime Porte for adopting an obstinate position. They 
found Tahir Pasha’s arguments to justify the Ottoman claim to the annexed territory 
flimsy and self-destructive. They thought that it would be difficult to find a basis for 
the negotiations unless the Ottoman commissioners produced arguments that are 
more satisfactory.
154
  
For the boundary commission, the Ottoman State did not accept the 
intervention of third parties as mediators; similar to the role Britain and Russia had 
played in the 1840s. Thus, previous mediating powers were excluded from becoming 
an official part of the meetings in the early years of the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, Britain and Russia sought solutions that would not undermine their 
interests in Iran before the negotiations commenced behind closed doors. Giving 
advice to both sides was the best way to observe the negotiations and to influence 
their outcome. For instance, Wratislaw stated that Tahir Pasha had not attempted to 
question his right to lecture him and pointing out the errors in his line of thinking. In 
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fact, Wratislaw appears to have believed that Tahir accepted him as an official 
member of the frontier commission.
155
 The reason why Tahir Pasha behaved in this 
manner was that he believed British and Russian consuls would be on the Ottoman 
side. On the contrary, as Wratislaw indicated, they were inevitably in opposite 
camps, but they had to keep friendly relations with both states.  
The Russian Vice-Consul Baron Tcherkassov and Captain Dickson, R. A., 
the British Vice Consul at Van, and the Ottoman commissioners met in Başkale in 
order to inquire about the local dispute mentioned above and to evaluate the general 
appearance of the boundary. During the meeting, the Russian Vise Consul stressed 
the importance of the recent convention that guaranteed the political integrity of Iran. 
Tahir Pasha handed a memorandum to the Russian Vise Consul that explained the 
general objectives of the Ottoman frontier commission.
156
 
4. 1. 1. A Local Dispute: Pro-Iranian Muslims and Nestorians vs. Pro-Ottoman 
Kurdish Villagers  
Frontier difficulties as they were mentioned in the methodology chapter 
showed that the relations of the frontier actors, whether interstate or intertribal, were 
fragile, the scarcity of summer and winter pastures in the region was mainly pushing 
the tribes to cross the status quo line. This was the main source of conflicts between 
the Ottoman Empire and Iran. In the microscopic level, the prevalent religious, 
ethnic, and tribal differences had created rivalry and antagonistic feelings among the 
local inhabitants of the region. As Vice-Consul Dickson reported: 
 
The Assyrians are divided up into many religious parties, and change about 
from one to the other with a conscience made easy by the inducements, 
pecuniary or otherwise, offered by the advocates of various creeds. Thus, in 
most villages one finds, Nestorians, Chaldeans, (i.e., Roman Catholics), 
Russian Orthodox, and American Presbyterian of some denomination, 
besides protégés of the English mission. They may have their petty 
jealousies, and differences of opinion among themselves, but they combine 
against the Kurds.
157
 
 
These socio-political differences could easily become sources of conflict 
when combined with economic concerns. Tahir Pasha witnessed a similar dispute, 
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among the local people, which involved several ethnic and religious groups. 
According to Tahir Pasha, Iranian officers instigated the Nestorians
158
 and pro-
Iranian Muslims to attack seven Kurdish villages in order to keep them under their 
sovereignty. When the Iranian officers could not win the tribes over, they turned to 
diplomacy. In Tahir Pasha’s eyes, Iran followed methods that ranged from 
diplomacy to coercive policies.  
An Iranian officer, Majd es Sultanah, was a modernist and favored a 
centralized state. He became the “boss” of the Enjumen in Urumiah in 1907. 
Wratislaw portrays him as the enemy of the crown prince.
159
 It seems he actively 
participated in local politics since 1905. As an editorial comment that was published 
in 1907 by the American Journal of International Law indicates:  
The present violence (1907) dates from disturbance that resulted from an 
ineffectual attempt by a Persian armed force, under command of the vigorous 
Majd es Sultanah, to capture, in the disputed Turco-Persian frontier in the 
indefinite Kurdistan region, the accomplices in the murder of the Rev. B. W. 
Labaree, an American missionary killed at Urumiah in March, 1904.
160
 
 
 Tahir Pasha blamed Majd es Sultanah for the actions of the Nestorians and 
other Muslim groups. Tahir Pasha depicted that Majd es Sultanah employed two 
hundred armed men with rifles from the village of Mavane to coerce the Kurds to 
obedience. With two hundred armed men, they seized seven Kurdish villages by 
violence and set fire to their houses.
161
 Wratislaw cited this dispute in his memoirs in 
detail.
162
 Tahir Pasha stated that the Kurds had decided to take revenge and this time 
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they raided Nestorian villages. They noticed that the Nestorians, who burned their 
houses, and Majd es Sultanah , were going to Urumiah. In a short time, the Kurds 
surrounded Mavane and the neighboring two villages, which did not have any 
military equipment, weapons and guards.
163
 They captured two hundred and eighty-
three cows, seven hundred and twenty-six cattle, two thousand nine hundred and 
seventy-nine sheep, many goods, and other items. 
The Ottoman Army reached the region, and prevented further infighting and 
stopped the plundering of Kurdish villagers. Then, the Ottoman officers persuaded 
Kurds to return the plundered animals and goods to the Nestorians, which they did. 
However, the Nestorians had already applied to the Russian Consulate in Urumiah. 
Tahir Pasha found this application unnecessary so that their losses could have been 
completely compensated by the Ottoman government if they had asked. In fact, the 
Kurds had returned Nestorian’s animals, goods and items.164 Tahir Pasha was afraid 
of the possibility of a triple alliance among the Russians, Iranians, and Nestorians, 
which could put the Ottoman subjects at a disadvantageous position in Urumiah. He 
ordered immediately that a person should have been appointed to represent these 
people. In order to prevent any arbitrary action and to gather accurate intelligence, he 
suggested the appointment of Memduh Bey, the Consul of Hoy and Selmas to 
Urumiah
 165
 By using Christian Nestorians in his expedition, Majd es Sultanah  had 
created a ground to complain about the Ottomans to Britain and Russia. These 
complaints turned into charges that the British and Russian consuls pursued against 
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One of them was the famous officer: Mösyö Yanavşakof (Russian Vice-Consul 
Baron Tcherkassov)
166
 also known as “Mu’allim,” the teacher, by the Iranians. The 
Russian delegate expressed two accusations that were asserted by the Iranians, 
namely that the Ottoman Imperial Army had entered the village of Mavane after 
bombarding it, and the troops kidnapped girls, and killed many women and children. 
Tahir Pasha shared the results of his own investigations and asserted that none of 
these arguments had any basis. The Ottoman troops had not violated anyone. In 
contrast, they had expelled the joint army of Mecdü’s-Sultanah while he was 
attacking the Kurdish villages. Tahir Pasha explained that the Ottoman Army had 
neither violated the status quo nor committed crimes against humanity.
167
 
According to Tahir Pasha’s report, Russian and British consul said the final 
word on behalf of the Iranian delegates, as Iranians did not participate in the meeting. 
In a debate during the meeting, the Russian consul gave a speech confirming the 
Ottoman position that Majd es Sultanah was the actual violator of the border, and 
that the accusations reflected not the reality, but the opposite. All the officers at the 
meeting, including the Russian consul of Urumiah, agreed that the information they 
had about the Ottoman soldiers firing guns on the Christian villages and insulting 
women did not have any basis.
168 
 
On the contrary, the Russians made remarks that corroborated the Ottoman 
position and suggested that the Ottoman soldiers had maintained justice there. The 
Russian officers stated that public security was at risk in the region and order was 
broken in Ushni in particular. They urged officially that everything should be done to 
provide security promptly and completely. The Russian officers made 
recommendations about how the Ottomans could help maintain security in the border 
region.
169 
 
Besides, the British consul behaved neutrally. A British consul reflected 
retrospectively on the British position regarding the frontier question in general at the 
time of the first meetings. 
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The disturbances on the Turco-Iranian frontier were in a locality in which 
Russia was more interested then we were. British interests were not directly 
affected, for the places we had Oil Concessions were further south, and were 
not at present involved. The locality was also out of our reach. Further, if we 
took the initiative in moving our fleet, the impression would be given that 
war between us and Turkey generally was impending, which would not be 
confined to the Iranian frontier, this might give rise to trouble and excitement 
in Egypt and elsewhere … We could not therefore take the initiative … But, 
on the other hand, we could cordially support an initiative taken by Russia.
170
 
 
In the same line with the above statement, the British consul asserted there 
was not a borderline that the two sides agreed upon officially, so Majd es Sultanah’s 
transgression cannot be considered as a border violation because how could one 
transgress a borderline that did not exist. However, Tahir Pasha asserted Mecdü’s-
Sultanah did not have the right to intervene in the affairs of people living in the 
disputed zone even if there was not a settled boundary line. At the end of the 
meeting, Britain was satisfied with Tahir Pasha’s argument. The Russian and British 
consuls refused to pursue the accusations that were brought to the commission. 
The British consul clarified his position by stating that he would not pursue 
this issue further. Furthermore, he asked whether the Ottoman State would be content 
it if the occupied places were left to it.
171
  
Evidently, Tahir Pasha took this question seriously and responded by an 
information sheet in which the Urumiah directorate had been blamed due to his 
commitment to the crime and violation of the border by provoking the Shikal tribe, 
inhabiting in Somay and Çehrin villages. According to Tahir Pasha, these pro-Iranian 
tribes transgressed the border and broke the public order by damaging people’s 
properties and killing many.  
Tahir Pasha was not authorized to annex any piece of territory. He could 
resort to action only after the Porte authorized him.  Nevertheless, he thought that a 
prompt response to the British consul in this case would be good for maintaining 
public security in disputed places and could work in favour of the Ottoman State. 
Due to internal turmoil, Iran was not able to maintain public security and order even 
within its provinces proper. Thus, Tahir Pasha responded to the British consul that 
the disputed villages should have been left under Ottoman rule because the Ottoman 
State had the ability to end the violence and lawlessness prevailing in the frontier 
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zone. In addition, he demanded the protection of the current Ottoman administration 
in the region. He added that the Ottomans would not hesitate to leave those districts, 
which were adjacent to the fertile plains of Urumiah, when a superior commission 
formed, once the public security was provided.
172
 
Before the meeting was completely dismissed, the participants discussed 
where they would meet next. They could not agree on the time and purpose of the 
next venue for the continuation of the discussions regarding the disputed districts and 
border matters. The Russian consul suggested Urumiah for the next meeting. 
However, they had to express that Iranian commissioners would be able to arrive at 
Urumieh thirty-four days later. Indeed, the Ottoman commissioners had waited for 
Iranian commissioners in different places since some months until the meeting. Tahir 
Pasha perceived the delaying of the meeting again as a big challenge and wondered 
suspiciously why Russia had chosen Urumiah while there were many other 
alternative places such as Selmas and Deyleman. The Russians propounded that 
Selmas or Deyleman were not proper places because the Caucasian revolutionaries 
(Kafkasiyye İhtilalcileri) were in the middle of the way and would stop them. Passing 
through narrow paths where these illegal groups situated could create catastrophic 
results for the commissioners. However, Tahir Pasha did not want to meet at 
Urumiah due to its security problems and the possibility that Iran could provoke 
some Iranian-Kurdish tribes in there.
 173
 
The meeting resulted with a relative victory for the Ottomans as they found 
an opportunity to express their opinions and to clarify accusations. In addition, Tahir 
Pasha criticized the Iranian Committee of Inquiry and associated their absence with 
their wish to decelerate the process of border demarcation and not to confront the 
consequences of their violent deeds in the Kurdish villages. 
Then, the British consul left the meeting and returned to Van via Beyazid 
after they stopped by four villages in Urumiah, Salmas, and Hoy. The Russian consul 
returned to Urumiah. Tahir Pasha deployed the Ottoman commissioners to Van and 
Bitlis until he received the next order due to the reason mentioned below.
174
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If Muhteshem es Sultanah leaves now, he will be able to arrive at the border 
front more than a moth later, but our commission has waited them for more 
than two months. If we spent one more month on the border front, indeed, we 
shall not able to implement our duty due to upcoming winter.  
 
In contrast, he witnessed the Porte’s resistance. Tevfik Pasha, the Minister of 
Exterior, suggested the commission should wait there as he had learnt that the Iranian 
officers were on their way. His reasons to order Tahir Pasha to wait can be outlined 
as follows. According to him, if the Iranian delegates arrived after the Ottoman 
commissioners left the region, they could manipulate the situation to create a 
perception as if the Ottoman State was actually leaving the boundary delimitation 
issue in limbo. Thus, the presence of the Ottoman commissioners at the meeting 
place would prevent labeling it as a reluctant state, deferring the resolution of the 
border conflicts. He feared further that Iranian complaints and false accusations 
could find a ground to be deemed convincing, and help them gain consequently the 
support of foreign powers in their future interventions.
175
 Considering all these 
variables, Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha did not admit Tahir Pasha’s request to leave and 
ordered him to wait for the arrival of the Iranian commissioners.
176
 Moreover, as the 
Russians proposed, the Iranian commissioners sent an information sheet and invited 
the Ottoman commissioners to Urumiah.  
Danyal Pasha, an Ottoman commissioner, opposed meeting in Urumiah for 
the similar reasons that Tahir Pasha had in his mind and he found the meeting place 
risky because Iran had strong influence on some of the Iranian-Kurdish tribes settled 
there.
177
 He added a sentimental comment on the duty of the commission. The 
boundary commission had been charged by a great state (the Ottoman State) to fulfill 
the responsibilities of the Caliphate, thus, they should not walk behind scattered 
government officials. Frontier inhabitants could perceive walking behind Iranian 
officers and going to places designated by them as a weakness. If the Ottoman 
commissioners acted under the direction of the Iranian commissioners, the allegiance 
and compliance of the frontier people might have been shaken gradually.
178
 In 
contrast to Tahir Pasha and Danyal Pasha, the Iranian commissioners insisted on 
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meeting in Urumiah.
179
 Instead, Tahir Pasha decided to meet in Mavane. He went to 
Mavane via Selmas to meet with Muhteshem es Sultanah, the Chief Negotiator of the 
Iranian Commission. Thirty cavalrymen and their captain accompanied Tahir.
180
 
On January 8, 1908, it was reported that Muhteshem es Sultanah did not 
come to Mavane although he was there earlier. Instead, he sent a letter to the 
Ottoman commission, suggesting to meet in the center of Urumiah. Despite the risks 
Tahir Pasha saw in such a meeting, he accepted to go to Urumiah.
181
 
One of the risks that Tahir Pasha considered was that Muhteshem es Sultanah 
tried to lead the Iranian Kurds astray with the support of Iranian soldiers ever since 
he came to Mavane. Tahir Pasha thought Muhteshem es Sultanah intended to disturb 
the peace in areas where the Ottoman State maintained the security. He criticized the 
intrigues of Muhteshem es Sultanah harshly and accused him of behaving 
irresponsibly: “an officer who was appointed to a joint investigation should not 
follow such a vulgar manner and threaten public security.”182  
He invited Muhteshem es Sultanah to a village in Urumiah in order to carry 
out the negotiations. All these delaying tactics and wavering showed that Iran was 
reluctant to negotiate while the Ottoman military occupied the disputed lands. None 
of these two states trusted the other, and confrontation remained always an option in 
contrast to the British and Russian who wanted to achieve a peacefull colonization of 
Iran. Tahir Pasha kept the military option in his hand. He could deploy at a moment’s 
notice the regular troops and some other forces that were carefully assembled in 
Savuçbulak for action in case of an emergency.183 The boundary negotiations began 
in this belligerent atmosphere. 
4. 2. The Phase of New Occupations and Boundary Negotiations 
Following the ad hoc meeting, which was the first meeting that Tahir Pasha 
attended at Başkale, the method in which the negotiations would be conducted 
became apparent. All the parties agreed that the question would be settled by friendly 
conversation, mutual concessions, formal negotiations, and the exchange of written 
memoranda. The Ottoman commission would lead the process, so they wrote the first 
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memorandum setting down their case. The Iranian commission followed suit and 
demanded the recognition of the neutral zone and the Second Erzurum Treaty of 
1847 as the basis of the negotiations.
184
 Tahir Pasha was getting prepared to propose 
that the earlier treaties should be the basis of the negotiations.
185
 
4. 2. 1. Imperial Edicts, The Porte’s Reports, Ancient Treaties and Maps 
Tahir Pasha did not have a predetermined plan apart from embracing the 
steps taken by Dervish Pasha. Within a short time, he learnt which registers from the 
Ottoman archives could be utilized to justify his arguments. First, Tahir Pasha 
ordered the retrospective examination of the imperial edicts of the last one hundred 
and fifty years that would enable him to understand the history of the boundary 
delimitation and the background of the present conflicts. Second, Tahir Pasha 
demanded the examination of the imperial edicts more specifically. This time, he 
ordered the investigation of the edicts, covering a hundred fifty years, particularly 
issued to the pashas and Beys of Imadiyye, Vezene and Hakkari. His aim was to 
understand the question whether some townships, including Soma-yı Çehrin, were 
under Ottoman rule or not. Furthermore, he wanted to formalize those sections of the 
boundary
186
 that the late Dervish Pasha had investigated and depicted in his 
explanatory document (layiha) and map.
187
 He extracted from Dervish Pasha’s 
explanatory document that those townships, Ushni
188
, some villages of Soma-yı 
Çeherin, and townships of Deşt-i Bil were part of the Ottoman Empire, but the 
Enzel-i Bala Township was under the jurisdiction of Urumiah.  
Tahir Pasha believed that the Iranian officers had confirmed the explanatory 
document of Dervish Pasha in the past. He asserted that Iran had never established an 
administrative unit in these lands, so they did not have the right to claim sovereignty 
over these lands. Moreover, he showed Iran as the main instigator of the disorder 
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because Iran had incited the tribes in the frontier zone clandestinely and 
continuously, although it was prohibited.
189
 He blamed Iran for breaking the public 
order and security in the frontier zone by inducing cross-border violence, injustice, 
and lawlessness.
190
 When the Ottoman state responded by taking the initiative and 
fortifying its military forces around the zone, the tribes retreated and Iranians began 
to complain about the intervention of Ottoman troops to Russia and Britain by means 
of its embassy.  
Tahir Pasha referred to the demographic features of the frontier zone as 
evidence to justify his arguments. According to him, the inhabitants of these villages, 
districts, and townships were practitioners of Sunni Islam, so they would never 
accept to live under the sovereignty of Qajars. They could be brought under the 
protection of the Caliphate in a short time in order to save them from the frontier 
difficulties.
191
 
He also benefited from geostrategic arguments to legitimate his actions 
pragmatically. When this was the case, his arguments became very suggestive of the 
occupations. For instance, he stated that if Ushni and Deşt-i Bil were taken under the 
protection of the Ottoman State, military facilities in that region would be closer to 
the Ottoman forces stationed in Vezene. He added that annexing the villages of 
Somay and Çehrin would also serve the promotion of regional security. 
His arguments necessitated the occupation of these lands, but if these lands 
were under the sovereignty of the Ottoman state once, why did it not establish an 
administrative unit covering these villages? One of the statements of Tahir Pasha can 
be an answer to this question. Tahir Pasha asserted that previous Ottoman frontier 
officers created the current complex situation by leaving these lands in a state of 
flux, so the gap had been filled by the constant intrigues of Iranian officers. 
Wratislaw illustrated the details of Tahir Pasha’s argument regarding how those parts 
of Kurdistan and some of the Kurds had remained in the hands of Iran: 
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Naib es Sultanah
192
 profited by the state of confusion into which Turkey was 
thrown by her disastrous wars with Russia, the suppression of the Janissaries, 
the institution of the Nizam Jedid (New Order), and other reforms, to seduce 
the Kurds and annex Turkish territory. But now the Kurds have returned to 
their ancient allegiance to the sultan.
193
 
 
After he made this argument, he implied that the Ottoman State would no 
longer stay silent and negligent. He believed that inability of Iran to establish its 
jurisdiction in these districts in the past showed that Iran had never established any 
authority in these territories. To solidify his argument, Tahir Pasha used Dervish 
Pasha’s explanatory document and map, which showed accurately, according to him, 
under whose jurisdiction the disputed villages and townships were.
194
  
He thought taking these villages under Ottoman rule was an obligation for 
several reasons. First, Iran’s efforts to win over the tribes gradually would continue. 
Second, the tribal leaders who appealed for Ottoman subjecthood could perceive the 
inaction of the Ottoman State as a weakness, and hence drawn to Iran. Third, the 
prevalent violence in the region was a problem and the Ottoman State had the 
capacity to prevent it. Because of prevalent anarchy in the disputed lands, Tahir 
Pasha proposed that protecting these people was a necessity and a priority of the 
Ottoman State.
195
 
As mentioned above, the third group of documents Tahir Pasha ordered for 
examination was the Porte’s Reports (Divan tezkireleri). He realized that these 
reports could be used to specify the identity of townships thanks to the technical and 
taxation information that they included.  
 A case in point is Tahir Pasha’s attempt to clarify whether the township of 
Beradost belonged to the Ottoman Empire or Iran. He concluded that Beradost was 
actually an Ottoman township. On December 4, 1907, Tahir Pasha brought out an 
information sheet, written by Dervish Pasha earlier. According to this sheet, Beradost 
was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire because it showed that the collection of 
the taxes of this township along with certain administrative duties was auctioned to 
Hatim Bey, an Ottoman subject, previously. He added that ‘during the time of 
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Dervish Pasha, Hatim Bey’s son, Halil Bey, brought up the records of this 
commission including a copy of the Porte’s relevant reports. These documents 
verified the relationship of the township to the Ottoman Empire.
196
 This example 
illustrates as well the ambivalence of the status of certain borderlands because of the 
need to dig deep into records to establish where they stood in between the two 
neighboring states. Tahir Pasha was evidently eager to gather as much information as 
possible to clarify the Ottoman identity of the their disputed areas. He asked for a 
scanning of the Porte’s reports going back hundred and fifty years towards this end. 
The fourth group of documents that Tahir Pasha requested included all the 
old treaties the Ottoman Empire and Iran had signed since the sixteenth century. He 
examined a total number of six treaties. The first treaty that he mentioned was the 
Treaty of Zuhab, or the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, signed on May 17, 1639 (1049), 
which indicated the validity of some of the articles related to his claims. This treaty 
fixed the frontier line in view of the conflict of nations, and accordingly, confirmed 
that the Iranian government should not interfere in [the affairs of] the Ottoman-
Kurdistan. The second treaty was signed in Hemedan after a series of battles broke 
out between 1723 and 1727. Tahir Pasha stressed that this treaty agreed to leave 
under the Ottomans not only Kurdistan but also certain cities that were currently 
under Iranian administration. The third treaty was signed in 1736. It confirmed 
previous agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. The fourth treaty was 
the treaty of Kerden, signed on September 4, 1746. This treaty, known as the Second 
Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin, confirmed the previous frontier limits and relevant articles. 
The fifth treaty was the treaty of Erzurum, which was signed in 1823, after the 
Iranian army lost a significant number of its soldiers due to an outbreak of cholera. 
By this treaty, Iran returned the lands it occupied in Eastern Anatolia, recognized the 
former border and guaranteed that it would not interfere in any district in the 
Kurdistan region. The sixth treaty was signed in 1857 and known as the Second 
Erzurum Treaty. It approved the outcomes of the previous treaties by revising and 
clarifying some parts of the border, such as Zuhab. Considering each treaty, which 
repeated each other and revolved around the first treaty, Tahir Pasha claimed that 
Iran did not have any right to interfere in any of the villages, sub-districts, districts, 
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or sub-provinces of the Kurdistan region, which stretched from Beyazid to 
Suleymaniye.
197
  
His examination of the imperial edicts and relevant government reports, 
dating back a hundred and fifty years, revealed that Iran had ratified Ottoman 
sovereignty in the Kurdistan region.  
He reached a conclusion signifying that the current situation of the border did 
not reflect the provisions of the treaties in the field. The present status in the border 
districts opposed to both the treaties and the rules, although the treaties assigned 
many districts in disputed lands to the Ottoman Empire, but previous frontier officers 
(serhad memurları) had not completely applied the treaty articles.198 Moreover, these 
districts, which were ignored by those frontier officers, became the main problems 
day by day between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Even though these districts in the 
border zone were ignorantly neglected, the Kurds in these lands perpetually and 
strongly maintained allegiance to the Ottoman State, which was understood at the 
end of small survey that was undertaken to learn about people’s opinions in the zone. 
In fact, Fazıl Pasha’s ability to mobilize thirty thousand Kurds in the zone against 
Firman-Firma supports Tahir Pasha’s view. All these variables show that a 
significant number of Kurds in the zone supported pro-Ottoman and pro-Caliphate 
policies because the discursive references of the Ottomans to the Sunni-Kurds 
resonated and acquired a practical meaning in view of the refugee demands. 
However, they were not only a group who wanted to benefit from Ottoman 
protection, there were also many people in the zone who opposed Iranian polices and 
chose to be an Ottoman subject regardless of ethnic and religious differences.  
The fifth group of documents Tahir Pasha considered was Dervish Pasha’s 
map and its explanatory notes. Tahir Pasha’s reports make amply clear that he relied 
extensively on this map and its explanations that Dervish Pasha provided. Therefore, 
one can argue that the boundary line in Tahir Pasha’s mind was the line specified 
according to Dervish Pasha’s surveys. In this study, unfortunately, I used not Dervish 
Pasha’s map, but a map that was drawn by the Ministry of Ottoman Foreign Affairs 
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in 1910 based on the maps drawn during Dervish and Tahir Pasha’s commissions. 
The boundaries that were shown in this map
199
 differed from the projections of the 
Anglo-Russian Joint Map
200
. The map of 1910 shows the geographical and 
demographical features of the empire’s eastern frontiers in detail, indicating the 
disputed and undisputed parts. Thus, the map illustrates the mountain ranges, rivers, 
lakes and their names, including the tribes living in the disputed-frontier strip name 
by name. The map shows the tribal neighborhood clearly. Thus, the map facilitates 
the understanding of the historical conflicts among the tribes and the states. The 
map’s legend that should have showed the symbols and color codes is missing. 
However, a version of this used by Melike Sarıkçıoğlu provides this information.201 
Tahir Pasha did not accept the Joint Map as a basis of the negotiations. He 
wanted to specify the boundary line according to the data set by Dervish Pasha and 
attempted to increase its accuracy by referring to earlier treaties. However, the 
British and Russian representatives believed that neither the Ottomans nor the 
Iranians had the original copy of the first treaty in 1639 on which Tahir Pasha 
constructed his arguments. According to them, the Ottomans did not have the treaty 
because the original text of the treaty was burned in one of the several fires in 
Istanbul. Iranians did not have it either because the treaty was lost during the internal 
turmoil in Iran. Iranians agreed, but not Tahir Pasha. He insisted that the copy he had 
was correct. 
To prove the invalidity of the Joint Map, which ignored the Ottoman rights 
over the Sunni population as based on the first treaty, he stated that Düvel-i Erbe’a 
(the four states of Britain, Russia, France and Austria) had done a survey in order to 
identify the tribes and their will in the past. After the survey, these states had 
prepared a map to be communicated to the Ottoman and Iranian States. However, 
Tahir Pasha asserted that the map was invalid due to the chronological order of the 
agreements because the Joint Map emerged after the Ottoman State and Iran signed a 
treaty, regarding Istankob. According to him, this map had to have confirmed the 
treaty first, but the map did not ratify it. Tahir Pasha insisted that the treaty remained 
valid. He referred to the inhabitants of Istankob to illustrate his point. He said they 
would enjoy relative freedom of movement and nobody would interfere in their 
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affairs if the entire boundary line were delineated clearly as it was stated in the 
treaty. On the one hand, he thought that the joint map was invalid because it ignored 
this provision of the treaty. On the other hand, the treaty prohibited any construction 
in this territory. Contradicting the treaty, the notables of Urumiah, who had close 
relationship with Iran, encouraged Iranian officers to establish a customhouse in the 
villages of Cirmi Behbik, whose inhabitants always identified themselves as 
Ottoman subjects. According to Tahir Pasha, the joint map prepared by Russia and 
Britain ignored the realties of the region, and that was why the treaty and the map 
contradicted each other. Furthermore, he noted, Article IV of the treaty did not allow 
the parties to control any part of the disputed lands until the states formed a new 
boundary commission. In order to stress the validity of the treaty, Tahir Pasha stated 
that four states had recognized it because their representatives had entered to their 
buildings in Urumiah by passing through the disputed lands by relaying on the treaty.  
In addition, Tahir Pasha referred to the reign of Nadir Shah (1736-1747) 
when Iranians often fought with the Ottomans for regional superiority. In the post 
war period, the Ottoman State and Iran signed the Kerden Treaty in 1746 at the end 
of negotiations. Even during the later battles, Nadir Shah’s imperial edicts and many 
other documents remained valid. During the reconciliation time, Iran had signed new 
treaties with the Ottoman State, and these treaties amended previous ones by 
preserving the ancient boundary between Iran and the Ottomans.
202
 Tahir Pasha 
highlighted the importance of Dervish Pasha’s map and explanatory documents. He 
articulated his confidence in the late Dervish Pasha’s work by these words: 
 
… Here, Dervish Pasha's map and explanatory document do not 
contradict the agreements. On the contrary, they are all accurate and 
compatible with previous records …203 
 
Overall, he meant that the treaty of 1869, which ratified the old treaties, 
remained valid. The intrusions and military fortifications of the Iranian officers 
and commanders around the disputed lands in 1905 were wrong and 
contradicted the existing agreements. These attempts of Iran to intervene in the 
disputed lands became a reason to justify the Ottoman occupations. When the 
Ottoman occupations started in 1905, Iran sent a committee of inquiry to 
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Istanbul in 1906. Tahir Pasha stated that the diplomatic conversation held 
between Iranian officers and Istanbul showed that Iran had confirmed the 
validity of Dervish Pasha’s map. Regarding this issue, he stated that he found 
an information sheet indicating the Iranian ambassador to Istanbul in 1906 cited 
Dervish’s map as evidence while arguing for the removal of troops from certain 
districts which included four villages. So Tahir Pasha argued, “I think there is 
nothing else that we can do now apart from considering Dervish Pasha’s map as 
a reference point.”204  
Dervish Pasha’s map showed that some people from the Ottoman tribes had 
been under the influence of the notables of Urumiah for many years. According to 
him, this situation produced several consequences: first, it served pro-Iranian 
notables in Urumiah to increase their properties, possessions, and wealth. Second, it 
caused the obedient people of both sides to move freely. Tribal competition in such a 
place that was officially under the authority of neither government accelerated 
regional conflicts, and the tribes on both sides shed blood in occasional incidents. 
This authority gap resulted in the destruction of many villages in tribal and other 
regional conflicts. Tahir Pasha proposed that his aim was to end this humanitarian 
crisis.
205
 He stated that he would welcome the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907, 
because Britain and Russia would both favor stability in the region.
206
 In this 
manner, he hoped that Iran would refrain from such arbitrary actions in the frontier 
zone such as supporting some tribal chiefs who willingly interfered in the affairs of 
pro-Ottoman tribes living in Urumiah. 
The Ottoman occupations until this time served the promotion of regional 
security. As Wratislaw stated, the Ottomans had achieved a very fair order in the 
territory they occupied, which was about a hundred miles long and fifteen to twenty 
miles wide.
207
 According to Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman troops situated around 
Urumiah provided regional security, public order and safety as never seen earlier, so 
he demanded that these territories remained under Ottoman sovereignty because they 
were part of the well-protected domains of the empire incontrovertibly.  
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4. 2. 2. The Boundary Negotiations 
The commissions of both states launched into the negotiations in this strained 
atmosphere in Urumiah in February 1908. Nevertheless, the Ottoman commissioners 
supplied the first memorandum to the Russian Vice-Consul Baron Techerkassov at 
Başkale in November 1907.208 This memorandum underlined importance of the 
Convention of 1869 and other old treaties signed between the Ottoman and Iranian 
states. Wratislaw found the tone of this memorandum very ‘uncompromising’ and 
noted that the pasha received new instructions. These strained relations of the first 
meeting reverberated in later sessions, and the debates on earlier international 
treaties. Tahir Pasha was a unique chief commissioner in his intensive reliance on old 
treaties in boundary negotiations. In its memorandum, of February 8, 1908, the 
Ottoman Commission stressed the importance of the old treaties, which are 
mentioned above in detail.
209
 Tahir Pasha believed that these six treaties reflected the 
true nature of the frontier and that the Ottomans and Iranians had explicitly defined 
the frontier in conformity with two criteria: national distinctions and the non-
intervention of Iran in Ottoman-Kurdistan. This memorandum did not refer to the 
Treaty of 1869, as Tahir Pasha had done in detail in the first meeting at Başkale.  
The point they reached was to discuss the related articles of the Second 
Erzurum Treaty of June 1, 1847. This memorandum showed that the Ottomans 
recognized the Second Erzurum Treaty, as the most recent treaty, but not with a 
special reference to it as if it were conclusive. However, the memorandum sent by 
the Imperial Iranian Commission to the Imperial Ottoman Commission on February 
8, 1908, clearly stressed that Iran recognized this treaty as the sole basis of the 
negotiations on the demarcation of the frontier, for it was the last of the international 
treaties between the two states and explicitly annulled the earlier ones.
210
  
The Iranians pointed to articles II and III to reject the claims of the Ottoman 
Commission.
211
 The Imperial Ottoman and Iranian commissions exchanged the 
memorandums in the form of questions and answers. The Ottoman commission 
wrote a memorandum on February 15, 1908,
212
 in response to the Imperial Iranian 
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commission’s memorandum of February 8. The Ottoman commission claimed that 
the Iranian government should show a treaty that allowed Iranian officials to 
interfere with the Kurds living in the sub-provinces of Shehrzur, Kurkuk, Rowanduz, 
Amadia, Hakkari, Van, and Bayazid. According to the Ottoman commission, article 
III explained article II. The treaty can only refer to the boundary of Muhammerah, 
Zohab, and Suleymaniye, and it did not cover the sub-provinces mentioned above. If 
the treaty were concerned with those districts, it would explicitly mention their 
boundary. Then, the Commission repeated its demand:  
Iran should put an end to her wrongful interference with our tribes and 
territory in the livas, kazas, nahiehs, and villages of Kurdistan from the 
Sanjak of Bayazid to the extremity of the Sanjak of Suleymaniye, except 
Kotour.
213
 
 
The Iranian commission responded to this memorandum by its own on 
February 17, 1908.
214
 They referred to articles II and III of the 1863 treaty again. The 
Iranian commissioners believed that the treaty avoided redundant and ineffective 
expressions. They stated that article II did not need further explanation because it 
shows clearly that the question related to Suleymaniye, Zohab, and Muhammerah 
were settled. According to the Iranian commission, article III also did not have any 
ambiguity, and it asserted that the two contracting parties abandoned their territorial 
claims. Furthermore, the Iranians asked for an explanation of the Ottoman 
occupation of Baneh, Serdesht, Lahijan, Ushni, Mergevar, Dasht, Tergaver, 
Beradost, and other places, moving beyond the territory they claimed.  
The Iranian and Ottoman commissions exchanged a third memorandum 
respectively on February 20 and 22, 1908.
215
 Wratislaw found the character of this 
and the previous memorandums very ‘recriminatory’.216 The Ottoman commission 
stated the treaty was related to the frontier and the territory covering Zohab, 
Muhammerah, and Suleymaniye. Article III was attributed to the territory and 
frontiers explained in article II. Thus, ‘the treaty had nothing to do with the territory 
and frontiers of Kurdistan between Beyazid and Sulaimaniya.’ Then, the Ottoman 
commissioners stated that they needed the interpretation of those articles by a 
supreme authority, while insisting on non-interference with the Ottoman Kurds. The 
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Iranian commission in response insisted that Articles II and III of the treaty were 
clear.
217
 
After these assertions, Tahir Pasha thought the commissions were not 
‘competent to decide on the right interpretation to be placed on Article III, so the 
matter must be left to their respective Governments’. As Wratislaw stated, Tahir 
Pasha had perceived this as a notable success and left Urumieh for Serai on February 
29, 1908. Tahir Pasha went to Van and he stayed there in a lodge close to the 
telegram house to receive further instructions.  
However, Istanbul ordered Tahir Pasha to return to Urumiah to resume the 
negotiations. Wratislaw used the time when the labor of the commission was 
suspended to review the works of the commission up until Tahir Pasha left, including 
the evaluation of the personality and qualifications of the two chief commissioners. 
He stated that: 
The relations between the two Commissions have throughout been far from 
cordial. Muhteshem-es-Sultanah is quick-tempered and not endowed with 
much tact, while arrogant assumption of Tahir that all the territory at stake 
was indisputably Turkish was very aggravating to his opponent. The Suj 
Bulak incident was like oil on the flames, and latterly the attitude of the two 
Chief Commissioners towards one another resembled that of the proverbial 
cat and dog.
218
 
 
He blamed Tahir Pasha for the consequent deadlock, because Tahir acted 
independently from his colleagues, Danyal and Ali Nadir Pasha, who were well 
informed, and did not entirely agree with Tahir Pasha’s attitude. Wratislaw believed 
Tahir was receiving secret instructions, and he believed that Tahir Pasha should have 
been replaced by one of these two Ottoman commissioners, because, according to 
him, they would be more conciliatory than Tahir, if the negotiations were 
resumed.
219
  
Wratislaw was dissatisfied with Tahir Pasha’s endeavor, but he stated in his 
memoirs (A Consul in the East) that Tahir had a remarkably pleasing personality and 
gained the hearts of the Kurds very easily. This time, the central government 
participated actively in the negotiations with a pro-memorid. The Grand Vizier, who 
updated the British consuls with the recent information he received regarding the 
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boundary affairs, stated that a pro-memorid that would be communicated by the 
Sublime Porte to the Iranian Ambassador at Istanbul formed the basis of the 
instructions sent to Tahir Pasha.
220
  
Before I continue, I want to clarify a point. Examining the period of Tahir 
Pasha by only relying on the fourth volume of R. Schofield’s work obstructs the 
context in which the boundary commission operated. For instance, the reports in the 
fourth volume did not exactly provide the reasons why the boundary delimitation 
remained unconcluded up until Tahir Pasha left the negotiations to the Porte. The 
parts of the fourth volume that coincide with the period of Tahir Pasha Commission 
do not mention that the Ottoman government had conditionally recognized the 
Second Treaty of Erzurum. In contrast, M. Sarıkçıoğlu in her work, which benefits 
from the Iranian and Ottoman sources as well, demonstrates that the Ottoman 
government recognized the Second Erzurum Treaty with its additional documents. 
However, Iran did not recognize these additional documents although its 
commissioner (Muhammed Ali Han) signed them.
221
 Iran recognized the treaty as the 
last treaty in contrast to the Ottoman Empire. Thus, this disagreement between the 
states, which was maintained by Britain,
222
 became the main reason why numerous 
boundary commissions produced no result as neither of the two states abandoned its 
arguments. This problem stalled the entire boundary commissions since the 1840s. 
Tahir Pasha’s Commission was just a segment of this sequence, a segment that 
coincided with the acceleration of the Ottoman occupations. 
Sabri Ateş seems to be repeating the same mistake in those parts of his work 
where he relies on Schofield IV. Contradicting the whole work of M. Sarıkçıoğlu,223 
Ateş states: 
 
… the Ottoman Empire launched what would become its last expansionist 
effort. Its attempt to conquer the northwestern Sunni Kurdish parts of the 
shah’s domains was in direct contravention to the fifty-years-in-the-making 
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frontier negotiations and, indeed, to all of the treaties that had thus far helped 
transform the Ottoman-Iranian frontier into boundary.
224
 
 
Sarıkçıoğlu’s work indicates that there was not such a big difference or 
contradiction in time in the eastern frontier policies pursued by the Ottoman 
government. Indeed, the Ottoman occupations showed that the Ottoman 
government’s frontier policies remained consistent from the 1840s until Kamil 
Pasha’s government in August 5, 1908-February 14, 1909.  
In the pre-memorid, the Ottoman government asserted that the view of 
Muhteshem es Sultanah that the Treaty of Erzurum settled the frontier question as a 
whole did not reflect the reality truly. The Ottoman government suggested that the 
two governments should reach first a preliminary agreement on the basic points of 
the Erzurum Treaty. They stressed that the treaty was not the sole source for defining 
the boundary; there were other documents such as official-joint notes, which were 
made an integral part of the treaty by Iranian, Russian and British envoys and 
delegates in 1848. According to the Ottoman government, the treaty only dealt with 
the ownership of the Sanjak of Zohab, the lands of Muhammerah and Suleymaniye. 
The other districts remained controversial, as the treaty did not explicitly deal with 
them. The lack of special provision regarding these districts in the treaty meant that 
there would be a continuation of the status quo. Article IX of the treaty explains 
clearly that ‘all the provisions and effects of previous treaties and, in particular the 
provisions of the First Erzurum Treaty in 1823 had been maintained. They stated that 
this agreement defined the districts of the boundary where the Second Erzurum 
Treaty remained silent. They supported their view by showing the ratification of 
those treaties by the mediating powers, namely the British and Russian delegates, in 
1848 and 1865 as ‘the validity of the unabrogated portions of older Treaties.’225 To 
sum up, the Sublime Porte did not consider the Treaty of Erzurum as final, and 
referred to the treaty signed by Sultan Murad IV in 1639, while Iranian government 
considered Articles II and III of the Erzurum Treaty as final in deciding the frontier 
question.
226
 
By using more specific and precise language, the Ottoman Government did 
not make a different claim than that Tahir Pasha had made earlier. Indeed, it 
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supported Tahir Pasha’s claims by presenting new evidences, which were detailed, 
well designed, and a better argued. It has been understood that Tahir Pasha’s 
decision to leave Urumiah was a clever move taken on time, although the Porte and 
many of the consuls had heavily criticized his action. On the other hand, the Iranian 
government hesitated to dispatch a special mission to Istanbul that would debate the 
frontier question with the Porte or directly with the Palace. A memorandum written 
by Muhteshem es Sultanah to Mushir-ed-Dowleh, clearly shows that Iran could not 
replay the memorandum of the Ottoman government well.
227
 Charles M. Marling 
believed that Iran did not have any evidence to prove their claims. He found the 
memorandum written by Muhteshem es Sultanah ‘unintelligible’ and criticized his 
proposition with impracticability that suggested returning to status quo ante. G. 
Barclay stated in a telegram he sent to Sir Edward Grey, 
 
Tahir Pasha reasserted that ‘Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzurum alludes solely 
to the places mentioned in Article 2 of the treaty. It is stated that clearly in 
this Article that these localities are lied down in the note addressed to the 
Iranian Ambassador by the Porte. Tahir asserts, again, that all the sanjaks of 
Kurdistan belong to Turkey according to the Treaty of 1639, and that up to 
the beginning of the nineteenth century they remained in the possession of 
Turkey. It was not till then that Iran trespassed on Turkish territory, profiting 
by Turkey’s domestic difficulties and disastrous wars to seduce the Kurds.228 
 
 
Tahir Pasha invited the Iranian Commissioner to continue with the 
negotiations in the line mentioned in his statement above. As Wratislaw stated, Tahir 
Pasha believed that the Treaty of Murad IV had described the frontier on the 
principle of distinction of religion and nationality, and further explanations was 
unnecessary beyond the statement that ‘the Shias are not to interfere’.229 This 
statement of Tahir Pasha excludes the possibility of the Kurds who can be Shia. He 
was most probably thinking that all the Kurds were originally Sunni.  
This consistency of the Ottoman commissioners’ arguments changed after 
political authority shifted abruptly from the Palace to the Porte in July 24, 1908. This 
process of political transformation, which was triggered by the so-called Young Turk 
‘Revolution’, prepared the ground for the Grand Vizierate to fulfill its assurances 
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that the Ottoman troops could be withdrawn from the disputed lands they had begun 
to occupy back in 1905. One can argue that Russia with its military power and 
Britain with its political influence had now increased the pressure they put on the 
Ottoman government after the 1908 “revolution”. Sir A. Nicolsan stated that M. 
Tcherykoff spoke with the Ottoman foreign minister about the next steps that would 
be taken for the sake of a final and amicable settlement of the frontier question by 
demanding the mediation of Britain and Russia. He found out that the attitude of the 
Ottoman government had changed and the minister was saying that his government 
would withdraw the Ottoman troops. Nicolson found this new position of the 
Ottoman government satisfactory and stated, with exaggeration, that the constant 
efforts of British and Russian governments had created this favorable change by 
August of 1908.
230
 Another point made by Charles M. Marling stressed the 
importance of this governmental change for the frontier delimitation. He stated, 
 
It is not impossible that with the recent change of Government in Turkey the 
Ottoman Ministries, who have all along shown a far more reasonable attitude 
than the Sultan’s unofficial advisers, will now be able to enforce their 
instructions on the Turkish Commission, and that Tahir Pasha will either be 
relieved or will be induced to be more amenable to argument.
231
 
 
Towards the end of negotiations, the southern parts of the boundary were 
demarcated peacefully. Major General Zeki Pasha, who was the chief commissioner 
before Tahir Pasha, had been charged to ratify the status quo line from Suleymaniye 
to Musul. Tahir Pasha needed those maps and Zeki Pasha’s explanatory documents 
included concluding remarks concerning the boundaries of the southeastern 
provinces of Ottoman Empire. Zeki Pasha sent all these documents to Tahir Pasha 
after he delimitated the boundary of Musul and transferred all the responsibility of 
the Musul boundary to Tahir Pasha’s Commission.232 Towards the end of August, 
Tahir Pasha set forth the frontier of the Baghdad Province and Zohab by declaring in 
a note that he neither recognized the “identic” zone nor accepted the status quo. He 
noted to Wratislaw that he would leave Urumiah if the Iranian commissioner kept 
ignoring the arguments Tahir Pasha proposed. 
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The Ottoman Minister of Internal Affairs instructed Tahir Pasha to rejoin his 
post in Bitlis and informed him that Danyal Pasha would succeeded him.
233
 Thus, 
Danyal Pasha continued from the point where Tahir Pasha left. He first went to the 
telegraph office to get fresh instructions from Istanbul. On September 1908, M. 
Tcharykoff stated that ‘Wratislaw might be instructed to leave when the Turkish 
troops have completely evacuated the country between Urumiah and Tabreez on the 
north side of the lake.’234 This showed that the hopes of British, Russian and Iranian 
representatives for the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from the disputed lands 
increased in this period. 
Tahir Pasha had been ordered to decrease the number of those troops situated 
on the border on August 18, 1908. This order of the new government established by 
the intervention of the Community of Union and Progress (CUP), suggests that they 
found it unnecessary to alert the Ottoman troops around the status quo line due to the 
critical financial situation. The new government ordered to decrease the number of 
troops. Although Tahir Pasha found this order inappropriate, he unwillingly recalled 
about eleven or twelve troops out of nineteen battalions (tabur) located in two 
frontier zones.
235
  
Ali Rıza, the new governor of Van in 1908, opposed decreasing the numbers 
of the battalions, but he had to comply with the Porte’s orders. He supported Tahir 
Pasha’s argument, which suggested that the troops were very important to maintain 
public security in the region. As the Porte knew that they would have difficulty with 
Tahir Pasha in terms of the withdrawal of the troops, they directly communicated 
with Ali Rıza himself. However, Ali Rıza responded to them with a letter in which 
he stated that he did not know the technical sides of the situation and lacked the 
knowledge to provide details. He stated that Tahir Pasha had all the information 
because he knew the contents of all the correspondence with Istanbul (the Palace?). 
The only thing Ali Rıza asserted with certainty was the need for these forces for the 
security of the borders of his province. Thus, he gave to Tahir Pasha and the other 
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frontier actors the technical responsibility to decide whether the Iranian forces could 
reoccupy the districts or not, if the Ottoman troops evacuated these districts.
236
  
CUP insisted on the withdrawal of troops by pointing out the current 
predicament of the Treasury and budget. The imperial frontier actors found 
themselves facing a dilemma due to the financial situation. Either they would 
accelerate the depletion of the treasury by maintaining the current number of the 
frontier troops or they would expose the eastern borders to Iranian intervention. The 
urgency of financial difficulties dominated the inter-departmental discussions.
237
 Ali 
Rıza came up with an alternative. He suggested that the Reserve Troops (Redif 
Taburları) in Van, which was held ready for a possible war with Iran, could be 
released because their significance was not as high as those regular troops situated in 
the districts of the frontier zone.
238
 
In the meantime, the other Ottoman commissioners increased the pressure 
they exerted to end the work of the boundary commission because they did not 
believe the commission would be useful in defining the rest of the boundary. They 
believed that Iran created an impasse in the negotiations by repeating their fallacies 
frequently. One of the commissioners, Tevfik Bey, who became the Education 
Director of Baghdad later, expressed his opinion regarding the dismissal of the 
commission after paying due attention to the current situation of the budget.
 239
 
According to him, they had tried everything that they could to demarcate the 
boundary. He believed that this commission had accomplished the political 
surveying of the boundary. He asserted that now a technical commission was 
urgently needed to draw the boundary lines specifically.
240
 However, Tevfik Pasha’s 
claim about the readiness of the conditions for a technical commission did not have a 
basis, because the two commissions had not yet reached a consensus on the articles 
of the treaties. 
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After the duty of Tahir Pasha as chief negotiator ended, he remained as a 
member of Danyal Pasha’s commission. This commission could not go beyond being 
an extension of Tahir Pasha’s commission. Eventually, Tahir Pasha was sent to 
Erzurum. The other commissioners, including Brigadier-General Ali Nadir Pasha 
and Tevfik Bey submitted their resignations to Danyal Pasha. They went to Istanbul. 
Only Danyal Pasha and Colonel Şakir Bey remained as members of the boundary 
commission.
241
 The Chief Secretary of Internal Affairs expressed his opinion on the 
same line with the commissioners. He stated that the telegraph lines between 
Urumiah and Tehran were broken, so the Iranian commissioners would not find a 
way to keep in touch with their superiors. They stated that the current political 
situation in Iran was not suitable to carry on the negotiations because the Iranian 
leaders had to deal with socio-political frictions due to the introduction of 
constitution in Iran. Danyal Pasha also demonstrated his unwillingness to carry on 
the affairs of the commission for “how much time the conclusion of the boundary 
negotiations would require was unknown”.242  
The Porte began to question Tahir Pasha’s ability and capacity in crisis and 
conflict management. However, it seems that he was just implementing the orders of 
the Palace. Wratislaw had reached the conclusion that his superiors were instructing 
him to encroach on Iranian territories because Tahir Pasha would not take serious 
steps on his own unless he was sure that his official superiors approved them.
243
 
Charles M. Marling stated that: 
 
It appears to me, however, that Tahir Pasha had probably not then been 
convinced that the formal orders of the Sublime Porte might not still be over-
ridden by the secret instructions from the Palace. His withdrawal from 
Urumiah, as reported by Wratislaw, may very well be consequence of his 
having received unmistakable information of the altered condition of affairs 
at Constantinople, and that in order to save his face he has chosen to ascribe 
his departure to the impossibility of continuing negotiations with Muhteshem 
es Sultanah.
244
 
 
Thus, the new government in Istanbul, and the British and Russian consuls, 
who observed Tahir Pasha’s decision, did not like his close relations with the Palace. 
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The Consul-General Wratislaw associated discrepancy between the assurances of the 
Grand Vizierate and Tahir Pasha’s action regarding the frontier affairs with his secret 
relations with the Palace. Not only the British and Russian consuls but also the 
members of the new Ottoman government perceived him as a member of the old 
Palace regime.  
Kamil Pasha became the new Grand Vizier on August 4, 1908. Throughout 
the British reports, it seems that the British consuls hold sympathy for Kamil Pasha. 
As they favorably stated, the internal situation of the empire began to settle down 
during his time. However, the frontier difficulties intensified upon the withdrawal of 
most of the Ottoman troops. The new government could not effectively deal with 
these difficulties because they were preoccupied with difficulties they encountered in 
the Balkans and internal matters that resulted from constitutional activities. Austria-
Hungary occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina on October 5, 1908. The same day, Bulgaria 
declared its independence. A day later, Cretans announced their island’s integration 
with Greece.
245
 
Nevertheless, the new cabinet under Kamil Pasha’s leadership sincerely 
promised to regularize the position regarding the Ottoman-Iranian boundary. In this 
period, the British and Iranian demands for the withdrawal of Ottoman troops from 
the disputed areas increased, urging the Ottomans for ‘speedy’ action. Thus, Kamil 
Pasha’s government adopted a scheme that suggested returning to the status quo of 
three years ago (1905) before the occupation of Vezneh and Pasveh. Sir G. Lowther 
showed the current state of the Ottoman troops on the line mentioned above with the 
paragraph below:  
 
…three battalions were withdrawn from the Pasveh-Lahijan region, leaving 
some four battalions to garrison the frontier. Of these, one battalion remained 
at Pasveh, east of the contested zone. Similarly, some five battalions and one 
mountain battery were withdrawn from the Van section of the frontier, while 
Wratislaw reports that only one mountain battery remained in Mergavar, 
Tergavar, and Baranduz, one or two companies at Somai and Charik, and a 
handful of Turkish troops in Beradost. It appears that these units are 
considerably below their normal strength, and that they are stationed at 
Mavana, Charik and other places situated on the eastern edge of the contested 
zone, the only Turkish troops stationed actually east of the zone being the 
battalion at Pasveh…246 
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In the following years, the Ottomans supported the constitutional movement 
in Iran because they thought the constitutionalists were less dangerous than the 
royalists, who claimed the lands that belonged to the Ottoman Empire.
247
 Due to the 
fluctuating polices and the pressure of many other conjectural changes, the Ottoman 
government had to recognize the Second Treaty of Erzurum as the basis of the 
negotiations in 1910. This recognition implied that the Ottoman government 
loosened the diplomatic resilience that it maintained since the 1840s.  
4. 2. 3. Where was Ushni and where was the Status Quo Line? 
Ushni was one of the controversial lands that became the subject of territorial 
ambiguity regarding whether this township was beyond the status quo line or not. 
Before the Ottoman officials concluded the debates that would decide its fate, they 
decided to occupy Ushni on October 10, 1907 by the troops under the command of 
Tahir Pasha. Tahir Pasha had put forth the increasing security concerns in Ushni the 
basic reason for its occupation at first. A group of the Sunni-Kurdish tribes in the 
western peripheries of Iran began to attack the town of Savuçbulak and plundered the 
villages in the neighborhood. The Ottoman troops at Serdasht was ready to support 
these tribes and they thought that the local authorities in Savuçbulak would welcome 
the Ottoman soldiers and the tribes.
248
  
When the occupation of Ushni started officially, all the foreign and some 
Ottoman officials surprised. These astonished group of officials believed that the 
occupation was one of the expansionist deeds of Tahir Pasha, although an 
information sheet that he wrote on January 19, 1908 indicates that the order for the 
occupation was the result of a decision taken in the Special Council of Ministers 
(Encümen-i Mahsus-ı Vükela) on September 25, 1907.249 What were the points that 
the Council made to justify its argument and the occupation? Yet, there are not clear-
cut answers to these questions, but in a meeting where all the Ottoman 
commissioners met with the Russian and British consuls on November 11, 1907, the 
Ottoman commissioners challenged the arguments of Russian Vice Consul by 
publishing a memorandum, and defending the correctness and validity of Dervish 
Pasha’s map. This shows that Ottoman government considered Dervish Pasha’s map 
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and explanatory document valid, and used them as the basis of the occupation of 
Ushni. Furthermore, the session focused on two more points. First, they argued for a 
convention between Iranian and Ottoman governments concerning the status quo line 
(presumably in 1869) by which the joint map is rendered inoperative. Second, they 
also discussed the frontier that was established by earlier treaties as embodied in the 
map.
250
  
Moreover, some foreign officials saw the occupation as the integral part of a 
bigger plan. For instance, the British Vice Consul Dickson had some doubts in his 
mind that brought the political side of the question into prominence. He believed that 
the Ottoman concern for a future Russo-Turkish war was the main reason of the 
occupation. He highlighted the geostrategic and logistic importance of the occupied 
lands, as these lands would enable troops to have an easy passage. In addition, he 
observed the unfriendly attitude of the Kurds towards the Russian officer who 
arrived in Ushni.
251
 The travelling account that was written by Dickson while he was 
in Van shows that he informed Sir. N. O’Conor about the frontier question of 
Ottoman-Iran underlining that all classes in Van considered Russia as the real 
opponent, and not Iran. Dickson stated that the problem between the Ottomans and 
Russians was dormant from 1878 to 1904, when certain Russian activities aroused 
the Ottomans’ suspicion. According to him, some key moves gave an idea about the 
Russian interests in the region. These moves included the Russian plan for an 
extension of their railway to Julfa; building roads to Tabriz and some other places; 
the appointment of a Russian Vice-Consul to Urumiah, and the wholesale conversion 
of the Assyrians in Iran to the Russian Church. 
Obviously, geographical conditions diminished the capabilities of the great 
powers to pursue their goals. Russia had experienced this during the Russo-Japanese 
War. Dickson believed that for “a railway to be constructed from Russia to Baghdad 
or the Iranian Gulf, the easiest way to pass would be through Lahijan and Vezene; 
while if a railway or cart road were to be constructed from Beyazid to Baghdad, it 
would have to follow through the same pass.”252 Tahir Pasha and the commissioners 
knew that they were dealing with Russia and not Iran, and they were convinced that 
Britain would support them eventually against Russia. At the end, Dickson judged 
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that “ the Ottoman State would be glad to fight with Russia now and pay off some of 
their old scores because Russia was weak due to the Russo-Japanese War and her 
internal troubles”. Thus, he decided, “a strong attitude of Turkey over this frontier 
was not a bluff because these districts had vital importance to her”.253 
While the British officials were preoccupied with divulging the reasons of the 
occupations, the Ottoman frontier officers and commanders, as previously 
mentioned, could not identify the townships. The lack of a status quo that was 
ratified by both states created the basic problem. The occupation of Ushni caused the 
resurgence of this matter again, and it incited the Ottoman frontier officials to seek 
an answer during the post-occupation period. Tahir Pasha appointed several officers 
to take on its administrative duties, and the government did not see necessary to 
fortify the township with additional troops. However, the Ottoman commander in the 
frontier zone kept asking whether Ushni was beyond the status quo or not as they 
could not understand the map in their hands. If it were within the status quo line, they 
would demand deployment of additional troops.
254
 Tahir Pasha believed that all 
parties had recognized the status quo and guaranteed it under the treaty of 1869. As 
he interpreted according to the treaty, the two parties should preserve the districts 
they held as part of the status quo until the boundary was fully delimitated. Probably, 
he believed that this agreement lost its validity due to the efforts of Russian interest 
to construct new railways that would increase their capacity in mobilizing their 
soldiers and the increasing military fortifications of Iran close to the disputed 
lands.
255
 
Nevertheless, Abdulhamid’s order was clear regarding the status quo that 
draws the international limits of the disputed lands. According to him, nobody should 
transgress the border, but a district within the status quo
256
 should be definitely 
protected. In addition, the Porte stated that all subjects of the empire should be 
protected from all threats to their lives. However, it did not answer the question of 
what would happen to the people from the disputed lands, who just became Ottoman 
subjects from disputed lands? Ottoman state actors of the frontier could not turn 
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down the inhabitants of lands if they appealed to become an Ottoman subject from 
the disputed lands.
257
 
During the post-annexation of Ushni, the Ottomans had placed small number 
of troops in Ushni. Prince Governor-General of Azerbaijan and the cousin of the 
shah Firman-Firma began to collect a force in order to evacuate the Ottoman troops, 
and punish the Kurds. He located about 12,000 cavalry, infantry, and mountain 
artillerymen in Miyan-ı Devabb, and continued to recruit soldiers and tribal cavalries 
in considerable numbers by providing ammunition and arms from other provinces of 
Iran such as Azerbaijan, Erdebil, and Hemedan. He attempted to enter Savuçbulak 
with these forces in order to push the Ottoman troops out of Ushni. 
The First Major General and the Commander of the Ottoman Border Forces 
Fazıl Pasha learnt about Firman-Firma’s preparations through the Tabriz newspapers. 
He believed that the shah himself had ordered this attack because the shah had 
declared a “holy war” against the Ottoman Empire by forcing the Kurds to fight on 
his side. Fazıl Pasha stated that he tried to solve this conflict diplomatically. He 
believed Russia encouraged Firman-Firma, who refused to consider diplomatic 
solutions to the problem, and continued his military fortifications around the frontier 
zone after situating himself in Savuçbulak. This situation worried Fazıl Pasha about 
the security of Ushni. Fazıl Pasha wanted to be sure that the security of Ushni was 
maintained. He considered abandoning Ushni without providing for its security a 
breach of state tradition.
258
 For this reason, the Porte decided to give permission to 
the Ottoman troops in Ushni to open fire against the forces of Firman-Firma, if they 
attacked Ushni. Accordingly, the government increased the number of soldiers 
stationed in the frontier zone and reinforced their capabilities. However, the 
government also warned the Ottoman forces not to violate the border rules by 
transgressing the status quo.
259
 All the high-ranking Ottoman frontier actors were 
warned not to attack the Iranian fortifications around Savuçbulak, and Fazıl Pasha 
was charged to enforce this caution.
260
 
These frictions between Fazıl Pasha and Firman-Firma made the obscurity of 
the status quo more apparent. Tahir Pasha himself did not know where the status quo 
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lines lay, although he kept stressing the importance of 1869 provisionally. He 
questioned very often the direction that the status quo line would run within the 
frontier zone, taking into consideration the demographic characteristics of the 
districts as well: 
 
If the status quo line meant the borderline that was drawn by late Dervish 
Pasha, Ushni was clearly in the Ottoman side. The earlier registers indicated 
that Ushni was a district that previously connected to the center of Şehr-i Zur 
Province that belonged to the Ottoman Empire, and whose inhabitants were 
Sunni-Kurds.
261
 
 
According to him, Dervish Pasha’s observation, which was based on 
demographic realities, suited all the agreements; so sending additional troops to 
Ushni was against none of the former treaties.
262
 Furthermore, Fazıl Pasha portrayed 
Firman-Firma’s aggression bitterly.  
 
Firman-Firma suddenly attacked the villages on their way with the support of 
Ahmed Han, a Kurdish tribal leader, and they violated the border by taking 
into account the winter conditions that disadvantaged the Ottoman soldiers 
and tribal forces.
 263
 
 
When the Ottoman troops approached them, Ahmed Han ran away. Other 
supporters of Firman-Firma also evacuated Savuçbulak, but they had already caused 
significant damage to the local people. Fazıl Pasha observed:  
 
Firman-Firma committed a crime against humanity by attempting to clean 
Savuçbulak from pro-Ottoman elements. His attempts were totally against 
universal values, the necessities of humanity and civilization.
264
   
 
Nevertheless, most of the people under their oppression had migrated to 
Pasve in order to avoid a bigger catastrophe. Accordingly, the number of people who 
applied to Ottoman subjecthood increased drastically. Fazıl Pasha knew that he did 
not have the authority to accept these refugees to Ottoman citizenship. He put the 
task of addressing this issue under the responsibility of the boundary commission. 
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Hearing these appeals could have been considered the duty of the commission, 
although deciding them was not. At any rate, Fazıl Pasha did not accept their appeals 
because he thought this action could create further diplomatic crisis and delay the 
boundary delimitation.
 265
 This sensitivity regarding accepting the refugee appeals 
did not reflect the reality, and the refugee policy of the empire had to change over 
time because the struggle with Firman-Firma continued. 
The local people and the tribal forces resisted the attacks of Firman-Firma’s 
forces by taking the support of Ottoman troops. These joint forces besieged him in 
Savuçbulak and prevented the access of military reinforcements and additional 
supplies to the city. However, Fazıl Pasha thought the joint tribal force did not have 
the ability to resist Firman-Firma much longer. If this local resistance was broken, 
the Iranian military forces could march to Basra and Baghdad, and establish contact 
with the Twelver Shias (Jafaris) living there. Having these concerns in mind, Fazıl 
Pasha thought that Firman-Firma’s aggression could damage the relationship 
between the Ottoman government and the tribes of the region because the latter were 
being forced to shift their loyalties when they faced superior forces.  
To prevent this shift and to end Firman-Firma’s oppressions, Fazıl Pasha 
stationed four hundred regular soldiers in Pasve. This number increased to a 
thousand, when Fazıl Pasha recalled the six hundred soldiers he had sent to winter 
quarters, because of inadequate food supplies and financial resources. However, even 
this force appeared inadequate to protect the status quo and those who applied for 
Ottoman protection. 
As it is discussed in the third chapter, financial struggle shortages new 
recruitments. Fazıl Pasha asserted that increasing the number of troops was going to 
be a growing burden on government finances day by day. In these circumstances, he 
had to prepare a joint force cooperating with the pro-Ottoman Kurdish tribes 
persecuted by Firman-Firma. After he put together a sufficient number of armed 
men, he began to draw up his strategy and distributed all the soldiers under his 
command to strategic points of Savuçbulak.  
He left two hundred regular soldiers in Pasve considering the winter 
conditions, which usually closed the roads for months. Fazıl Pasha thought that 
Firman-Firma had chosen this time of the year deliberately. He transgressed the 
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status quo in the coldest season of the year because the heavy winter conditions 
would cut off the communications and make the flow of urgent information difficult. 
He positioned eight hundreds soldiers in the village of Mahmud Shah. He then went 
to Köse Güherize, which was a village in a distance four hours away from the center 
of Savuçbulak, with the remaining soldiers and fifteen thousands tribal forces. 
 
 
Map 4.1: This map shows the center of cities where Fazıl Pasha and Firman-Firma 
fortified their forces, and it demonstrates their proximity to the rivers and mountains, 
which means to the strategic points such as important passageways.
266
 
 
Meanwhile, Firman-Firma was under the siege of the Kurdish tribal forces. 
Fazıl Pasha praised them for their bravery and ardent attachment to their country and 
family. However, their resistance against a regular army would not last long, so 
Firman-Firma could break their resistance very soon. He reminded as well that these 
people had taken refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Before the tribes became totally 
exhausted and tired, and ceased fire, Fazıl Pasha charged some officers with the task 
of assuring them that the Ottoman military support was behind them. Consequently, 
he sent a memorandum to Firman-Firma telling him the evacuation of Savuçbulak 
and otherwise, his joint forces would expel them. Firman-Firma found the Ottoman 
troops and tribal forces deterrent, and retreated to Miyan-ı Devabb without making 
any effort to fight. Fazıl Pasha evaluated Firman-Firma’s withdrawal with an 
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interesting statement that Firman-Firma had lost Kurdistan completely to the 
Ottoman Empire.
 267
 
These initiatives of Fazıl Pasha would be subject to investigations. In order to 
justify his position to the Porte, he stated that: 
 
… Firman-Firma took control of the tribes living in the disputed lands by 
force and oppression, so my action cannot be seen as one that breached the 
rules because it was obvious that Firman-Firma’s interference would later 
create dangerous situation, just as it did before. My action was against the 
Iranian military fortifications around the border …268 
 
Fazıl Pasha defended himself that He preserved the prestige of the Ottoman 
State in the eyes of the Kurds by interfering in a dispute that threatened them and did 
so by organizing a local force made up of the Kurds and backed by regular army 
troops. He believed protecting the status quo with only the available troops in the 
frontier zone was impossible. Thus, this cooperation between the Kurdish tribal 
forces and the Ottoman troops maintained the security of the imperial borders and 
people who sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Otherwise, the Ottoman 
government had to recruit thirty thousand soldiers to protect the status quo for an 
unspecified length of time.  
As the annexation of Ushni launched new debates, Fazıl Pasha’s 
interventions in Savuçbulak created similar debates. The Ottoman Empire found the 
status of Savuçbulak also in dispute. Fazıl Pasha asserted that Iran did not have any 
right to be in Savuçbulak because they had appointed neither an officer nor sent a 
solider there, which meant Iran had never governed this place in the past. The 
Ottoman government provided another reason to prioritize the occupation of 
Savuçbulak. They stressed the importance of Savuçbulak for different reasons, 
although Savuçbulak was obviously beyond the status quo line. One of the reasons 
was the township of Pasve. They believed that Pasve was on Ottoman soil and 
bordering Savuçbulak. Thus, any dispute in Savuçbulak could directly have a 
negative impact on the public security and order of Pasve that was in the status 
quo.
269
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4. 2. 4. Two Tribes and Their Search for Protection 
To explain the complexity of the frontier difficulties, Fazıl Pasha’s 
intervention to the frontier affairs exemplifies an important instance. How a state 
could resist a significant amount of appeals for protection in a contested area where 
two states competed for regional superiority constituted one of the difficulties while 
pro-Ottoman tribes, who appealed to the Ottoman State for being refugee from the 
disputed lands, were being pushed by Firman-Firma to westward. Mekri and 
Deveböğri tribes were just two of the tribes who took refuge in the Ottoman Empire 
with their five thousand cavalries and infantries in the same number to escape 
Firman-Firma’s persecution and oppressions. Fazıl Pasha stated that these people 
were subjects of the empire, so the government had to protect them as freely as 
Russia did for the well being of those people who chose to become a Russian 
subjects in the same region. He stated:  
 
The Russian consul gave a particular importance to the evacuation of two 
people, Kerbelayı Osman and Nevruz Ali, who lived in Savuçbulak, but took 
refuge in Russia. These people were neither Russian nor Christian, but they 
became subjects of Russia.
270
 
 
He meant that if Russia had the right to accept new subjects from the region and 
protect their well being, the Ottoman State had the same right. At first glance, this 
was a reasonable wish in terms of maintaining the security of the subjects of the 
empire, but it was bringing up new territorial claims, and thus, conflicts. Tahir Pasha 
clarified the importance of the refugees for the empire: 
 
… No objections against the people those who accepted Ottoman sovereignty 
can be accepted, because they were naturally part of the Muslim community, 
and thus, they could be the subjects of the Empire. Ottoman State will protect 
their rights and claims for their “ancient lands”...271 
 
He justified these claims for Muslim-Kurds based on old treaties. According to the 
treaties, Kurdistan was part of the Ottoman Empire, and Iran did not have any right 
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to intervene in its affairs.
272
 He found his own interpretation of the treaties 
trustworthy and a realistic definition of the boundary, yet Iran ignored this reality 
constantly and encroached the disputed lands gradually. According to Tahir Pasha, 
they became successful and these attempts of Iranian officials in the past eased their 
penetration to the disputed lands. Thus, the old treaties, which showed the real 
owners of the lands, lost its basis, and Tahir Pasha realized that the treaties were no 
longer valid for the some parts of the frontier zone due to systematic encroachments 
of Iran. Moreover, the Ottoman State did not loose its contact with the inhabitants 
who felt religiously bound to it. He believed that if the Ottoman State took 
possession of these lands, Golden Age (devr-i se’adet) would return. Wratislaw did 
not see this nostalgic view of the past correct because he could not be sure whether 
Tahir Pasha quoted justly without seeing a copy of the Treaty of 1639.
273
 He asserted 
that they provided public security and order increasingly in these lands on behalf of 
humanity and Islam by stopping the tribal raids, so boundary settlement would serve 
the same purpose.
274
 
A detailed Ottoman version of Firman-Firma’s intervention shows that a pro-
Kurdish tribal leader who wanted to be dominant in the region played a significant 
role in terms of helping Firman-Firma. For example, Ahmed Han, a pro-Iranian 
Kurdish tribal leader had interfered with the other Kurdish villages. Like these 
attacks for local superiority, Firman-Firma’s military fortifications had roused the 
tension on the frontier. His action resulted with his evacuation of Savuçbulak, but he 
continued his attacks on the Sunni-Kurdish villages on his way out, and ordered 
killing of villagers. According to Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman frontier actors did not 
encourage the Kurds, but Firman-Firma had actually provoked the Kurds by 
attacking their villages. By taking precautionary measures, Fazıl Pasha had just 
prevented the proliferation of this regional instability.  
Regarding the relationship between Firman-Firma and Fazıl Pasha, Tahir 
Pasha shared an interesting intelligence. Firman-Firma and Fazıl Pasha were friends 
for many years in Baghdad. Fazıl Pasha became a commander responsible for the 
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security of the imperial eastern frontiers. Eventually, both of them wanted to 
terminate all the quarrels in the frontier zone.  
However, Tahir Pasha believed that Firman-Firma was planning to abuse his 
friendship with Fazıl Pasha to gain some more time for collecting soldiers that would 
enable him to control Savuçbulak. His relation was a cynical ploy of ill intentions 
and would give more space to Firman-Firma for his divergent purposes such as 
resettling in Savuçbulak, isolating the pro-Ottoman Kurds with magisterial measures, 
and finally appointing Iranian officers. 
Tahir Pasha criticized Iranian commissioners and he complained that they 
were doing nothing for the wellbeing of the people other than accusing the Ottoman 
government to the Europeans.  He believed that Iran was using this method in order 
to prolong the boundary delimitation. He also did not find appropriate Iranian 
attitudes, claiming Savuçbulak belonged to Iran unconditionally, so they could do 
whatever they wanted in their territories. On the contrary, Tahir Pasha thought that 
this claim was not certainly reflecting the truth because Iran must not commit 
massacres in Savuçbulak, even if they had a say in these territories. The only 
evidence of sovereignty they can show in Savuçbulak was the existence of an Iranian 
embassy there, but the treaty of 1869 (1286) did not mention an embassy there as a 
reference point. He believed that Iran established that embassy in Savuçbulak in an 
illegal manner. He stated that if Iran based their claims on the treaties (he meant the 
Second Treaty of Erzurum), they had to show sensitivity to the diplomatic rule 
(pacta sund servanda) first by respecting the Ottoman rights (coming from the treaty 
of 1639) in Savuçbulak.275  
He believed that Iranian commissioners were delaying boundary negotiations 
intentionally. By this way, they were gaining some time to apply magisterial 
measures to the tribes before they intimidated them. The economic value of the 
Savuçbulak plain was making them more aggressive because, as Fazıl Pasha stated, 
the region consisted of wide, large and fertile lands. To take the possession of these 
lands under their sovereignty, Iran used magisterial measures and sophisticated 
strategies for centuries yielding them to win the tribes over living in status quo. Iran 
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gave these tribes many privileges like high ranks, golden swords, many khalats 
(robes of honor) as well as tax reduction.
276
  
Beside Iranian measures and strategies, Tahir Pasha and Fazıl Pasha believed 
that the previous Ottoman frontier officers had in the past had created present 
situation. They criticized these frontier officers for their condoning of Iranian 
infiltration into the region. They accused these officers with behaving irresponsibly 
and never asking the tribes again.  
Infact, Fazıl Pasha had collected thirty thousand tribal forces in a short time 
against Firman-Firma. This showed that Ottoman claims had a ground as they 
usually proclaimed that the Kurds were increasingly returning to their real protector. 
He said that he did not intend to disregard the order of the sultan regarding nobody 
would transgress the status quo, in contrast, he had protected the status quo by 
relying on the local forces. If he let Iran to cross the status quo line, Iranian 
commanders could apply a forward policy, and threaten Iraq in their next move.
277
  
Meanwhile, Abdulhamid appreciated Tahir Pasha’s effort, and he awarded 
him a medal on February 13, 1908, as he found his service on the boundary 
settlement loyal and invaluable because he did not allow Iran to transgress the status 
quo line even one-hand span and he did not condone Iranian interventions and 
violations in the frontier zone.
278
 
4. 2. 5. Ottoman Discourses and Savuçbulak 
To describe their connection with the local people in the region, the Ottoman 
frontier actors used several distinctive words in their correspondence. These words 
indicate how frontier officials justified their actions and positions that transgressed 
the position of the Ottoman government regarding the frontier zone. For instance, 
Fazıl Pasha had to justify his action discursively when he intervened the affairs of 
Savuçbulak. 
Fazıl Pasha underlined the importance of Savuçbulak in terms of its high 
economic value thanks to its fertile plains, its geostrategic position, and its people. 
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Savuçbulak was also important for the British interests because it was a township 
adjacent to Muhammerah and Basra. Some related British reports in Shofield’s 
collection of Volume IV indicates neither shah nor revolutionary groups were able to 
implement their authorities completely in Savuçbulak, so Britain was indirectly 
governing the region through the sheiks they agreed and threatened. 
When Fazıl Pasha began to interfering Savuçbulak, Iran protested him. Tahir 
Pasha replied in protest, arguing that some factors had pushed Fazıl Pasha to take 
such an action. According to him, Fazıl Pasha had merely expelled Firman-Firma’s 
military forces and he had saved the Muslim inhabitants of the township who 
suffered from prevalent anarchy and appealed to the Caliph for help and 
assistance.
279
 Yet, Tahir Pasha was not sure whether Savuçbulak was in the Ottoman 
territory or not. On February 3, 1908, he announced that all of Kurdistan belonged to 
the Ottoman Empire, including the inhabitants of the Kurdish villages scattered in 
the Urumiah plain. 
Besides Iranian and Russian officials, British consuls did not see Tahir Pasha’ 
claims something that can be justifiable. In particular, British consuls perceived 
Ottoman advancement into Savuçbulak as a threat to their position in Basra. They 
suspected that this recent advancement of the Ottoman military showed the Ottoman 
State had plan that was prepared carefully.
280
 Even though they could not find any 
evidence exposing the German role in the occupations, they thought that Germany 
might be involved in this plan as well. 
Fazıl Pasha’s involvement to Savuçbulak increased their anxiety and inclined 
them to produce domino effect theories because they feared possible Muslim or tribal 
conflagration in Muhammerah that was in the British sphere of influence. Their 
situation in this place where they controlled through agents and sheikhs since fifty 
years was about to disappear. Fazıl Pasha’s intervention corresponded to the period 
when Britain sought methods to consolidate their relations with the sheikhs, so his 
action obviously could undermine the British interests. Thus, Savuçbulak strained the 
diplomatic relations much more than ever in this period. The British consuls thought 
the expansion of Ottoman encroachments into the territories of the sheikhs, where 
the British Oil Companies had concessions, could create further problems. To 
dominate and control all these local variables, they would demonstrate their navy in 
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Basra, if necessary. They stated, “… any disturbance of the status quo at 
Muhammerah would affect British interests and might lead to the active intervention 
of the British government, who gave the sheikhs certain assurances regarding their 
territory.”281 
4. 2. 5. 1. Fundamentals of Ottoman Discourse for Military Fortification and 
Intervention 
The Ottoman leadership did not accept Shia Iran as a member of the Muslim 
community. This opposition had shaped Ottoman and Iranian bilateral relations since 
the Safavid period, so this difference reverberated to their language as well. In the 
first decade of twentieth century, the Ottoman officials addressed to the problems of 
local people who remained out of the Ottoman imperial territory considering this 
different understanding of Islam. 
Maintaining the security (hâsıl-ı emniyyet), people of Islam (ahâlî-i 
İslâmiyye), Ottoman tribes (aşayir-i Osmaniyye), Muslim tribes (aşayir-i Müslime), 
People of the Sunni doctrine (Sunniyyül mezhep ahali), preservation of the rights of 
Ottoman subjects (teb’a-i şâhânenin muhâfaza-i hukûkları) were groups of words 
they used frequently to remind their religious, political and cultural connections with 
the local people. In other words, they highlighted tribal interrelations with the 
Ottoman government on issues of identity and security.  
The frontier actors who reported all the information associated with the 
frontier zone to Istanbul used some many other phrases as well. Two of them were 
“ancient lands” (arâzî-i kadîme) and status quo line (Istatuko hattı). Like the 
previous words, these words draw the frame of the borderlands where these local 
people inhabited, and so their connection with the Ottoman State was being 
solidified. Most of these groups of local people, mainly Sunni Kurdish tribes, applied 
for taking refuge or political asylum (arz-ı dehalet) to Ottoman Empire. However, 
these appeals encouraged the Ottoman frontier actors, and the eastern frontier policy 
of the empire evolved furthermore by the time to embrace these people as official 
Ottoman subjects. Fazıl Pasha became the chief actor of this changing policy. He 
took the initiative to maintain the security of the people, who applied to the “Caliph” 
for protection, by differing than the Porte. The Porte was opposing new occupations 
and was reminding the frontier actors to preserve the status quo rules. They inquired 
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the reasons about Fazıl Pasha’s initiative when he occupied Muhammed Shah village 
in order to make the River Çığata the boundary between the two states.  
Unlike the Palace’s motivation, there was not a political space that Ottoman 
government could stay behind these policies and discourse because each move of the 
Ottoman Empire was also encroaching the Russian and British spheres of influence. 
For this reason, the Russians demanded Fazıl Pasha to inform the Russian Embassy 
in Istanbul each day and urged him not to cause a new conflict, so the Russians 
began to follow the moves of Fazıl Pasha and the Ottoman troops closely around 
Savuçbulak. In fact, the Ottoman government that was informed about the quarrel in 
Savuçbulak later did not see territories beyond Pasve including Savuçbulak as part of 
the empire, so they decided to withdraw Fazıl Pasha from Savuçbulak when they 
learnt about the occupation.  
On February 15, 1908, Rıza Pasha, the Minister of War, was notified by a 
telegram, which was originally sent from the British Consul in Savuçbulak to the 
British Embassy, that Fazıl Pasha was still in Savuçbulak, although the Porte had 
decided to evacuate the Ottoman troops a week ago. Instead, Fazıl Pasha took charge 
of the government customhouse and appointed an Ottoman consul to govern it. On 
this border strip, he wrote letters to the Kurdish tribes in order to formalize the 
government’s relations with them by taking their written consent to their obedience 
to the Sultan.  
Such actions of Fazıl Pasha and his refortifications around Baghdad arouse 
the reaction of pro-Iranian parties. Russia and Britain feared any disturbance that 
could increase national sentiments in their respective spheres of influence. Russia 
sent a military commission to investigate into the roots of this anger of the people 
there. The pressure Russia put on the Porte worked. The Porte underlined that Fazıl 
Pasha’s presence in Savuçbulak could create problems with Russia. In fact, the 
Ottoman Embassy in St. Petersburg indicated that Russia had begun to prepare a 
force of twenty thousand soldiers to transport to Caucasia.
282
 Rıza Pasha assumed 
that any close contact with Russian forces before full-delimitation of the boundary 
could complicate the situation further. Thus, he ordered Fazıl Pasha to withdraw his 
forces from Savuçbulak to Pasve, namely, the other site of the status quo line. Ferid 
Pasha shared the same opinion with Rıza Pasha and believed that the situation could 
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get worse if Russia intervened in the conflict in Savuçbulak, so they should withdraw 
the rest of the soldiers from there.
283
 Thus, it seems, Russian opposition restrained 
the implementation of the Ottoman discourse about Savuçbulak.284 
Tahir Pasha continued dealing with boundary affairs. He became the object of 
Muhteshem es Saltanah’s complaints. He criticized him,  
 
Tahir Pasha has fiddled around by claiming the frontier investigations and 
negotiations were done already. Tahir Pasha has asserted that Savuçbulak and 
Kurdistan belonged to the Ottoman Empire wherever he went from Urumiah 
to Selmas, and its villages. He has transformed some buildings into station 
houses, fortresses, and customhouses.
285
  
 
The historical roots of this fact that was problematized by Muhteshem es 
Sultanah could be found in the earlier stages of the boundary negotiations. As 
Wratislaw observed, the boundary negotiations had been delayed for three months 
after the Ottoman commissioners reached to border front. New developments and 
violent incidents occurred around the boundary each day. The Ottoman Empire had 
significant number of Kurdish population as well. Therefore, the postponements of 
the negotiations pushed the representatives of the Ottoman State to seek what their 
alternatives were in face of Iranian efforts to win over the tribes in the disputed 
lands. Tahir Pasha read the delays as deliberate tactics to suspend the meetings to 
gain additional time for Iranian penetration into the disputed lands. 
 Tahir Pasha found himself in a dilemma. On the one side, the Porte insisted 
on the delimitation of the boundary. On the other side, the current impasse made the 
Ottoman commissioners unwilling to continue the negotiations under prevailing 
circumstances. Towards the end of March, Tahir Pasha could not resist further the 
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internal pressure coming from the commission members. He tended to break the 
negotiations off, and ended the work of the commission unilaterally and returned 
from Urumiah to Bitlis without consulting the central government. 
On March 28, 1908, Tahir Pasha informed the Palace that the negotiations 
produced eight official reports, which were “signed” and submitted by two frontier 
commissions. Seven of these reports were signed by the Ottoman and Iranian 
commissioners at the end of the negotiations. One report remained unsigned, but that 
one was signed when the Iranian delegates met with the Ottoman commission in the 
village of Kuşçu three days after the Ottoman commission left Urumiah. 
Tahir Pasha summarized the contents of all these reports in a single report 
embodying the results of the border negotiations. In particular, he referred to the 
conditions that were ignored in the first treaty (1639). He stated: 
 
The boundary line from Kızılça in Süleymâniyye to Van had not been 
mentioned by the Ottoman State and Iran in the first treaty, yet they had 
accepted the “sectarian controversy” (ihtilâf-ı mezheb) for the boundary line 
by conditioning Kızılbaş must not intervene. This aspect was expressed with 
the term of “controversy of people” (ihtilâf-ı akvâm) in our official report. 
(Iran) In their response, they did not interfere in this aspect and accepted it.  
Finally, Iranian officers began to complain our commission when they could 
not find any article that they can use in none of those previous agreements 
apart from finding the article III of Second Erzurum Treaty that is unrelated.  
If all claims for the possession of lands had to comply with previous treaties, 
namely, the rule of pacta sunt sevanda, Iran must reconfirm the rights of the 
Ottoman State over the Kurds, coming from the same rule.
 286
 
 
Ottoman and Iranian officials delimitated the long boundary, mainly from south to 
north. When the boundary line reached to Van, a new dispute emerged in the districts 
bordering with Van.  Before Tahir Pasha left his duty, he considered annexing the 
township of Havder on March 26, 1908. He was concerned with the Kurdish tribes 
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whose leaders urgently asked for protection, so he believed that Havder was also part 
of the Ottoman Empire. 
Tahir Pasha was resolved to maintain the security of these people and their 
protection from Iranian attacks as much as possible. He perceived this event as one 
of the outcomes of the friction between the people of Islam (Sunni) and the Shiite in 
the northern parts of the status quo area, because the Shiite groups had been 
attacking the Sunni villages and plundering their properties.
 287
 
The local conditions reshaped the refugee policies of the Ottoman 
government. It seems the government did not have a settled and official plan for 
refugees. Frontier actors confused with each wave of appeals for protection that were 
causing further ambiguities and complexities. However, these appeals to come under 
the protection of Ottoman State increased dramatically. Tahir Pasha or other frontier 
officers did not know what kind of official procedure they would follow on behalf of 
the sultan in response to these appeals.
288
 Tahir Pasha could accept all the appeals 
personally, but the Ottoman government warned him to abstain from accepting the 
applicants as Ottoman subjects because it could create further problems with Iran. 
An inquiry of the Minister of War Rıza Pasha asking the Porte about the procedures 
to be observed regarding the asylum seekers points to the ambiguities of the issue in 
the Ottoman Empire.
289
 The appeals for refuge kept coming in increasing numbers 
from the people who inhabited the northern shores of the Lake Urumiah.  
This situation enabled the Ottoman frontier officials to consolidate two other 
significant terms that one encounters in Ottoman daily politics in 1908. Dehalet is 
one of them, referring to political asylum or refugee. Muavenet was another term, 
connoting assistance and protection. These two terms that supported each other 
interactively, the inter-tribal quarrels and inter state rivalry accelerated their 
application.  
Relying on their power or the benefits they hoped to get from the state, the 
tribes acted freely in a flexible environment. They did not have advanced war 
technologies and military equipment aside from the regular tribal cavalries. They 
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depended on the support of the states to establish superiority over another tribe with 
which they quarreled or to protect themselves from the tribe that enjoyed artillery 
support from a rival state. This situation brought Iran and the Ottoman State to the 
brink of war on several occasions. Neither the Ottomans and nor the Iranians 
hesitated to back their tribal cavalry forces with artillery support, when the 
conditions required the application of more offensive polices in order to protect their 
respective allies in the frontier zone.  
Besides these frontier difficulties, the commission members had to deal with 
their own needs. Indeed, they served under exhausting climate, geographical, and 
sheltering conditions. On April 9, 1908, Tahir Pasha, as the chairperson of the 
commission, reported that all members of the commission needed to go to nearby 
towns such as Hakkari, Van, and Başkale for three or five days in order to find 
doctors, who could check their health, to buy indispensible supplies and materials, 
and to wait for their next orders. Tahir Pasha himself went to Erciş from Gevar to 
receive his orders.
290
  
4. 2. 6. The States and Inter-Tribal Conflicts 
Many cases can be found to illustrate the above-mentioned situation between 
1905 and 1908.  The Imperial Fourth Army, which was situated in Erzincan, sent a 
telegram vividly elaborating the basic pulse of these interstate and inter tribal 
activities.  
For example, Timur Han, an Iranian Commander-in-Chief, led a joint 
military consortium consisting of a group of tribal forces from Arusanlı, Celali, 
Abdudi tribes from the Iranian side and three hundred Armenian fedais (guarillas). 
They carried a cannon and attacked with this cannon to the Castle of Çari in Sumay. 
They also bombarded the Şikak tribe with cannon fire in the same village. 
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Map 4.2: This map shows the northern parts of the Ottoman-Iranian frontier and the 
geographical location of Havder, Sumay, Beradost and Selmas. The Lake on the 
right is Urumiah. 
291
 
The reason behind the attack was very interesting. It reveals the complex 
interrelations between the states and tribal entities in the frontier zone of northern 
Urumiah, a zone that was shattered sociologically. The Fourth Army linked this joint 
campaign of Iran to the intelligence reports that Iranians received earlier about 
Ottoman military plans to annex Havder, Çari, Sumay, and their vicinity.  
Upon receiving this intelligence, the Iranians immediately granted these 
lands, including Çari, to Ismail Agha, the leader of the Abdudi tribe. The other tribes 
resisted this fait accompli. The first tribe who resisted this situation was the Kardar 
tribe that has lived in the same district. All these tribes recognized the Ottoman 
sovereignty. In order to push its regional rival away from the district, Ismail Agha 
prepared his forces to confront them with due military support of the Iranian 
government. On the other hand, Ismail Hasup, another agha in Çari and the leader of 
the Kardar tribe, adopted a pro-Ottoman position and asserted that the lands they 
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inhabited were part of the Ottoman Empire and they would not recognize Iranian 
sovereignty.  
This situation pushed Iran to pursue a two-dimensional policy. On the one 
hand, they wanted to win Ismail Hasup over with various promises. On the other 
hand, they sent five hundred cavalry against the Kardar tribe. Ismail Hasup who was 
left to choose between fighting or become an ally wanted assistance from the 
Ottoman government. To prevent these kinds of oppressive policies of Iran in Çari, 
the Ottoman Empire decided to annex it before Iran consolidated its power in these 
lands.
292
 
 Thus, the Ottoman State and Iran became involved in a proxy war through 
these two tribes who espoused different sovereignties. While the battle continued on 
the tribal level, Sertib, the brother of the leader of the Şikak tribe293, and the chief of 
Kardar tribe, Ismail Agha came to the Ottoman barracks in order to ask for military 
support. The Imperial Fourth Army requested permission to dispatch regular 
Ottoman soldiers, namely the troops in Nisah and Şecare in order to help the Şikaks 
for a variety of reasons. The conditions of the Şikaks were becoming worse and their 
losses were increasing. Furthermore, this situation worried the Ottoman officers and 
this situation of panic reverberated on the reports of the Fourth Army that detail these 
tribal disputes.  
The reports explain that the Şikaks barricaded themselves in the fortress of 
Çari to defend themselves against the joint Iranian forces. However, the Iranian 
forces brought the fortress under cannon fire. Ottoman officers feared that the tribal 
resistance could be broken soon due to destruction of the fortress with cannon fire. 
They believed that the Iranian forces could then head towards the Ottoman 
headquarters after they killed “the people of Islam”.  
The Ottoman officers needed to consolidate their de facto refugee support 
policies (muavenet) in the region. They realized that the number of the Ottoman 
troops in the frontier zone was inadequate, and they considered that the Iranian 
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forces could defeat them in a future attack. For this reason, they fortified the 
Ottoman military stations in the frontier zone to dispatch the Ottoman troops against 
the joint Iranian force fighting the Şikak tribes in Sumay. Brigadier-Commander of 
the Ottoman Frontier Forces, Yaver Bey, was responsible for the protection of the 
status quo, public security and order in the frontier zone. He suggested the 
fortification of the Ottoman troops located in Beradost as well.  
The Field Marshal of the Fourth Army explained the trick and the attack of 
Iranian state and tribes. He believed that these Iranian attempts could facilitate their 
encroachments. It could cause irremediable consequences for the defense of the 
frontier zone, so he supported the deployment of additional Ottoman troops.
294
 This 
resistance of Ottoman troops and tribal forces prompted the Iranian troops and its 
tribal allies to stop and retreat. 
Tahir Pasha set himself to annex Havder, but the Ottoman government was 
very reluctant to allow him, although he insisted that Havder was within the status 
quo. The Ottoman government believed that both Ottoman and Iranian commissions 
should rapidly fix the boundary by avoiding any action that would prolong this 
process of frontier delimitation.
295
 The government considered the frontier 
delimitation more important than the protection of some pro-Ottoman tribes, and 
thought that the annexation of Havder could block the negotiations for the 
delimitation of the frontier zone.
 
They wanted to postpone the decisions to be taken 
on Havder’s status for a while, until after the end of the negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to investigate one of the most 
controversial Ottoman boundary commissions, namely the one led by Tahir Pasha in 
1907-1908, with emphasis on the international conjecture that affected the 
commission’s work. This study showed how the boundary commission was formed 
and how it interacted with internal and external politics. The reports of Tahir Pasha 
and other officials who were in charge of maintaining the security of the frontier and 
of the people around the frontier constituted one of the major sources of this study. I 
compared these reports to the reports written by the British envoys. These reports 
indicate that the boundary commission played a central role in the implementation of 
the orders of the Palace, just as the reports of the frontier actors enabled the Palace to 
deal with the conflicts emerging in the eastern peripheries. 
My argument is that the Ottoman frontier commission under the headship of 
Tahir Pasha was a political instrument of the sultan to implement his eastern policy. 
Tahir’s conduct and the positions he took suggest that the sultan was wary of 
possible Russian encroachments and hoped to create a diplomatic space against 
Russia and Iran by winning the loyalty of the predominantly Sunni population of the 
frontier zone.  
As it has been indicated above, the peripheries of the empire became centers 
of conflict late in his history. As well, it has been asserted that the Palace and the 
Ottoman government diverged in their approach to and perception of the boundary 
affairs. The frontier actors, especially Tahir Pasha, became a source of resistance 
against Iran’s increasing military activism around the frontline. The Palace and the 
majority of the frontier actors from governors to high-ranking commanders shared a 
similar perspective regarding the boundary conflicts. They were willing to occupy 
the disputed lands until Iran agreed to negotiate. In fact, Iran’s main goal became 
clear in 1905, when it showed its desire to annex the disputed lands with British and 
Russian diplomatic support. To prevent this fait accompli, the Ottomans occupied 
 105 
significant parts of the disputed lands, and even went beyond the disputed lands in 
order to force Iran to negotiate.
296
 
The status quo of the eastern boundary remained unconcluded for many years 
after Russia and Britain, the so called mediating powers, and the Ottoman and 
Iranian States, known as the contracting powers, specified a neutral or disputed zone 
in the 1870s, after fixing other parts of the frontiers as undisputed territory. However, 
these states could not reach an agreement to fix the disputed zone, because of frontier 
difficulties, such as tribal movements or acts against government authority and inter-
tribal conflicts.  
Review of the existing literature on Ottoman-Persian boundary conflicts 
revealed how the states came to the point mentioned above. It showed the complex 
nature of historical struggle that indicated the efforts to transform the traditional 
imperial frontiers to imperial boundaries. It became clear that the written knowledge 
of the states regarding the region, including that of Britain and Russia, was quite 
sketchy in the 1840s. The Ottoman government thought Britain and Russia wanted to 
settle the frontier disputes in favor of Iran by relying on superficial surveys, which 
included thousands of discrepancies regarding the physical and demographic features 
of the area. Dervish Pasha, who was aware of these mistakes, had acted unilaterally 
to correct the discrepancies by his own surveys. However, he could not persuade 
others effectively after he rejoined the negotiations. The issue of frontier conflicts 
between the Ottoman State and Iran remained unresolved although several boundary 
commissions were established to deal with the problem. The analysis of the existing 
literature indicated that the Ottomans had never given up their arguments, and that 
their eastern frontier polices of the Ottoman Empire did not fluctuate much. As 
Melike Sarıkçıoğlu’s work (2013) shows, these polices were stable, and there was 
continuity in their eastern frontier policies throughout history. Thus, it can be said 
that the Ottoman occupation of the disputed lands was an aggressive expression of 
                                                 
296
 In 1905, the Ottomans began to occupy Vezene, Lahijan, and Pasve. Abdulhamid II had already 
ordered to occupy these lands in 1905 before Tahir Pasha was appointed as a chief negotiator in 1907. 
Ottoman troops continued to advance close to Savuçbulak on October 1906. Besides previous 
districts, Ottomans took complete possession of the districts of Dasht and Mergawer in May 1906, and 
the occupation of Mergawar and Tergawar Plains were eventually completed following the Persian 
expedition to punish Begzadi (or Dasht) Kurds in 1907. In August 1907, Ala-es-Sultana, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs for Persia, declared, “Turks had occupied Mergawer, Tergawer, Chereek, and the 
districts of Dasht and Beradost as far as Kotur, that is, up to the eastern limit of the frontier zone.”  
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these polices. Tahir Pasha’s boundary commission did not digress from these 
policies. 
The main and most important chapter of this thesis is Chapter 5. The other 
chapters are meant to provide a theoretical framework and a historical context to 
assess the problem. Chapter 3 shows that the boundary commission was formed in a 
period whilst the Ottoman treasury suffered from cash shortages. The lack of 
insufficient funds to pay the salaries of the boundary commissioners and additional 
expenditures related to boundary delimitation efforts, including the flexing of 
military muscle around the boundary pushed the Ottoman frontier actors to relying 
on tribal forces for military support in order to deter similar Iranian forces. This 
study has asserted that taking military action for the Palace was not simply an 
expansionist or opportunist move under the prevailing circumstances. Multiple 
factors such as ideological, humanitarian, and geopolitical ones played significant 
roles in Abdulhamid’s spontaneous act to conquer the eastern peripheries of the 
empire in contrast to the British envoys who suspected the existence of a systematic 
plan prepared together with Germany. 
Tahir Pasha was the governor who implemented Ottoman policies shaped 
with unintended consequences in the eastern peripheries of the empire. The 
appointment of Tahir Pasha as a head boundary investigator and negotiator was not a 
coincidence. His political career, the social network that he cultivated for thirty-three 
years by being in the same environment made him the best option available as an 
official who could pursue Abdulhamid’s regional goals. Appendix A provides an 
original account of the early life, political identity and career of Tahir Pasha as an 
Ottoman bureaucrat. It indicates that Tahir Pasha became the chief negotiator two 
years after the Ottoman occupation of the disputed lands actually began. A few 
newspaper articles, several reports of the British envoys, and the Ottoman reports 
portray Tahir Pasha between two opposite poles. He was perceived as an Ottoman 
bureaucrat who grasped a conciliatory approach. As well, he characterized a person 
who became ‘narrow-minded’ and an ‘obstinate old gentlemen’. The actions he took 
in different periods shaped these different judgments, and comments. All the reports 
have shown that he was a Kurdish-friendly Ottoman bureaucrat, because for him the 
Kurdish people were part of the Islamic community. This did not mean that he 
behaved unjustly to other ethnic and religious groups. Was Tahir Pasha merely an 
implementer of the state orders? Did his emotions influence his conduct of the affairs 
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of the state? How did he balance the state orders, his emotions, and local realities? 
These topics need further studies. According to himself, Tahir Pasha was not a 
governor-negotiator who acted independently of the Palace. He saw his actions as the 
extension of Abdulhamid’s policies. Obviously, he saw Abdulhamid as the head of 
the government. He became an instrument of the Palace in the eastern periphery of 
the empire. Others suspected that he received secret instructions directly from the 
sultan. This situation increased the dissatisfaction of the Ottoman grand vizier (the 
Sublime Porte), the other commissioners in Tahir Pasha’s commission, and the 
British and Russian delegates. 
The dissatisfaction caused by the secret instructions of the palace made 
visible the dualism, discord, and friction within the Ottoman government. Not only 
did Abdulhamid send secret instructions to governors holding sensitive posts, he also 
relied on his advisers to control the empire from the Yıldız Palace rather than letting 
the ministers run the empire. Such practices caused discord with the leading officials 
of the Sublime Porte, especially the grand vizier. In other words, diverging views 
regarding the delimitation of the imperial eastern boundary indicated the existence of 
disharmony in conducting the affairs of the Ottoman state in 1905-1908. In this 
period, the Palace favored aggressive policies to define the imperial borders in the 
east, while the Porte embraced moderate and practical policies for the same purpose. 
The policies of the Palace regarding its borders were not compatible with the views 
of Russia and Britain, where the Porte advocated ideas similar to those of the 
Russian and British ambassadors, consuls, and representatives in general and as such 
opposed to those of the sultan or his advisers. 
I have elaborated on the issue of inter-governmental relations in the new 
imperialist era. Historians in general hold that Britain had close relations with the 
Ottoman government and the constitutionalists. Britain followed the same policy in 
Iran. It established close contact with the Qajar government and the revolutionaries. 
Germany maintained a close relationship with the sultan, while Russia chose the 
shah as a political partner. In this respect, Russia and Britain contradicted one 
another in their approaches to the internal dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and Iran, 
although Britain and Russia agreed in 1907.  
While these relations were at the state level, different states acted according 
to ethnic and religious differences at the local level. The states used these differences 
as an excuse to have a say in the affairs of the groups they backed in the region. In 
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this period, the different ethnic and religious identities defined the identity of a 
territory or a district on the border front. These two terms were intermixed. 
Nestorians and Armenians cultivated close relationships with Russia. Britain was 
interested in cultivating close relationships with these two Christian groups, as well.  
Iran was interestingly in the same company. In this socio-political environment, 
Abdulhamid arranged regional alliances by developing close relationships with the 
region’s tribes in order to safeguard Ottoman interests against possible threats.  
 I have also discussed that the pleas of the local people for inclusion (dehalet) 
Ottoman Empire gave legitimacy to the frontier actors’ policy to aid (muavenet) 
these people in the disputed lands as an effective way to promote the prestige of the 
sultan in the eyes of his Muslim subjects, particularly the Kurds.  
I have additionally discussed two political riots that occurred in Bitlis and 
Van. The reports indicate that these riots aimed at driving away the governors, who 
had different mentalities (Ottomanism?) than that of Abdulhamid and Tahir Pasha 
(Islamist Ottomanism?). I also explained how widespread scarcity of grains in 1907 
due to inadequate rainfalls played a role in the escalation of public discontent. The 
general characteristics of the riots, in other words, certain actions of the protestors 
such as the occupation of telegraph houses by the sheikhs in the provinces showed 
that the climatic conditions do not suffice to explain the reasons behind the protest. 
Other factors such as customary, traditional, and religious ones played crucial roles 
as well. I would argue that they simply did not want any governor, because they 
thought these governors disapproved the continuity of the sheikhs’ local supremacy. 
In Chapter 4, I explained the actions of the boundary commission. The 
chapter aimed to inquire how effective the Ottoman governance in the periphery was, 
and how the Ottomans co-opted the local people and elites while the government 
faced certain grave problems. A. C. Peacock raises these questions in order to 
understand the inner dynamics of the Ottoman frontiers. I sought answers to similar 
questions in my effort to understand the situation in the eastern peripheries of the 
empire. Thus, this thesis sheds some light on the interactions of the Ottomans in the 
late period with their neighbor Iran, and what motives they had and which methods 
they used to pursue their goals. The chapter also presented examples from the region 
that showed the relations of the people of the frontier (tribes) with the Ottoman 
garrisons and administration. I argued that pro-Ottoman Kurds saw the Ottoman 
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garrison as safe places and asked for military support against Iran, and that religious 
and political distinctions influenced neighborly relationships in the periphery.  
The taxation systems of these two neighboring states need to be further 
studied in order to illustrate the economic activities and concerns of the people at the 
frontier, as well as their interactions with one another, because economic motives as 
well caused conflicts in the region. Evidence shows that the Kurds who constituted a 
great part of the population on the Ottoman side of the frontier were not against the 
rule of the sultan. They had a strong sense of ‘belonging’ so long as the 
government’s approach to local issues remained flexible. As British reports show, 
most of the tribes identified themselves as Sunni and Kurdish. They were engaged in 
pastoral activities primarily. This thesis has shown that the Palace was capable of 
exerting influence on these people, who in general considered the authority of the 
Sublime Porte legitimate. 
I have examined how Tahir Pasha prepared to provide a background for the 
to his arguments in the boundary negotiations. He examined the imperial edicts, the 
Porte’s reports, ancient treaties, Dervish Pasha’s explanatory documents, and maps. 
This examination proved fertile in consolidating the Ottoman arguments during the 
negotiations. However, the British envoys viewed these evaluated Ottoman 
arguments as futile as the earlier arguments put forward in the past.  
I discussed how the boundary negotiations progressed, and what kind of 
methods the Ottomans followed before and during the negotiations. One can argue 
that Tahir Pasha’s approach was civilizational, in that historical phenomena were 
compatible with all treaties. He widely used the argument that religious and national 
distinctions should be taken into consideration in designating the frontier during the 
boundary negotiations. Thus, he asserted that all the Kurds were subjects of the 
empire. According to him, they would not desire to stay under Iranian rule, when 
Iran relieved them of the force it used against the tribes. As Iranians knew this, they 
insisted on the precondition of the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the 
disputed lands to resume the boundary negotiations. Towards the end of the 
negotiations, the Porte advocated similar views subtly. The debates that dominated 
the negotiations indicated that the legitimacy of the Ottoman rule and claims in the 
region theoretically relied on “ancient” or old treaties. The practical manifestation of 
his position was the aggressive policies that the Palace pursued. However, as I 
mentioned above, the Porte did not develop a practical policy (apart from accepting 
 110 
Iran’s arguments) though the Porte shared the theoretical vision that informed the 
Palace. They did not know how they would achieve their goals if they withdraw the 
Ottoman military force from the disputed lands, a space where the interests of the 
Great Powers converged and competed.  
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APPENDICES 
A. TAHIR PASHA’S CAREER LINE 
 The first phase of Tahir Pasha’s bureaucratic career comprises of twelve 
years until he was discharged from the chief secretaryship of Salonika. The second 
phase of his career embraced a longer period, more than two-thirds of his career, 
which started with his tenure as a chief secretary in Bitlis, on January 15, 1880. This 
appointment became a turning point in his life and bureaucratic career. He carved out 
a mediating role for himself in the eastern provinces at the margins of the empire. 
Despite his disadvantages for being ignorant the regional dynamics at first, the time 
he spent in the eastern provinces made Tahir Pasha an expert of the region, as based 
on the sources. His biographic records did not give much detail that would shed light 
on the reasons behind his appointment from Salonika to Bitlis, which on the surface 
looks as though he was exiled. At this point, it is important to ask why he was 
suitable for a position in Bitlis, while he was not for a similar administrative position 
in Salonika. His biographical record indicates two reasons for his dismissal from 
Salonika. His status did not match to his ability to govern (hâl ü iktidâr) although his 
handling of records and correspondence (mu'âmelât-ı tahrîriyyesi) was good.297 
There must have emerged a controversy between him and other officials in Salonika.  
 Living in Bitlis for a person who did not have any connection in the area was 
a big challenge, so he needed an adaptation process in a different social milieu that 
was very different than those he experienced in the western parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. He knew the local language of his own community in the west, apart from 
Iranian and Arabic; he did not know the local languages of the eastern peripheries 
such as Armenian and Kurdish. In such an alien community at first, most probably, 
his life was affected by a series of special differences stemming from divergent 
socio-economic, communal and environmental factors, but it can be said that his 
Islamic identity eased the adaptation process. He established good networks with 
sheiks and prominent figures of the region that enable him to communicate easily 
with the local people, who were very religious. The best example of this can be 
observed in his good relations with a Modernist-Kurdish religious figure, 
Bediüzzaman Said-i Nursî298, during his governorship of Van. Thus, Tahir Pasha’s 
influence in the eastern parts of the empire can be understood through the scope of 
his social contacts.
299
 
The First Phase: (1868-1880) 
Tahir Pasha was born in Shkodra, one of the oldest towns in northwestern 
Albania, in 1849. He was born into a world where the majority of the population 
consisted of Albanian-Muslims. There were also people whose ethnic and religious 
backgrounds differed. This cosmopolitan nature of Albania shaped young Tahir in 
the same way. He learnt several local languages. In 1880, Izzet Pasha, Governor of 
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Shkodra, remarked that Tahir had both reading and writing ability of Serbo-Croatian 
in addition to Turkish. He indicated that Tahir could fluently speak Turkish, Bosnian, 
and Albanian.
300
 
Relating to years when Albanian nationalism accelerated, Tahir Pasha’s 
political position is unknown, but his silence in the sources and lack of evidence 
regarding his political stance indicates he advocated remaining under Ottoman rule. 
He preferred identifying himself as an Ottoman-Muslim bureaucrat. Not only 
Ottoman bureaucrats but also foreign officials and their press specifically knew him 
as the governor of Van and Bitlis, although he served in many different provinces as 
a governor.  
 
Table 3: This table shows tenures of Tahir Pasha’s governerships in various 
provinces. 
 
Dates From To 
Places Hicri/Rumi Miladi Hicri/Rumi Miladi 
Musul 15 Za.1306 13 July 1889 8 Za. 1308 15 June 1891 
Van 9 L. 1315 3 March 1898 2 Za. 1324 18 Dec. 1906 
Trabzon 28 R. 1325 10 June 1907 19 C. 1325 30 July 1907 
Bitlis 19 C. 1325 30 July 1907 30 B. 1326 28 August 1908 
Erzurum 30 B. 1326 28 August 1908 1 Ca. 1327 21 May 1909 
Bitlis 18 M. 1328 30 January 1910 9 Za. 1330 11 October 1912 
Musul 19 B. 1328 27 July 1910 9 Za. 1330 20 October 1912 
 
Tahir Pasha was one of six sons of Haji Ali Bey Efendi, a local ruler in 
Podgarica, a district of Montenegro. Tahir married twice. From his first wife, he had 
a boy, Cevdet, and two girls, Fikriye and Naima. Cevdet spent all his professional 
life as a provincial administrator around Van until he became the governor of Van at 
the end. He was imprisoned on the island of Malta during the First World War, but 
he escaped later.
301
 From his second wife, he had Mün’ime, Münibe, Mükrime, 
Necdet, Fikret, Hikmet, Fahrünnisa and Mihrinnisa. One of his daughters, Mün’ime 
married to Fahreddin Altay Pasha, a commander in the war of independence.
302
   
His primary school education was a religious one. In the Ottoman education 
system, the students used to start their primary school at the age of five or six in 
order to learn introductory religious subjects and other basic knowledge. In these 
schools, students used to learn the Holy Quran, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, grammar 
and syntax, writing/calligraphy, Islamic behavior (ilm-i hal), history of religions, 
ethics, and arithmetic.
303
 After he completed all these courses, he continued his 
education in a madrasa. This was an educational institution where relatively 
advanced religious sciences (tafsir, hadith, kelam, fiqh, and aqaid), were taught in 
addition to introduction to medicine and engineering.
304
 Young Tahir learnt Arabic 
very well, and reached on advanced level in Persian. However, his educational 
lineage was not indicating he would be a person who would deal with governance 
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and administration because he followed on educational trajectory that normally 
produced ulema (religious scholars and functionaries).  
This educational background shaped Tahir Pasha and his achievements 
through his bureaucratic carrier always indicated his background. It can be seen that 
he attained positions in various secretariats of different provinces during his earlier 
career. In detail, at the beginning of his career, on April 24, 1868, Tahir entered the 
secretarial office of Podgorica (Podgoriçe Kazası Tahrirat Odası) for an on-the-job 
training into civil service (mülazemet) when he was twenty years old. Five months 
later, he was appointed as the secretary of the Koç Sub-district (Koç Nahiyesi Katibi) 
with a wage of two hundred and fifty qurushes. In 1872, he was appointed as the 
secretary of the Podgorica Land Registry (Podgoriçe Tapu Kitabeti) with an 
additional income of twenty to forty qurushes. On March 1, 1873, his mission in the 
office changed, and he was appointed as the Second Counterpart of Secretariat 
(Tahrirat Kalemi Suver-i Sanisi) with a salary of three hundred and fifty qurushes.  
During the time when Tahir Pasha acquired experience in the affairs of the 
state, the state itself was also changing. By the dethronement of Sultan Murad V in 
August of 1876, Abdulhamid became the thirty-fourth sultan of the empire. The 
declaration of the first constitution in 1876 started a new era in the history of the 
Ottoman Empire until the outbreak of the Ottoman Russian War in 1877, when the 
constitution was suspended Abdulhamid established an authoritarian regime. Tahir 
lived the most successful years of his career during the reign of Abdulhamid until the 
Young Turk movement dethroned Abdulhamid in April of 1909. Afterward, his 
loyalty was frequently questioned. The CUP suspected him as a potential threat to 
their regime. The CUP-dominated cabinets changed his place of duty often. They had 
to keep him within the bureaucracy because Young Turks had a few well-trained and 
experienced bureaucrats in their ranks in the first years of their government. In 1912, 
he was retired due to his age, and went to Istanbul to seek treatment for his chronic 
thyroid disease, but he died in November 1913.
305
 
The documents of hand indicate that Tahir Pasha was seen as an assiduous 
bureaucrat throughout his career in the bureaucracy. He began to work as the chief 
secretary of the Shkodra Province (Mektubi Odası) in 1877. The declaration of the 
Ottoman constitution called for the formation of a nominated senate (Heyet-i Ayan), 
and the organization of an elected chamber of deputies (Heyet-i Mebusan).
306
 Tahir 
was temporarily appointed to the Senate as a clerk with a monthly salary of five 
hundred qurushes.
307
  
Following his temporary service, Tahir was transferred back to Shkodra 
Province as chief secretary (İşkodra Vilayeti Mektupçuluğu) with a salary of three 
thousand qurushes, on October 27, 1878. Thus, he became one of the leading 
officials of the province, because the chief secretary of a province undertook 
significant tasks as a member of the governor’s main staff and carried out the 
province’s correspondence, filing, and the publication of a yearbook (Salname).308 
Two years later, Tahir was promoted to the rank of third degree (rütbe-i sâlise) on 
March 13, 1880, due to his seniority and good services in the civil service.  
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The Ottoman bureaucracy tended to be quite volatile; officials moved from 
one post to another within a few years. It was possible to see sharp breaks or 
fluctuations within one’s career. Tahir Pasha was one of those who had a fluctuating 
career path. He had to leave his official post while being transferred and appointed to 
another post. In one instance, he was not assigned to a post related to his career and 
commensurate with his seniority, so he resigned. At this time, Izzet Pasha was the 
governor of Shkodra. He filed a report referring to the general qualities of Tahir as a 
chief secretary, on November 11, 1880:  
 
Aforementioned (Tahir) is capable of fulfilling his civil service duties 
promptly and competently and capable of settling even arduous disputes 
between litigious parties thanks to his intuitive understanding of the 
time and the necessities of the state and the place. He is a punctual 
young bureaucrat who goes to his job regularly. He has the capacity to 
fulfill the requirements of his praised title. He has a praiseworthy 
personality, which deserves great respect.
309
  
 
New financial difficulties emerged following the Ottoman-Russian War of 
1877-1878. The Ottoman government was struggling to balance its budget, and 
trying to reduce or cut the expenses that were not vital. One outcome of this policy 
became the promulgation of the Regulation for Salary Adjustment (Tensîk-i Ma’âşât 
Karârnâmesi). According to this Regulation, the salaries of many officials were 
reduced. By this act, which went into force on March 14, 1880, Tahir Pasha’s salary 
was also reduced to two thousand and five hundred qurushes.
310
 On August 4, 1880, 
the Ministry of War stated that Tahir Pasha could not continue in the same post 
because the post was not compatible with his qualifications even though he had been 
in a similar position before. Thereupon, Tahir Pasha was transferred to the position 
of chief secretary in Salonika (Selânîk Mektûbçuluğu) with a raise of five hundred 
qurushes, which increased his salary to three thousand qurushes.
311
  This increase of 
his salaries represented that he was gradually promoted due to his growing 
knowledge of and experience in state affairs. Eventually, he moved from Shkodra to 
Salonika, where he served about four months, beginning on August 10, 1880. 
However, when he was transferred to the chief secretaryship of the Bitlis Province 
(Bitlis Vilâyeti Mektûbçuluğu) on April 15, 1880, his salary dramatically decreased 
to two thousand and five hundred qurushes.  
The Second Phase: (1880-1912) 
His appointment to Bitlis marked the beginning of the thirty-three years of his 
career that he spent in the eastern provinces. This appointment was clearly a turning 
point in his life. Bitlis consisted of four sub-districts: Bitlis, Mush, Siird and Genç. 
The weather conditions in the region were terrestrial in general. The winters were 
very severe and extended to six months. These harsh climatic conditions led to the 
closing of roads for a long time. Besides, the mountainous terrain negatively 
restricted the transportation and shipping in the region. The province was surrounded 
with highlands in the east and bordered on the lake Van, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, and 
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Musul in the west.
312
 Demographically, Bitlis maintained a significant number of 
Muslim populations together with Armenians, Assyrians, and Yezidis in low number 
in the twentieth century.
313
  
After four years in Bitlis, Tahir was promoted to the Second Class (Sâniye 
Sınıfı) of his third rank on January 15, 1884. 314 His rise within the state bureaucracy 
fluctuated, but continued, and he was promoted to Sınıf-ı Mütemâyizîn, a civil rank 
equivalent to army colonel, on January 17, 1885.  
Within five years of his tenure in Bitlis, Tahir seems to have adapted to the 
social milieu of Bitlis. He established a good network of neighborhood and 
cultivated close relations with some of the notables and officials in the province. 
However, cultivation of this type of relations by a high-ranking official could create 
problems, and it was against Ottoman state traditions and rules. To establish this kind 
of networks had been prohibited to prevent the emergence of oppositions and 
criticisms by other prominent figures in the province. In this case, we have an 
example that some prominent officials complained about Tahir Pasha and his 
brother, the governor of the Mûş Sancak (Mûş Mutasarrıfı), because they were 
establishing close relations with local people.  
The governor of Bitlis decided to send Tahir to another post, which equaled 
to his current post, on January 29, 1887. The sources say that the allegations were 
proven at the end of an investigation, but they are silent about the kind of relations he 
established with local notables. He was allowed to stay in Bitlis until December 4, 
1887, when he was appointed as the governor of Suleymaniye (Suleymaniye 
Mustasarrıfı) with a salary of seven thousand and five hundred qurushes.315 During 
his tenure in Suleymaniye, Tahir Pasha sent a telegraph to Istanbul, to report one of 
his good deeds that helped maintain public security. He reported that a bandit of 
Hemvend, Ahmed Turşi, was finally killed on March 24, 1889.316 Within a short 
time, he was appointed to the deputy governorship of Musul (Musul Vilayeti Vali 
Vekaleti) on May 28, 1888 with a salary of fifteen thousand qurushes. Evidently, he 
was appointed as the governor of Musul on July 13, 1889.
317
 He was climbing up to 
high ranks and began to take medals for different reasons from not only his own state 
but also from France and Iran. However, he became involved in rivalries among 
local notables, therefore, attracted complaints frequently. 
Several people accused Tahir Pasha during his governorship of Musul. An 
investigation was ordered to clarify these allegations. The most significant figure 
who complained about him within the bureaucratic structure was Abdülkâdir Pasha, 
the governor of Mamurat ül-‘Aziz. The investigator first looked into the reliability of 
his reports about Tahir Pasha as Abdülkâdir Pasha severely criticized him on few 
points and saw him as a corrupt person participating in corruptive activities. One of 
the assertions was more striking than the others. Abdülkâdir asserted that Tahir had 
taken money from the fund allocated for orphans and widows, and had depleted it. 
Another accusation was that Tahir Pasha released the chiefs of Shimr (Şümür), who 
had been arrested during the time of the late-former governor Rashid Pasha, in return 
for fourteen Arabian horses. The third accusation was based on that he decreased the 
salaries of officers for a few years because the Finance Office (Mâl Sandığı) was 
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short of funds. A personal voucher for five hundred-odd thousand qurushes was 
entered in the journal for income and expenditures during the time of Tahir Pasha. At 
the end of investigation, he was acquitted of all charges. However, accusations 
suggest that Tahir Pasha used available resources to manage local conflicts and 
politics in the border provinces, where he served. The case of Arabian horses 
illustrates this point.  
By basing their arguments on the records of finance office, the investigators 
reported that there was not any evidence that indicated that Tahir Pasha was actually 
guilty of embezzlement of money from the revenue of province. According to 
investigators, these claims were dubious and unfair because Tahir had actually 
borrowed the sum in question. As for the charges related to the freeing of the Shimr 
(Şümür) chiefs, the inspectors decided that the chiefs had been released due to the 
fact that the reason for the arresting was unclear. Besides, they found out that the 
chiefs had assisted the Ottoman troops who tried to eliminate the looting activities on 
the border, and that the officials took this service into account. When the army 
confirmed all these good services of the Shimr chiefs, Tahir was acquitted of these 
allegations as well. Indeed, Tahir restored the image of the sultan in the eyes of the 
chiefs. Receiving gifts like Arabian horses from the Shimr chiefs, who were in 
government service, was the order of the Sublime Porte (Bâb-ı Âlî) and sending 
valuable gifts in return was necessary to honor the prevailing custom gift exchange 
between the state and the chiefs.  
The late Abdulkadir Pasha had reported from Musul that the salaries of the 
regular and reserve army officers and of widows and orphans were paid against a 
loan. The financial distress of recent years [and the consequent delay of the payment 
of salaries] obliged the local officials to borrow [at a discount] against their salaries 
[in arrears]. Thus, under Tahir Pasha’s administration, promissory notes worth 500, 
000 qurushes were entered into the general daybook [yevmiyye defteri], although no 
entry was made in the local Treasury [accounts] for the corresponding years. It 
would be unfair to leave Tahir Pasha under suspicion for this reason, even if we 
assume these promissory notes represented discounted salaries. When Tahir Pasha 
was asked to provide his view on this charge, he reminded his telegram to the Grand 
Vizierate on 5 April 1306, where he had explained how the contractors [who offered 
cash at a discount against salaries in arrears] would accept only the promissory notes 
made to their names and refuses others. Consequently, he had made other 
arrangements, vouching for the payment of the salaries of officials and pensioners. In 
fact if he had any illicit intentions, he would not have accepted to buy back at a fifty 
percent discount the promissory notes in the hands of contractors and then devoted 
the revenue of about 3, 000 gold liras that eventually accrued to the local Treasury 
due to this transaction to good deeds [in the province].
318
  
On September 25, 1892, the inspectors reported that the accusations were 
insubstantial, and Tahir was innocent. The Porte decided that there was no need for a 
new investigation because it made no sense to pursue the accusations whether related 
to fraud or the matter of Arabian horses.
319
  
Tahir was appointed the deputy governor of Genç, a sub township of Bitlis 
(Genc Sancağı Mutasarraflığı Vekaleti). Tahir occupied this position twice. First, he 
served there from October 26, 1881, to June 10, 1883, and second, from August 18, 
1885, to November 12, 1885, with a salary of 1, 175 qurushes. Bitlis provincial 
government ratified the investigation results by noting that Tahir Pasha touched 
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neither the state’s property nor the people’s money. Similarly, the Local Council of 
Administration of Bitlis reported that Tahir Pasha improved public order in Bitlis and 
managed very well the auctioning of the tithe (a tax on crops).
320
  
On February 22, 1898, he was appointed as the governor of Van. This 
governorship continued until 1906.
 321
 A week after he became the governor of Van, 
he was granted a Mecidi badge of the first order (Birinci rütbe’den Mecîdî nişân-ı zî-
şânı).322 However, his medical problems such as thyroid disease began to relapse 
quite often towards the end of 1906. Accordingly, the cabinet (Meclis-i Mahsûs-i 
Vükelâ) decided that the governmental gaps that occurred in the absence of Tahir 
Pasha could not be tolerated any longer because the provincial government of Van 
was very significant. Thus, they decided to appoint another person as a governor 
instead of Tahir Pasha and to appoint him to another governorship, suitable to his 
title after he recovered. Abdulhamid (İrâde-i Seniyye-i Hazret-i Hilâfet-penâhî) 
unwillingly approved this decision because Tahir Pasha remained completely loyal to 
him, and appointed another official instead on December 18, 1906. 
After recovering from illness, he was transferred to the governorship of 
Trabzon for a short time from June 10, 1907,
323
 to July 30, 1907.
324
 Before long, he 
was re-called to Bitlis in order to investigate a local conflict. Then, he was 
additionally appointed as the Head of the Investigation Committee for the Iran 
Border (Îran Hudûdu Hey’et-i Tahkîkıyyesi Riyâseti) by the approval of both 
Abdulhamid and the Grand Vizier on September 2, 1907.
325
 This appointment 
initiated a new era that changed his life significantly while affecting as well the lives 
of people who lived on the borderlands between the Ottoman and Qajar empires.  
 
There was a perception among the people who lived in the eastern provinces that all 
the officials of the empire represented the Sultan, so the officials had to behave 
according to the necessities of this link between the sultan and his subjects. 
Abdulhamid chose Tahir for the position indicated deliberately not randomly. This is 
evident from the marginal note the sultan added to Tahir’s appointment sheet.326 One 
can argue that Tahir’s local knowledge, ability and contributions to settle local 
disputes and mose between the rulers and the ruled, as demonstrated by his earlier 
performance in Bitlis and Van made him a prominent figure. His background 
endeared him to the majority of the population in the eastern provinces.  
His service during the border defining process, which was highly appreciated 
not only by Abdulhamid but also many Ottoman officials, raised him to the rank of 
vizier (Rütbe-i Sâmiyye-i Vezâret) on February 13, 1908, although there were some 
participants of the negotiations who frequently criticized him for his expansionist 
tendencies. Tahir Pasha continued to enjoy the central government’s confidence so 
long as Abdulhamid stayed on the throne. He became the sultan’s eye at the eastern 
margins of the empire in a critical time of period. Some other officials and 
commissioners anticipated this relationship between Abdulhamid and Tahir Pasha. 
For instance, Danyal Pasha implied to Wratislaw that Tahir Pasha pursued a secret 
agenda that was instructed directly from the Palace, and about which he did not talk 
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even to other commissioners.
327
 For that reason, he was one of the people who were 
highly affected by the dethronement of Abdulhamid, because CUP saw him as one of 
the loyal servants of the sultan. Actually, this perception of CUP initiated a new era 
for all officials who advocated the policies of Abdulhamid. Many of them were sent 
to exile and suppressed. For similar reasons, Tahir Pasha was frequently removed 
from his post, but the main reason was the skepticism of the CUP leadership about 
the employees of the old regime whom they thought were favoring the reign of 
Abdulhamid. 
Nevertheless, Tahir was recalled to duty several times, as the CUP did not 
have very many qualified and experienced administrators until they retired him due 
to his age and illnesses. Thus, we can see the 1908 movement as another turning 
point in his life, for reasons indicated above and because all the bureaucrats’ life 
underwent to experience fundamental changes and transformations after 1908. The 
border commission that he led did not continue long after 1908. After the 
commission was dissolved, Tahir Pasha was transferred to the governorship of 
Erzurum with a salary of twenty one thousand and five hundred qurushes on August 
27, 1908. However, he was paid a salary of twenty thousand qurushes plus a sum of 
two thousand qurushes earmarked for special expenses. They continued decreasing 
his salary until it became seventeen thousand qurushes without additional funds in 
1909. These constant salary decreases show that CUP was willing to discard such an 
experienced bureaucrat. 
He had to leave the governorship of Erzurum due to the decision of the 
Commission of Ordinances and Regulation under Domestic Affairs (Dâhiliyye 
Tensîk Komisyonu). It declared he did not have the capacity and stamina to 
administer the province. Finally, he was asked to retire on September 2, 1909 based 
on the eleventh article of the commission.
328
 There were also some other reasons 
why Tahir Pasha was removed from his post, including his reputation for having 
sympathies towards the reign of Abdulhamid II.  
CUP announced an Imperial rescript that linked Tahir Pasha with reactionary 
groups and dismissed him accordingly as they thought Tahir Pasha maintained 
contact with the counteractions against CUP in Erzurum. They blamed him for 
supporting and provoking those people in Erzurum who wanted to revive the reign of 
Abdulhamid. When CUP noticed this side of Tahir Pasha, they immediately 
discharged him, and appointed another official in his place, on May 30, 1910.
329
 As 
Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador in Istanbul, expressed in his annual report 
about Turkey in 1908, “the news of the Constitution was generally received in the 
Asiatic provinces with rejoicing, although in some cases employees of the old regime 
were roughly handled.”330 His analysis regarding how the people in the eastern 
provinces perceived the constitution is particularly striking. For instance, “[In] Van, 
Diyarbakir, and Musul, there was inability on the part of the population to 
accommodate themselves to the new idea of a common country, based on the 
principles of justice, fraternity, and equality.”331 The Kurds, who had more than 
those principles under the reign of Abdulhamid II, did not have a positive look on the 
proclamations of CUP. Under these circumstances, CUP reappointed Tahir Pasha to 
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Bitlis with a salary of twelve thousand and five hundred qurushes, on February 28, 
1910
332
.  
CUP’s act was compatible with the statements of the Ottoman officers who 
paid attention to the need to entrust Bitlis to a person who had the capacity to govern 
a province where fragile interrelations existed. Actually, the fragility came from the 
failure of the new governors to appreciate the conservative nature of Bitlis. For that 
reason, the bureaucracy needed an officer who had deep knowledge of the local 
people as well as experience about handling the fragility of the region.
333
  
In general, the salaries of the Ottoman officials corresponded to the 
qualifications and seniority of the official for the post to which he was appointed. 
The salaries could roughly change according to these parameters or, perhaps, salary 
changes occurred according to the hierarchy of the provincial administration system 
in general.  The decrease in salaries generally indicated that an official, whether high 
ranking or not, had constantly lost his importance for the bureaucracy. This pattern 
became more apparent when an official was denied additional duties that would 
bring extra income. In this case, Tahir Pasha was appointed to Musul as a governor 
from Bitlis with the same salary on July 14, 1910. The comparison of his salaries 
with the previous years indicates that there was a dramatic decrease in his payment 
as his salary decreased from twenty thousand to ten thousand qurushes.  
 The fluctuations in Tahir Pasha’s career continued in these years. CUP’s 
intervention in politics was quite normative. They expected to create a rapid change 
in order to break away from practices of the reign of Abdulhamid, but they had to 
lean on the legacy of the old regime. Tahir Pasha was victim of this transition period 
because CUP treated him unjustly. Neither his personality nor the environment in 
which he worked appears to have been well prepared for such a grand change in 
state-society relations. They suspected him again, of establishing close relations with 
those groups who were trying to revive the reign of Abdulhamid, and considered this 
link as a significant weakness for his governmental capacity.
334
 However, it was 
impossible, for a senior bureaucrat, who was aged and spent his entire career in the 
eastern provinces under Abdulhamid, simply to forget the influences of his reign and 
to adapt to a new civil officialdom, which CUP had just begun to shape. The salary 
cuts became prevalent throughout the empire for the sake of balancing the budget. In 
fact, they did not pay Tahir Pasha’s pension. For this reason, he wrote a petition 
demanding his pension, as he did not have any other source of income. Instead of 
allowing Tahir Pasha a pension, the Ministry of Internal Affairs asked whether Tahir 
Pasha could work for a ministry or not. In a note dating December 1, 1912, they 
simply decided that Tahir Pasha could actually work, when he was sixty-three years 
old and suffered from thyroid disease in 1912.
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E. BRITISH TRANLSATION OF SECOND TREATY OF ERZURUM 
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F. THE JOINT MAP OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN 
 
 
 
 
Reduced from the Anglo-Russian “Identic Map” completed in 1869 (communicated to the 
Ottoman Government in 1869, and to the Iranian Government in 1870). 
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I. THE PICTURES OF TAHIR PASHA AND WRATISLAW 
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Mr A. C. Wratislaw
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A Consul-General in the Levant Consular Service.  
He served at Basra as Consul and later at Tabriz as Consul-General.  
He was observer of the British interests during the Boundary Negotiations 
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